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Article
Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor:
New Governance, New Accountability, and a
2 1st Century War on the Sources of Poverty
Tara J. Melisht
In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson called for a Nationwide War on the
Sources of Poverty to "strike away the barriers to full participation" in
our society. Central to that war was an understanding that given
poverty's complex and multi-layered causes, identifying, implementing,
and monitoring solutions to it would require the "maximum feasible
participation" of affected communities. Equally central, however, was an
understanding that such decentralized problem-solving could not be fully
effective without national-level orchestration and support. As such, an
Office of Economic Opportunity was established - situated in the
Executive Office of the President itself - to support, through
encouragement, funding, and coordination, the development and
implementation of community-based plans of action for poverty
alleviation, as identified and prioritized by the poor themselves.
This Article urges a return to this practical, locally-responsive, yet
federally-orchestrated orientation of U.S. social welfare law. It argues that
while the regulatory and political context of the 1960s provided
inauspicious ground for the early "maximum feasible participation"
t Associate Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, University at Buffalo
School of Law (SUNY). J.D., Yale Law School, 2000; B.A., Brown University, 1996. Early
versions of this article were presented at the Junior Faculty Workshop on Poverty Law at
American University Washington College of Law and the 2008 Junior International Law
Scholars Association meeting. Special thanks are owed to all participants, particularly to
Louise Trubek and Susan Bennett for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
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policy to effectively take root, four decades later, two broad paradigm
shifts have yielded a new, more fertile opportunity framework. The first
involves the shift in U.S. regulatory law away from earlier command-and-
control structures favoring fixed rules and centralized enforcement,
toward a New Governance model that privileges decentralization,
flexibility, stakeholder participation, performance indicators, and guided
discretion. The second is the concurrent paradigm shift in U.S. social
movement approaches to poverty - what I call "New Accountability" -
which similarly promotes local voice and inclusive participation,
performance monitoring around human rights standards, and negotiated
policymaking (rather than non-negotiable material demands and mass
confrontation, the preferred tactics of 1960s activism). Supported by a
renewed U.S. interest in collecting and reporting performance indicators
for government programs, these two shifts converge to create a theory and
policy-based environment in which it is both practically feasible and
normatively coherent to re-embrace the participatory orientation of the
early "War on the Sources of Poverty" strategy.
The challenge for U.S. social welfare rights law, I argue, is how to bring
these two complementary paradigms together in constructive synergy to
mount a 21st century battle against poverty. A set of national
subsidiarity-based institutions to support this effort is proposed, each
mandated to orchestrate and competitively incentivize targeted anti-
poverty efforts by all social stakeholders, while opening new institutional
spaces for the active participation of the poor in all aspects of meeting the
nation's poverty reduction targets.
INTRODUCTION
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that the poor have a
constitutional right to be heard in a meaningful manner before subsistence-
based entitlements are terminated.' While the case-specific holding of
Goldberg v. Kelly was narrow, limited to the procedural scope of the Due
Process Clause where statutory subsistence entitlements are
administratively terminated,2 the Court's decision derived from a much
broader principle of democratic self-governance and public accountability:
the imperative of ensuring that the poor have the "same opportunities that
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2. This scope was found to extend to a right to meaningful participation in judicial
processes undertaken to correct arbitrary bureaucratic action affecting subsistence-based
entitlements.
2 [Vol. 13
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community."3
This principle of participatory self-governance, self-consciously
inclusive of the poor, did not emerge sui generis from the Court's 1970
opinion. It derived from the normative milieu and formal political
commitments of the 1960s in which Kelly was briefed and argued.' That era
was one in which meaningful participation of the poor in identifying
barriers to economic opportunity and defining poverty-alleviation
strategies came to be seen as core to American democracy and post-war
progress. Nowhere was this vision better exemplified than in President
Lyndon B. Johnson's 1964 federal commitment to wage a "Nationwide War
on the Sources of Poverty." In declaring that war, President Johnson
affirmed the "total commitment" of the Executive, the Congress, and the
nation "to strike away the barriers to full participation in our society," as a
means of addressing the profound inequalities of opportunity in post-war
American society.
To implement that commitment, Congress passed the 1964 Economic
Opportunity Act, one of a series of coordinated federal anti-poverty
programs designed to equalize opportunity and participatory engagement
in all aspects of social, economic, civic, and political life.! That Act, like the
War on the Sources of Poverty as a whole, had two distinct, yet equally
essential components. The first, organized under Titles I, III, IV, and V,
comprised a new set of federal legislative entitlement programs.
Supplemented by other anti-poverty policies of the Great Society
legislative agenda,' these federally-financed programs were designed to
3. 397 U.S. at 265.
4. Justice Brennan identified its source more broadly as "the Nation's basic commitment
[from its founding] ... to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders."
Id. at 264-65.
5. President's Special Message to Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of
Poverty, 1 PUB. PAPERS 375-80 (Mar. 16, 1964) [hereinafter LBJ Special Message to Congress].
As President Johnson announced to Congress in proposing his Nationwide War, "The war on
poverty is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity
of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance ... an effort to allow them to develop and use
their capacities, as we have been allowed to develop and use ours, so that they can share, as
others share, in the promise of this nation." Id. at 376.
6. These inequalities and their impact on America's poor, estimated at forty to fifty
million, were increasingly being documented in this era of otherwise robust economic growth.
See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).
This growing witness led President John F. Kennedy to declare "a basic attack on the
problems of poverty and waste of human resources" to be a central feature of the 1964
legislative program, a program developed and implemented by the administration of
President Lyndon B. Johnson. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE
MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY xiv (1969).
7. The Act defined the elimination of poverty as "the policy of the United States."
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, 508 (repealed 1981) (to
be achieved by "opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the
opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity."). This policy was
established under the express understanding that "Itihe United States can achieve its full
economic and social potential as a nation only if every individual has the opportunity to
contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings of our
society." Id.
8. The Great Society as it related to poverty consisted not only of the Economic
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open new job opportunities in the labor market and to build human
capacity through new services aimed at job training, work-study, adult
basic education, school improvements, loans to rural families, and
increased access to health care, child care, and legal services.
The drafters of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act nonetheless
understood that while such federal programs were necessary to any
serious poverty alleviation initiative, they were insufficient by themselves.
Without a congruent focus on community-based participation from below,
they could not ensure that the practical day-to-day barriers to opportunity
experienced by the nation's poor (including barriers institutionalized in the
administration of poverty programs themselves) were systematically
identified and targeted for removal. Nor could they ensure that community
leadership, ingenuity, and resources were being effectively mobilized to
find proactive solutions to the most serious causes of poverty identified
locally in each community. Accordingly, proceeding on the understanding
that neither voting rights,' federal income supports,"o nor top-down
professional provision of social services to the poor" by themselves were
sufficient to guarantee equal opportunity and responsive policy solutions
for all social sectors, especially historically marginalized ones, Title II of the
Act mandated "the maximum feasible participation" of affected communities
in the development, implementation, and administration of programs
aimed at eliminating the causes of poverty.12
To establish a coordinating structure through which such participatory
engagement could be effectuated, the Act thus authorized federal funding
for the establishment of locally-administered community action programs
(CAPs). Designed to mobilize local action and stimulate neighborhood
involvement in the implementation of innovative, community-owned
poverty-alleviation activities and strategies, such programs aimed to "give
every American community the opportunity to develop a comprehensive
plan to fight its own poverty."" Indeed, as President Johnson himself
declared, community action plans based on maximum feasible
participation would be "based on the fact that local citizens best
Opportunity Act of 1964, but also a long list of other anti-poverty policies and programs,
including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Food Stamp Act of
1964, Medicare and Medicaid, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Head
Start, neighborhood health centers, Foster Grandparents, Upward Bound, and neighborhood
legal services (not the Legal Services Corporation). See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Toward a
Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1712-13
(1993) [hereinafter Edelman, Silver Bullet].
9. As guaranteed in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §1971 (2006).
10. As guaranteed to qualified recipients in the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat.
620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
11. See infra Part I, for further discussion.
12. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(a), 78 Stat. 508, 516
(repealed 1981).
13. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5 ("This program asks men and women
throughout the country to prepare long-range plans for the attack on poverty in their own
local communities."). The program thereby intended to "strike at poverty at its source - in the
streets of our cities and on the farms of our countryside among the very young and the
impoverished old." Id.
[Vol. 134
Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor
understand their own problems, and know best how to deal with those
problems";" as such, they would be able to "strik[e] at the many untilled
needs which underlie poverty in each community, not just one or two,"
with "components and emphasis [differing] as needs differ." 5
At the same time, to ensure that this community-based problem-
solving infrastructure did not degenerate into "a series of uncoordinated
and unrelated efforts - that it perish for lack of leadership and direction""
- the Act went on to create an Office of Economic Opportunity. Through
this national headquarters on poverty alleviation, housed in the Executive
Office of the President and directed by the President's personal Chief of
Staff for the War on Poverty," the government was to act in an essential
orchestrating role, "help[ing] [communities] to carry out their plans""
through concerted federal oversight, coordination, information sharing,
and financial assistance.
In structuring its War on Poverty, the Johnson administration did not
then understand the proper role of government as providing a one-stop
federal solution to poverty "prepared in Washington and imposed upon
hundreds of different situations."'9 Rather, promoting "a creative
federalism,"' it understood its role as affirmatively supporting,
coordinating, and orchestrating a plurality of solutions percolating up from
the grassroots where "the causes, not just the consequences of poverty,"2'
could best be identified and where proposed solutions could be most
attentive to localized needs, democratic experimentalism, cross-
jurisdictional learning, and continuously evolving priorities.
This Article urges a return to this practical, locally-responsive, yet
federally-orchestrated orientation of U.S. social welfare law. Specifically, it
calls for a new twenty-first century Nationwide War on the Sources of
Poverty that, like its predecessor, takes the active participation of those
most affected by poverty, and their recognition within a nationally-
orchestrated institutional framework of participatory planning,
monitoring, evaluation, and review, as its central motivating policy
commitment. Most importantly, it argues that given two coinciding
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. ("I do not intend that the war against poverty become a series of uncoordinated
and unrelated efforts - that it perish for lack of leadership and direction.").
17. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 601 (a), 78 Stat. 508, 528
(repealed 1981); LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5 ("[The Act] will give the entire
nation the opportunity for a concerted attack on poverty through the establishment, under my
direction, of the Office of Economic Opportunity, a national headquarters for the war against
poverty.... Its Director will be my personal Chief of Staff for the War against poverty.").
18. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5.
19. Id.
20. President Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan, 1 PUB PAPERS 704, 706 (May
22, 1964) ("The solution to these [national social] problems does not rest on a massive
program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the strained resources of local authority.
They require us to create new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the
National Capital and the leaders of local communities.").
21. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5 ("[The Act] charts a new course. It
strikes at the causes, not just the consequences of poverty.").
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paradigm shifts in the domestic policy environment - one in the regulatory
apparatus, the other in social movement organizing strategies - the
political moment for reengaging this participatory approach to poverty
alleviation has never been more propitious than it is today.
In advancing this argument, this Article seeks to add an important and
underrepresented voice to the growing chorus calling for a new approach
to national poverty in the United States. This rising chorus reflects a
mounting consensus that U.S. poverty levels, the highest amongst
industrialized countries," are intolerable in the world's wealthiest nation,
that too many hardworking people have fallen through the system's
cracks, and that government can and must do more. Indeed, voting
majorities today indicate that poverty is either "the single most important
priority" facing the nation or a "top priority for Congress and the
President."' Standing at thirty-seven million, or 12.6 percent of the
population, the number of people living below the federal poverty line has
grown by millions over the last decade, with record numbers, 17.1 million,
experiencing extreme poverty.24 In 2008, over forty-nine million people
lived in food-insecure households, the highest level since official data was
first tracked fourteen years ago.' These numbers have only worsened with
22. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FROM POVERTY TO PROSPERITY: A NATIONAL
STRATEGY TO CUT POVERTY IN HALF 11 (2007) (U.S. ranks twenty-fourth of twenty-five
developed nations when measuring the share of the population with income below fifty
percent of the national median income, followed only by Mexico); Legal Momentum, Welfare
Benefits and Child Poverty: A Cross-Country Comparison 1-3 (2009) (among seventeen high
income democracies U.S. ranks last with respect to its child poverty rate, which at twenty-one
percent stands at more than double the 10 percent average of the other sixteen nations).
23. Zogby International, Zogby Poll: Majority Call Fighting Poverty a "Top Priority" (June 4,
2007), http:/ /www.zogby.com/news/readnews.cfm?ID=1320 (last visited Feb. 22, 2009)
(documenting fifty-eight percent voter support for these statements, while a similar percent
declares itself more likely to support a candidate who would "set a national goal of cutting
poverty in half within a decade"); see also THOMAS Z. FREEDMAN ET AL., ALLIANCE TO END
HUNGER AND SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY, NEW ATTITUDES ABOUT POVERTY
AND HUNGER: THE RISE OF THE "Do RIGHT" VOTER AND OTHER LESSONS FROM RECENT
RESEARCH (Oct. 30, 2007), http:/ /www.spotlightonpoverty.org/users/spotlight-on-poverty
/documents/Alliance%20to%2OEnd%20Hunger%2OPoll.pdf (noting that fifty-four percent of
Americans do not believe "political candidates have spent an adequate amount of time
discussing hunger and poverty issues").
24. From 2000 to 2006, the number of people living below the federal poverty line in the
U.S. ($19,971 for a family of four) increased by five million, rising to 37 million Americans, or
12.6 percent of the population. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
(2006). At the same time, the number of Americans living in extreme poverty - with incomes
below half the poverty line, or less than $9,903 for a family of four - grew by over three
million, with the share of poor people living in extreme poverty "now greater than at any
point in the last 32 years." CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 22, at 8 (citing Tony Pugh, The
U.S. Economy Leaving Record Numbers in Severe Poverty, McClatchy Newspapers (Feb. 23,
2007)); see also Peter Edelman & Barbara Ehrenreich, Why Welfare Reform Fails is Recession Test,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2009 (from 2000 to 2008, people living in extreme poverty in U.S. grew
from 12.6 million to 17.1 million). From 1995 to 2004 the number of single-mother families
with combined annual incomes from public assistance and work of less than $3,000 increased
by fifty-six percent, to stand at 1.7 million. See Rebecca Blank, Improving the Safety Net for Single
Mothers Who Face Serious Barriers to Work, 17 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 183, 186 (2007).
25. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008 (2009).
Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor
the 2009 economic recession. In fact, poverty rates have not appreciably
declined in the United States since the period between 1964 and 1973, the
last time poverty alleviation was made an explicit national priority. During
that period, poverty rates fell by forty-two percent in the United States.7
Anti-poverty advocates have, correspondingly, increasingly
emphasized the imperative of a new national commitment to poverty
elimination. A series of specific proposals have been offered as the
legislative basis of this recommitment, almost all for new or expanded
government safety-net programs. These include raising and indexing the
minimum wage to half the average hourly wage, expanding the Earned
Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, guaranteeing child care assistance
to low-income families, promoting unionization, expanding federal
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments, ensuring
equity for low-wage workers in the Unemployment Insurance system, and
expanding and simplifying the Saver's Credit, amongst many others.'
Notably absent amidst these calls, however, is anything even remotely
akin to the early War on Poverty's "maximum feasible participation"
component. This is true even as the early War's successes in reducing
poverty are repeatedly invoked. This Article seeks to fill that troubling
void. It argues that, just as President Johnson's War on the Sources of
Poverty envisioned a wide series of national entitlement programs -
including Medicare and Medicaid, Head Start, Job Corps, and expanded
access to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) - together with
community-based plans and programs of action based on "maximum
feasible participation" of affected communities, so too must current
initiatives look through dual lenses. The challenge is how to tie these two
components together in a national orchestrating structure, ensuring that
the practical obstacles, lessons, and solutions identified at the local level by
intended beneficiaries can in fact be channeled effectively to influence, in a
regular manner, the design and modification of targeted anti-poverty
programs at local, state, and national levels.
It is important to underscore, in this respect, the parameters of my
argument. In calling for a return to the dual emphases of Johnson's earlier
war, this Article focuses its lens on only one of those components: the
"maximum feasible participation" (MFP) component. Specifically, it
26. See, e.g., Jason DeParle & Robert Gebeloff, Food Stamp Use Soars, and Stigma Fades, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009 (noting that one in eight Americans and one in four children now receive
food stamps, while representing only two-thirds of those eligible to receive them).
27. See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 22, at 16.
28. See, e.g., id. at 16, 26-58 (proposing a strategy of twelve specific policies to reach a goal
of halving national poverty within ten years, and citing a study estimating that just four of
them would successfully reduce poverty by twenty-six percent) (report and recommendations
compiled by blue-ribbon Task Force on Poverty, composed of leading academic and think-
tank authorities on poverty, convened to examine the causes and consequences of poverty in
America and make recommendations for national action); CTR. FOR CMTY CHANGE ET AL.,
BATTERED BY THE STORM: How THE SAFETY NET IS FAILING AMERICANS AND How To Fix IT
(2009) (offering comprehensive relief plan of job creation, state and local fiscal relief, and
safety net improvements, including expansion of federal TANF payments).
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focuses on how and why that component must be recovered in any modern
national poverty alleviation initiative. This focus is vital given that the need
for participatory channels through which the input and knowledge base of
the poor can effectively be tapped has not been part of the national
conversation since the 1960s.2 Consequently, this Article does not speak to
the set of national-level entitlement-based social safety-net programs that
should, and must necessarily, be a part of any effective anti-poverty
campaign. Rather, the crux of this Article is to insist that no set of
government entitlement programs, on their own, can address the depth
and complexity of U.S. poverty without a congruent focus on
institutionalizing community-based participation in corresponding poverty
alleviation efforts."
In urging a national re-embrace of the core tenets of Johnson's MFP
policy, this Article nonetheless remains acutely attentive to what is perhaps
the most formidable argument against it: the difficulty of overcoming the
powerful political legacy that survives practical experience with the early
MFP policy. Indeed, despite the community-based activity, enthusiasm,
and benefits (both tangible and intangible) it promoted at the grassroots, 32
29. Indeed, current efforts to recover the national anti-poverty commitment of the sixties
have been notable in their omission of any reference to "maximum feasible participation," a
policy that remains crippled by its association with the tactics of the early national welfare
rights movement in the United States. That movement, given its consumerist, material-
demand bent, has been widely criticized as one of the great errors of post-war history.
30. That effort has, and will continue to be, undertaken by others. See, e.g., supra note 28.
Special mention should be made here of Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity, a foundation-
led, non-partisan initiative that brings together diverse perspectives from the political, policy,
advocacy, and foundation communities aimed at "ensuring that U.S. political leaders take
significant actions to reduce poverty and increase opportunity in the United States." See
Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity, http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org (last visited Feb.
21, 2010).
31. In this regard, nothing in this Article should be read as a proposal to substitute local
policy-making processes and micro-projects for national policy-making processes and
structural or macro-policy reforms. Rather, both levels need to be strengthened and, most
importantly, tied together through a nationally-orchestrated system of monitoring and review to
ensure that policies are working at all levels to in fact improve the human welfare outcomes
for which they have been instituted. Where such outcomes are not achieved, stakeholder
input - especially from intended beneficiaries on the reasons programs were less effective than
expected - needs to be channeled in a way that it can be heard by policymakers and actively
taken into consideration in flexible and responsive program modification or amelioration
efforts, within a structure of stakeholder accountability.
32. See, e.g., DANIEL YANKELOVICH, INC., OFFICE OF EcON. OPPORTUNITY, DETAILED
FINDINGS OF STUDY TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS ON
SELECTED COMMUNITIES AND THEIR Low INCOME RESIDENTS 8-9 (1967) ("[Tihe large majority
of the poor reached by CAA programs report significant changes in their own and their
children's lives as a result of their participation. For their children, they report improvements
both in school and at home. For themselves, they report a mix of tangible and intangible
benefits including new jobs, special trainings, more earnings, education, stretching available
dollars further, improvement of neighborhoods, and increased hope, self-respect and
confidence in the future (mixed with an intense impatience especially on the part of the Negro
families to share in the affluence they see in the rest of the society)."); ARTHUR WHITE, CAP
PROGRAMS AND THEIR EVALUATION: A MANAGEMENT REPORT 8-16 (1967) (synthesizing and
evaluating accomplishments of CAP programs).
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that policy has widely been perceived as a failure.3 ' Across the mainstream
political spectrum it has been credited with entrenching an entitlement
culture that, far from fostering local initiative and problem-solving
capacity, functioned to sap personal initiative and to create a permanent
sub-class of welfare recipients dependent on federal handouts." Breaking
the resulting cycle of dependency has subsequently become a major policy
goal of social welfare policy, with "rights" talk and participation of poor
communities seen as a core part of the problem, not part of the solution."
Within this context, any call to affirmatively re-embrace the
participatory, rights-based framework of Johnson's early MFP policy must
explain why such a model would have a different impact today than it did
in the 1960s. It must also explain how, once such a program were put in
place, appropriate "buy-in" by relevant actors could be assured. Such buy-
in must come both from the regulatory apparatus, which has for nearly
four decades resisted a participatory orientation that includes recipient
communities, and by poor communities themselves, who for an equal
number of decades have felt pushed out of and marginalized by politics.
This Article takes up both challenges. It does so by reexamining the
environment in which the MFP policy was introduced, and contrasting that
with the environment that exists today. Specifically, I argue that while the
political and regulatory context of the 1960s provided inauspicious ground
in which Johnson's MFP policy could effectively take root - indeed, that
policy was largely defunded and in disarray within a few years" - a new
opportunity framework exists today, four decades later, that offers a
distinctly more amenable environment in both its theoretical foundations
and practical policy-orientations for facilitating an institutionalized
participatory role for the poor, as democratic stakeholders, in defining the
policies that affect them.
That environment is one defined by two broad paradigm shifts. The
first is the rise of "New Governance" approaches to regulatory law,
displacing both the earlier "social work" and "legal-bureaucratic" models
that dominated twentieth-century social welfare policy and, accordingly,
33. This perception of failure was as true in the late 1960s as it is today. See, e.g.,
MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 136-42 (documenting failures); S.M. Miller & Pamela Roby, The
War on Poverty Reconsidered, in POVERTY: VIEWS FROM THE LEFr (Irving Howe & Jeremy Larner,
eds. 1968) (concluding policy brought about little change, produced few supporters, and
brought on "enormous dissatisfaction"); Edelman, Silver Bullet, supra note 8, at 1713-16
(identifying Community Action, the principle implementing policy of "maximum feasible
participation," as one of only two programs under the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act that
could credibly be called a failure).
34. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 56-57, 139-142.
35. Id. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOuRSE (1991) (arguing that absolutist rights talk in the United States privileges
hyperindividualism at the expense of social responsibility).
36. The most active community action agencies (CAAs) were effectively defunded by
1968, while the Office of Economic Opportunity was closed in 1972. See infra text
accompanying notes 275-284. CAAs were not, however, disbanded; approximately one
thousand continue to operate in the United States, albeit without the benefit of a federal
orchestrating body. See About Community Action Agencies, http://www.cap-
dayton.org/about (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
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defined the political context within which poor people's social movements
organized to secure their rights. The second is the rise of what I call "New
Accountability" strategies from grassroots organizations of the poor.
Unlike their U.S.-based 1960s forbears, these strategies do not focus on
absolutist politics and nonnegotiable demands for fixed sums of money
and consumer goods as a solution to poverty." Rather, they consist of
increasingly sophisticated institutional-engagement initiatives that,
drawing upon process-oriented human rights methodologies, insist upon
inclusive participation in policymaking, orchestrated goal-setting and
performance monitoring, targets and concrete plans of action, and a
framework of political accountability in which the poor have a recognized
and secure voice."
Brought together, these two shifts not only mutually complement each
other - strengthening the other's core weaknesses - but, if constructively
merged as the basis of a national recommitment to poverty alleviation, in
fact recreate the decentralized policy environment in which the
participatory orientation of the early War on Poverty was originally
conceived - and, I argue, if structured properly, could effectively be
recovered today.
The Article offers, in this regard, two critical insights aimed at filling
important gaps in the academic and policy literature. The first is that new
governance and new accountability, as theory-based frameworks of action,
embrace an effectively identical set of organizational precepts and guiding
principles. These include a shared policy preference for decentralization
and broad stakeholder participation, flexible results-oriented policy
planning, coordinated public-private partnerships, innovation and
competitive experimentalism, rigorous monitoring and performance
evaluation, and nationally-orchestrated incentive systems around defined
performance goals and targets. While enormous scholarly attention has
been directed to describing these organizational tenets in new governance
theory," virtually none has focused on the congruent tenets that structure
and organize new accountability. Nor has attention been directed to how
the deficiencies characteristic of each framework are in fact constructively
addressed by the complementary reinforcement of the other. As such, the
necessity and feasibility of their constructive merger within a new national
orchestrating structure has yet to be addressed.
37. The term "new accountability" has likewise been used to describe local school
governance structures in the U.S. as well as in the context of a "new corporate accountability."
See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183,
229-31 (2003) (discussing "new accountability" in school governance); THE NEW CORPORATE
AccouNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (D. McBarnet et al. eds.,
2007). The "new accountability" agenda discussed here is broader in scope and less
centralized in the setting of performance goals than these other models, as discussed in Part
III, infra.
38. See discussion infra Part III.A.
39. See discussion infra Part III.B.
40. See, e.g., infra notes 115-125.
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The second critical insight, viewable only when new governance and
new accountability are considered at their constructive interface, is that it is
precisely upon their shared organizational precepts that the War on
Poverty's MFP policy idea was conceptually constructed. That idea
likewise derived from a programmatic commitment to flexible policy
planning, innovative learning and competitive experimentalism,
decentralization and broad stakeholder participation, coordinated public-
private partnerships, rigorous performance monitoring, and federal
orchestration. While the War on Poverty was in fact implemented in a 1960s
political and regulatory environment that increasingly eschewed those
principles in favor of centralized bureaucracy, fixed-rules, and militant
rights absolutism - contributing to the policy's rapid political unraveling -
the convergence of new governance and new accountability in the twenty-
first century provides a uniquely propitious environment for its modern re-
embrace. This is particularly true with respect to new accountability's
conceptual delinking of participation of the poor from the dominant tactics
embraced by social movements of the 1960s.
Within this context, the central policy challenge faced today remains
the same as in 1964: how to create a new set of era-appropriate national
orchestration mechanisms and policy arrangements through which the
voices and constructive inputs of the poor - those best situated to identify
day-to-day barriers to opportunity - can continually be taken into account
by the regulatory apparatus in practical social-welfare policymaking. Such
institutional mechanisms serve not only as an essential check and
reinforcement on effective and responsive policy implementation, but also
to ensure that all stakeholders, including particularly the poor, feel part of
a common project of mutual responsibility and community ownership in
overcoming the sources of poverty. The institutionalization and operation
of such mechanisms thus serves both instrumental and intrinsic-value
ends, each as vital today as they were in our nation's first War on the
Sources of Poverty.
Perhaps nowhere is this challenge more timely and urgent than in the
field of social welfare policy. In 1996, in a solid embrace of new governance
theory, Congress passed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act ("PRWORA" or "Welfare Reform Act") under the
promise to "change welfare as we know it."" Tasked with the goal of
reducing the welfare rolls and getting recipients back into the workforce,
the policy has been hailed a great success, with government-defined
performance measures being continually met, even exceeded.4 2 Yet, levels
of economic hardship, deprivation, and exclusion of the poor from both
41. See infra notes 138-139.
42. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, the number of welfare
recipients has declined by almost two-thirds since 1996, falling from 4.8 million families with
9 million children in 1995 to 1.9 million families with 3.5 million children in 2006. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 2008 Appendix A at A-8 (2008), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/Indicators08/apa.pdf.
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social life and the political process have been on a noted rise, with poverty
rates in fact rising and disillusionment in ascent. 3 Although new
governance theory touts stakeholder participation as a guiding principle,
the poor have been left with ever less power within the PRWORA
regulatory relationship. Social movements of the poor have responded by
turning to new accountability strategies." Indeed, with increasingly few
outlets for promoting the dignity-based interests of marginalized sectors
within institutional regulatory spaces, new efforts are underway to create
extra-institutional spaces in which poor people's voices, concerns, and
proposed solutions can be meaningfully heard." Such civil society
initiatives have nonetheless to date remained almost entirely unrecognized
by and marginalized from institutional processes of new governance
performance review. As such, despite the enormous potential they offer,
they have had little practical effect on altering regulatory conduct and
hence improving the performance of anti-poverty programs from a human
dignity vantage.
A national recommitment to poverty alleviation in the United States
would seek to remedy this important regulatory failure. Guided by a
renewed U.S. interest in collecting and reporting performance indicators
for government programs, such a policy would constructively draw
together the best features of new governance and new accountability
regimes, thereby redressing the deficiencies that invariably arise when each
operates to the exclusion of the other. Specifically, it would tie together the
performance-based orchestrating structures of new governance regulatory
regimes with the critical information inputs produced by grassroots new
accountability movements, themselves equally committed to meaningful,
participatory engagement in results-oriented performance monitoring and
rights-based assessment or review. By doing so, a twenty-first century
groundwork may be laid for politically recommitting as a nation to what
President Johnson, forty years ago, aptly called "the great unfinished work
of our society."
To this end, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I turns back to the
key motivating understandings that animated the early War on Poverty,
and specifically its most currently underappreciated or misunderstood
component: the policy of MFP. It recalls, in this regard, the underlying
conceptual and policy motivations that insisted that MFP be part of a
national strategy against poverty, and why it was understood that a
program based on legislatively mandated entitlements programs alone
would not be capable of eliminating the complex sources of poverty in
America's many communities. It concludes that while the MFP policy was,
in practice, used in ways unanticipated by the original drafters, that
historical fact does not diminish the modern relevance of full stakeholder
participation in social welfare policy design. Nor does it speak to how the
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. See Part III infra.
45. See discussion infra Part III.B.
46. LB Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 376.
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concept of MFP would predictably be used today, particularly under a
different structure, given key changes in the political and regulatory
environment of the twenty-first century.
Parts II and III directly address these key political and regulatory
changes. Part II begins by reviewing the oft-noted and widely celebrated
paradigm shift in U.S. regulatory law from one of top-down command-
and-control regulation to more decentralized new governance or reflexive
law regimes. In reviewing this shift, Part II highlights not only the theory
and policy-based arguments supporting it, but also the principal
shortcomings repeatedly identified in the practical roll-out and
implementation of such regimes, particularly those governing housing,
welfare, health care, job training, and other forms of social assistance that
have the greatest impact on the poor. It takes the 1996 Welfare Reform Act
as its analytical point of departure.
Part III then turns to the far less examined - yet equally important -
paradigm shift in the rights-based strategies of historically marginalized
groups, including those of the poor. While the late 1960s was characterized
by both an increasing centralization of regulatory control over social
welfare policies and an ever more absolutist rights discourse from
organizations of the poor," the 1990s and early twenty-first century has
brought with them a radical reversal of both trends. This reversal likewise
reflects a changing global marketplace and the new democratic
opportunities and challenges that accompany it. Within this environment, a
new movement of the poor has emerged that is demanding not
nonnegotiable material entitlements, but rather voice and participation in
the decisionmaking processes that determine the content of social welfare
policies that affect them. That is, human rights law, and the subsidiarity-
based institutional framework it represents, is being used by the poor
precisely to overcome, from below, the democratic deficiencies that
scholars and stakeholders have long noted in the day-to-day
administration of new governance regulatory regimes. These include, most
notably, the limited opportunities for low-income beneficiaries to
participate as full stakeholders, the lack of performance-based indicators
and benchmarks that can serve as a metric for human well-being (rather
than numerical service delivery targets), and the inadequacy of federal
orchestration of locally-devolved authority.
These public accountability failures have been identified across the
regulatory spectrum. Given this, academic assessments of PRWORA
regularly conclude with a call for further study of new forms of public
accountability that can bring the practice of new governance better into line
with its celebrated theory. In the welfare law context, such assessments
47. See, e.g., FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATELE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY
IN MODERN AMERICA (2007) (discussing the era of anti-poverty activism in the 1960s).
48. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) (urging that scholars, policymakers,
and advocates focus their attention on developing new mechanisms to provide effective
public participation in administrative policymaking and implementation); Michele Estrin
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have nevertheless tended to focus on narrow court-centric legal protections
for individual recipients: enhanced due process requirements, increased
resort to fair hearings, and the identification of new individual causes of
action against service providers. While these legalistic appeals -
reminiscent of the prior legal-bureaucratic model - are sounded by legal
academics from above, it is nevertheless grassroots organizations of the
poor from below, using trans-jurisdictional human rights strategies and
resources, that are engaging in innovative strategies on their own terms to
fill the accountability void. They are doing so by demanding the opening of
new spaces in which they can insert their voice and be heard as full
democratic stakeholders in the policy-based decisionmaking that affects
them.
Indeed, under such banners as "don't talk about us, talk with us"' and
"nothing about us, without us,"51 organizations of those historically
marginalized from political processes are seeking ways to make themselves
heard, building institutional commitments and demanding participation
within them. They want to speak for themselves, not, as has typically been
expected of them, through lawyers, social workers, planners, politicians,
academics, or other advocates seeking to speak in representation of their
interests.52 They wish to reclaim a space for themselves, to cast off notions
Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001); Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229
(2003).
49. See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1994); Gilman, supra note 48, at 569; David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a
Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998); Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement
After Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 13 (2005).
50. This is the identifying phrase of Picture the Homeless, a U.S.-based advocacy group
founded and led by homeless people in New York City who aim to make homelessness visible
to America. See PICTURE THE HOMELESS, HOMELESS PEOPLE COUNT 6 (2007). The organization's
mission statement affirms, "We refuse to accept being neglected, and we demand that our
voices and experience are heard at all levels of decision-making that impact us." Id.
51. "Nothing about us, without us" is the organizational refrain used by the global
disability community in insisting on broad and active participation of persons with disabilities
in the drafting, implementation, and monitoring of the new U.N. Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and its implementing legislation in nations around the world. See
Tara J. Melish, The U.N. Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the
U.S. Should Ratify, 14(2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 37, 43-44 (2007). International recognition of this
direct participation imperative is reflected in articles 4.3 and 33.3 of the Convention, which
require States Parties to "closely consult with and actively involve" persons with disabilities
and their representative organizations in the implementation and development of legislation
and policies to give effect to the Convention, as well as in its monitoring and supervision. Id.;
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities arts. 4.3 & 33.3, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Disability Convention].
52. An extensive literature on the "theoretics of practice" movement deals with the
importance of giving voice to poor clients in the courtroom representation process, allowing
them to participate more directly in defining case tasks and strategies, as a means of
promoting client autonomy and political strength. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the
Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535
(1988); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructing Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Binny
Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV.
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of their "inability" or "dependence," and instead compel the public and
government actors to see them as human beings with dignity, agency, and
a drive to be treated on the basis of equal opportunity - not charity or
paternalism. If there is to be a solution to poverty's many indignities and
practical day-to-day barriers to opportunity, they insist, it will not come
exclusively through case-by-case client representation in judicial
proceedings nor through national or local legislation framed without their
active participation and input. Rather, it must include them, as those best
situated to identify the most pervasive and abusive problems experienced
by the poor in their distinct communities, to locate their immediate as well
as structural causes, and hence to provide a roadmap of potential
responsive solutions at both the micro and macro levels. Local and national
organizations of the poor are thus increasingly taking up the self-
organizing banner of human rights law, its instrumental focus on
participation, transparency, non-discrimination, and accountability and a
corresponding insistence that they be heard as essential stakeholders in
democratic self-governance.
While the power and plurality of these voices are increasingly, if
abstractly, being acknowledged in constructivist and legal process accounts
of international law and jurisgenerative norm theory," they nevertheless
continue to be largely neglected in the more domestically-insular fields of
social welfare policy, domestic legislation, and regulatory law, particularly
in relation to low income groups. As such, the fact that this "new
accountability" model merges so closely with that of "new governance"
has yet to draw the attention it deserves. It is to this important disconnect,
and its relevance to promoting a new national poverty infrastructure in the
United States, that this Article responds.
Toward this end, Part IV proposes a set of nationally-orchestrated
institutional accountability and performance review arrangements
designed to draw together the principle tenets and subsidiarity
orientations of both new governance and new accountability theory. These
include: (1) a federally-articulated national commitment to poverty alleviation,
backed by a legislatively determined set of poverty reduction targets and
institutional incentive regimes; (2) a national office on poverty alleviation,
housed in the Executive Office of the President and mandated to
orchestrate national implementation of the poverty reduction targets at
local, state, and national levels; and (3) a national monitoring body, ideally in
the form of a national human rights commission, designed to stimulate
participatory engagement by affected communities in all aspects of local
485 (1995). This article does not address this literature directly given its principal focus on the
construction of institutional spaces outside the courtroom context, spaces in which the poor
can express their voice and relate their personal narratives to a larger community audience.
53. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L L.
301, 308 (2007) ("[Tlhe important points for the current generation of international law
theorists are that we need to think of international law as a global interplay of plural voices,
many of which are not associated with the state, and that we need to focus on how norms
articulated by a wide variety of communities end up having important impact in actual
practice, regardless of the degree of coercive power those communities wield.").
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and federal achievement of poverty reduction targets and plans of action.
Through these, it is concluded, the outlines of a normatively-coherent and
stakeholder-centered twenty-first century Nationwide War on the Sources
of Poverty may begin to be seen - one that can realistically, even
wholeheartedly, be embraced by advocates across the national political
spectrum as part of a collective project to reduce poverty and grow
opportunity throughout the nation.
Such a participatory project, it may be concluded, would serve to
emphasize the continuing relevance of Goldberg v. Kelly and, specifically, its
imperative of ensuring the participation of the poor in decisions affecting
livelihood rights. It would compellingly recall, in this regard, what Lucie
White identified twenty years ago as that decision's most enduring legacy:
an acknowledgment that public or private "hand-outs," no matter how
reliable, can never alleviate "the frustration and insecurity - the injustice -
of poverty. Rather, the deepest injustice of poverty will be alleviated only
as poor people secure the power to help decide what the substance of the
state's welfare policy should be."
I. MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION: THE POLICY CONCEPT AND EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
It might be assumed that no one in America could quarrel with the
idea that "maximum feasible participation" (MFP) of affected residents and
communities should be the basis of all policymaking in the United States.
Indeed, as U.S. schoolchildren are taught, it is upon this very notion that
American democracy is conceptually founded. And yet, the idea that poor
communities should be explicitly included in the implementation and
administration of anti-poverty policies and programs has, with the brief
exception of the 1960s, never been readily embraced in the United States,
where suspicions about the motivations, capacities, and competences of the
poor have long led to their social marginalization and political invisibility.'
Ironically, the 1960s experiment with community action based on MFP
of the poor only further hardened those suspicions for many. Former
Secretary of Health and Human Services in the George W. Bush
administration, Tommy Thompson, has claimed, for example, that welfare
rights activists in the 1960s and 70s "succeeded only in persuading him
that the [United States] was a society in trouble.... turn[ing] him into a
life-long opponent of public aid programs."' Even those who today seek to
54. Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 861, 877 (1990).
55. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1996) (discussing historical treatment of the poor in the United
States).
56. KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 10; see also Norman Atkins, Governor Get-A-Job: Tommy
Thompson, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, at 22 Uan. 15, 1995) (discussing Thompson's welfare reform
philosophy and policies as Governor of Wisconsin). Following the logic popularized by
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and recurrent in policy debate today that "We fought a war on
poverty and poverty won," proponents of this view tend to understand the policy as
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recover the national anti-poverty commitment of the sixties by invoking
the legislative successes of the early War on Poverty, steer markedly clear
of any reference to "maximum feasible participation," a policy that remains
crippled by its association with the militant tactics of the early national
welfare rights movement in the United States.17 Its legacy continues to
haunt current national debates on social welfare policy and poverty
alleviation.
Within this context, any call for a return to the MFP policy
commitments of the 1960s must necessarily explain to a predictably
reluctant policy audience two core questions: What is its practical utility?
That is, how can participation of the poor contribute to the achievement of
measurable poverty reductions? And, second, given traditional forms of
democratic participation, such as the periodic electoral vote, how can such
participation operationally be structured such that it complements, rather
than antagonizes, the role of elected representative government in
policymaking?
In answering these questions, it is useful to begin by looking
backward, re-shining a light on the critical concept of "maximum feasible
participation," as it was used in the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act and as
it appears to have been understood by its drafters, sponsors, and
promoters. The following three sections thus address, respectively, the
theory that motivated the early MFP policy, the structure that policy was
given in the War on Poverty, and what appears to have gone wrong in
translating that theory into measurable achievements in the 1960s social
environment. It concludes that the fact that the MFP policy was, in practice,
used in ways unanticipated by the original drafters does not diminish the
continuing vitality of the policy concept nor does it speak to how that
concept would, with greater forethought and planning, predictably be used
under a different structure and in a different policy environment, such as
today's.
A. The Policy Concept: Why Participation of the Poor Matters
There is, in fact, little consensus on the precise origins of the term
"maximum feasible participation" nor on the precise meaning attached to it
contributing to an entitlement-based activist attitude among the poor, giving rise to a welfare
rights movement intent on rejecting work responsibilities in favor of permanent dependence
on government aid. Consequently, they tend to conclude that government involvement in
anti-poverty programs is counter-productive and leads only to dependency and depravity.
Government should, instead, get out of the poverty-alleviation business, focus on creating
national wealth and sustained economic growth upon which all boats will float, and leave
poverty-alleviation programs to the charitable hand of the private sector.
57. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 22 (failing to mention the need for
participation of the poor, even while invoking successes of the War on Poverty); David A.
Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) (arguing that pursuit of a participatory, decentralized anti-
poverty program is a luxury the poor can ill-afford, and that a more centralized entitlement
approach to poverty law should be pursued).
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in the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act," by either the members of the
Administration task force that drafted it' or its congressional sponsors.
Indeed, there is no explicit legislative history considering the phrase nor,
curiously, was there any public discussion of the participation clause in the
five months between President Johnson's commendation of the bill to
Congress and its passage." Even the drafters of the bill recalled no
discussion of the term in the task force deliberations giving rise to the Act,
inserting it only after a member recognized that it had been invoked
several times by another in an all-night drafting session."
And, yet, as has been observed, "the idea was in the air." Indeed,
"maximum feasible participation" was reflective of a coherent and
powerful idea that had increasingly been circulating through the theory-
based literature, non-profit advocacy and philanthropic world, and U.S.
foreign development assistance community in the late 1950s6 2 and that, by
the early 1960s, had worked its way into national policy.' The concept was
simple: those most affected by social disadvantage - "the indigenous
disadvantaged" - were necessarily better positioned to understand
poverty's causes, to identify the most effective solutions to them, and to
advocate their own communities' interests than were "outside" middle-
class professional reformers lacking any direct experience with those
conditions. In this way, maximizing the participation of the poor in poverty
alleviation efforts was understood to be imperative both instrumentally, as a
means of ensuring program adaptability and responsiveness, and
intrinsically, as a means of building the dignity, confidence, and initiative
required to sustain proactive engagement in community self-help
initiatives.
58. Other perhaps than recognition that it is "clearly a lawyer's term." MOYNIHAN, Supra
note 6, at xvi.
59. Convened in January 1964 by President Johnson and led by Sargent Shriver, former
head of the Peace Corps, this Cabinet-level task force included key members of the U.S.
Department of Labor, the Bureau of Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and a number
of new administration members coming directly from philanthropic foundations and
academia who had been leading advocates of community action. See generally id. (discussing
personal role in task force while serving in Labor Department).
60. Lillian Rubin, Maximiun Feasible Participation: The Origins, Implications, and Present
Status, 385 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, at 15-16 (1969).
61. Id. at 16 (quoting Adam Yarmolinsky, The Origin of Maximum Feasible Participation,
SOCIAL SCIENCES FORUM, Fall-Winter, 1966-67 at 19). Another task force member recalled:
"The clause ... relating to participation of the poor was inserted with virtually no discussion
in the task force and none at all on Capitol Hill.... I cannot say that I was aware of the
implications of the clause. It just seemed to me like an idea that nobody could quarrel with."
Id.
62. For excellent discussions of each of these, see PETER MARRIS & MARTIN REIN,
DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM (1967); Rubin, supra note 60; and MOYNIHAN, supra note 6.
63. This is hardly surprising, given the flocking of professional reformers and intellectuals
to Washington to serve in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The idea of community
action with citizen participation and the imperative of mobilizing those most affected by
social problems to address them themselves had been a core part of the Ford Foundation's
Grey Areas Projects, Mobilization for Youth and President Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime, from which many of the drafters of the EOA had come. See
MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 38-74.
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This idea responded, in turn, to two core assumptions about poverty
increasingly espoused across the policy, advocacy, and philanthropic
sectors in the late 1950s and early 1960s." The first related to a new
understanding of poverty's causes. Stimulated by the persistence, yet
growing invisibility of what Michael Harrington called the "huge,
enormous, and intolerable fact of poverty in America," afflicting some
forty to fifty million people, or over one quarter of the population," a new
theory of poverty was emerging. That theory sought to explain poverty's
massive persistence in the United States despite the successes of the 1930s
and 1940s in achieving an important patchwork of New Deal social welfare
legislation, an active philanthropic sector, and unprecedented American
prosperity and economic growth in the 1950s.
Articulated by academics such as Charles Ohlin, Richard Cloward, and
Michael Harrington, the theory focused not on personal pathology or
simple lack of household income as the cause of poverty, as did dominant
contemporary accounts," but rather on the "culture" or "cycle of poverty"
that kept the poor trapped in conditions that prevented them from
accessing opportunities available to others. In this context, poverty was
caused both by a structural breakdown in the distribution of opportunities
and by the devastated environments in which poor populations, as a result
of this breakdown, were increasingly ghettoized and isolated. These
conditions constituted a vicious cycle of poverty in which a series of
interdependent causes kept the poor in a downward spiral, from which
they could not escape. Thus, substandard and slum housing, inadequate
diets, poor education, and lack of access to health care, meant that the poor
were sick more frequently and longer than any other group of society,
64. MARRIS & REIN, supra note 62, at 36 ("[I1n the summer of 1964, on the eve of President
Johnson's campaign against poverty ... [tihere was then more of a consensus of purpose than
at any time before or will likely be again.").
65. See HARRINGTON, supra note 6, at 1-2. Focusing on "The Problem of Poverty in
America," the 1964 Annual Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers
alternatively reported this number at thirty-three to thirty-five million people, representing
one-fifth of all families and nearly one-fifth of the total U.S. population. COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISERS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERs 59 (1964), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/ERP/issue/1208/download/5639/ERPARCEA_1
964.pdf.
66. Prior to the post-war affluence of the 1950s and early 1960s, poverty in the United
States could still credibly be attributed to the economic effects of the Great Depression. By the
early 1960s that view became increasingly difficult to sustain. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 293 (1958) (discussing "new" poverty); HARRINGTON,
supra note 6, at 7-14. There was growing disillusionment, in this sense, with the Eisenhower
administration's hands-off approach to domestic social problems in the 1950s, one based on
the idea that economic growth would itself, by diffusing prosperity, reduce inequalities and
resolve social problems. See MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 11. There was likewise growing
discontent with the "social work model" that had prevailed since the 1930s, which tended to
view poverty as largely a pathological condition within the home. See infra note 163.
67. Reflecting the influence it had on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the
concept of The Poverty Cycle and the need for "a coordinated attack" to break it was set forth
in detail in the "Program for a Concerted Assault on Poverty," a 1963 Staff Memorandum of
the White House Council of Economic Advisors which served as a critical input in the
drafting of the EOA. MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 79.
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leading to lost wages and loss of stable work, which meant they could not
in turn pay for good housing, a nutritious diet, or doctors, hence
reinitiating the cycle.' Breaking the poverty cycle meant that effective
interventions could not focus on single issue areas in isolation; rather,
given the complexity and interdependency of poverty's many causes,
interventions had to be dynamic, multifaceted, targeted at causes rather
than mere consequences, and - given limited available resources -
systematically coordinated among a variety of cooperating public and
private institutions, all concerting community resources in a coherent
attack on a commonly understood enemy.'
The second core assumption about poverty related to growing
disquietude about existing institutions - specifically, their bureaucracy,
inflexibility, and unresponsiveness to the problems of the poor. Social
agencies of the era were thus perceived as operating in narrow issue silos,
with limited vision, no coordination, and under bureaucratic blueprints
that frequently bore little correlation to the diversity and complexity of
needs faced by the actual communities purportedly served.' To restore
their relevance, it was believed, America's broken institutions "had to be
turned outward again, to look afresh at the needs they should be serving."
This, it was understood, required not only a more rigorous results-oriented
experimental approach,' but also the active and regularized participation
of those most affected by poverty in project design, implementation, and
monitoring. Such persons, it was understood, were in the best position to
serve as a check on institutional conduct. Their participatory engagement
would ensure that programs were in fact responding flexibly to changing
community needs and priorities, being communicated in effective and
culturally appropriate ways, and leading to actual measurable
improvements in the lived realities of impoverished communities.7
68. HARRINGTON, supra note 6, at 15.
69. This understanding appeared prominently in Johnson Administration messaging
about the Act. See, e.g., LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5 at 380 ("Poverty is
deeply rooted and its causes are many."); id. at 379 ("[Ploverty is not a simple or an easy
enemy. It cannot be driven from the land by a single attack on a single front."); id. at 377
("[The Act] charts a new course. It strikes at the causes, not just the consequences of
poverty."); id. at 379 (underscoring that poverty "[cannot] be conquered by government
alone" and hence calling for full participation of all segments of society in bringing their
collective energies to bear on "our common enemy" of poverty).
70. See, e.g., MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 41-53 (discussing perceived problems and
growing disenchantment).
71. Id. at 53.
72. Demanding rigorous research and analysis, this approach was the basis of the
community action demonstration projects that provided the blueprint for Title II. For general
discussion of these demonstration projects, see id.
73. See generally LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 378 (recognizing that
community action plans would be "based on the fact that local citizens best understand their
own problems, and know best how to deal with those problems," allowing "components and
emphasis [to] differ as needs differ"); id. at 380 (recognizing importance of flexible
responsiveness to changing circumstances and noting that "[a]s conditions change, and as
experience illuminates our difficulties, we will be prepared to modify our strategy"). Many of
the drafters of Title 11 had been closely involved in the demonstration projects of the Ford
Foundation and President's Committee and had become convinced that the poor could often
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At the same time, cycle of poverty theory recognized that the
downward spiral created by lack of opportunity had a crushing effect on
communities, leading to a social disintegration that bred apathy, fatalism,
and an oppression of spirit that robbed communities of the will to
respond.4 Breaking the cycle of poverty thus required not only programs
that could provide new and real opportunities, but also programs that
could regenerate a will to respond to them. Engagement and active
participation were, again, seen as the solution. Indeed, by increasing
individuals' sense of their own dignity, worth, and importance in
democratic society, such participation would return a sense of purpose and
initiative to devastated communities, motivating them to mobilize their
internal resources, knowledge, and ingenuity to engage in real self-help.'
Equally important, participatory engagement was understood as a
means of building the political power required to ensure that the interests
of the poor were in fact adequately represented in institutional
decisionmaking. This was true both within private social service agencies,
which too often represented the interests of donors and middle-class
taxpayers, and in political governance more generally, where the poor had
always lacked effective voice. It was increasingly recognized, in this
regard, that new mechanisms had to be created through which the interests
of the poor could be made powerful enough to force concessions and
establish a new order of priorities. Programs which emphasized the active
participation of members of affected groups in self-help and in the design
and administration of programs thus came to be seen as a priority. As
help each other more effectively than a social worker from a different culture. See MARRIS &
REIN, supra note 61, at 215 (noting positive experience of use of non-professionals in social
work with street gangs).
74. See, e.g., HARRINGTON, supra note 6, at 15 ("The individual cannot usually break out of
this vicious circle. Neither can the group, for it lacks the social energy and political strength to
turn its misery into a cause."); MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 188. In this regard, Michael
Harrington contrasted the "old" generalized poor of the 1930s, who had together organized to
demand New Deal legislation, and the "new" invisible poor of the 1960s who, largely
unhelped by that legislation, were isolated, unorganized, political invisible, and increasingly
despondent. HARRINGTON, supra note 6, at 8-9.
75. Title II of the final Act explicitly referenced this community competence thesis. See
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 205(d), 78 Stat. 508, 518 (repealed
1981) (mandating "special consideration to programs which give promise of effecting a
permanent increase in the capacity of individuals, groups, and communities to deal with their
problems without further assistance"); see also U.S. CMTY ACTION PROGRAM, COMMUNITY
ACTION PROGRAM GUIDE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPLICANTS 7 (1965) [hereinafter "CAP Guide"]
(identifying same as "[tlhe long-range objective of every [CAP]" and noting that "[ploverty is
a condition of need, helplessness, and hopelessness"). For most of its drafting stage, the Act
was in fact titled the "Human Resources Development Act of 1964." See MOYNIHAN, supra
note 6, at 88-89.
76. When advised by Horace Buzby not to pursue a program for the poor, but rather one
for the middle class given that "that is where the votes are," President Johnson reportedly
replied: "35 million poor in America don't have a single lobbyist. The motor companies have
them, the telephone companies have them. I'm going to be the lobbyist for the poor. And
they're going to get a voice through me and the Congress. And that is why I'm going to send
this bill up." See Interview by Lynn Neary with Larry Levinson, Partner, Piper Rudnick, LLP
(National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 7, 2008).
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Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy declared in a statement prepared by
one of the drafters of the Economic Opportunity Act:
[The existing social welfare structure] plans programs for the poor,
not with them. Part of the sense of helplessness and futility comes
from the feeling of powerlessness to affect the operations of these
organizations. The CAPs must basically change these organizations
by building into the program real representation of the poor. This
bill calls for the 'maximum feasible participation of the residents.'
This means the involvement of the poor in planning and implementing
programs: giving them a real voice in their institutions.7
A particular concern of the drafters of Title II in this regard was that
historically marginalized groups, especially unorganized poor blacks in the
South, would be prevented by the local power structure from participating
in the benefits of federal community action funds. Thus, while an early
White House draft of the bill had provided for "appropriate representation
of and participation by the key governmental agencies, community, and
neighborhood groups, and key professional and other organizations in the
area," the Task Force drafters amended the language of Title II to provide
for the "maximum feasible participation of the residents of the areas and
the members of the groups" served.7 By doing so, they explicitly sought to
preserve the authority of Washington to intervene in exclusionary
programs on the grounds that the participation requirements of the
legislation were not being met.79
There were thus several distinct meanings and intents behind the
insertion of the MFP language by Title II's drafters. These included
improving the responsiveness and innovativeness of social agencies,
promoting community self-help, incentivizing effective coordination of
public and private resources, creating community-based jobs, and building
the political power of the poor to better represent their own interests. All of
these motivations were, in turn, based on "the peculiarly American
tradition of democracy" that the federal government had an essential role
to play in facilitating and incentivizing local action, but that the ultimate
objective of such support was the strengthening of local capacity to deal
with each community's own problems, at their source.' As such, federal
funding was designed to be withdrawn from CAPs as soon as practicable,
77. MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 90-91 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 86-87.
79. See, e.g., CAP Guide, supra note 75, at 11 (specifying requirement that all CAP
applicants execute form assuring full program compliance with Civil Rights Act of 1964).
80. See Marris & Rein, supra note 61, at 8-9 (noting that social reformers of era understood
that any reform proposal had to be reconciled "with that peculiarly American tradition of
democracy, which believes profoundly in the vitality of local autonomy as an expression of
personal freedom" and thus "[elven problems common to the whole society tend to be seen as
a complex of local difficulties, to which national policy should offer support rather than direction")
(emphasis added).
22 [Vol. 13
2010] Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor 23
with full responsibilities turned over to localities."' The federal role from
then on out, it was understood, would be limited to national orchestration
of local experiences and transferable learning processes, ensuring that best
and worst practices were shared across jurisdictions in a continually self-
strengthening and effectively coordinated national project of poverty
alleviation.8 2
B. Structuring a Participatory Framework for Poverty Alleviation
The question remained: how would such participatory engagement be
structured? Drawing on prior public and private sector experiences with
community action demonstration projects," the plan was organized to have
two distinct framework parts: one was designed to facilitate broad
participation from below, through the creation of community action
agencies (CAAs); the other sought to orchestrate their activities within a
new federal coordinating entity from above, the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO).
The structure of both was guided by a distinct goal: the need for
effective institutional coordination. Indeed, it is important to underscore that
this primary goal was key to Federal government endorsement of the War
on Poverty. It had in fact been the foundation stone upon which the Bureau
of Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors had insisted that CAPs be
the basis of the anti-poverty agenda, countering the Labor Department's
preference for an employment strategy.' CAPs were seen, in this regard, as
81. CAP Guide, supra note 75, at 7 ("The long range objective of every [CAP] is to effect a
permanent increase in the capacity of individuals, groups, and communities afflicted by
poverty to deal effectively with their own problems so that they need no further assistance.")
(emphasis added); see also id. at 8-9 (except in exceptionally justified circumstances, level of
federal assistance to CAP agency costs to be reduced from 90 to 50 percent after August 20,
1966, with goal of full replacement by non-federal sources as soon as practicable) ("Federal
assistance is intended to supplement and raise existing levels of local support for action
against poverty, not to replace it.").
82. In presenting his plan to Congress, Johnson explained this long-term orchestration
role in the following way: "We are fully aware that this program will not eliminate all the
poverty in America in a few months or a few years.... But this program will ... give us the
chance to test our weapons, to try our energy and ideas and imagination for the many battles
yet to come. As conditions change, and as experience illuminates our difficulties, we will be
prepared to modify our strategy." LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 380.
83. Both the Ford Foundation's Grey Areas Project and the President's Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime had offered funding for the establishment of
demonstration "community action" agencies. The President's Committee had additionally
created a Special Executive Committee, designed to serve as a Cabinet-level pressure group
for coherent reform and empowered to draw together the many Federal departments,
institutes, and bureaus relevant to its purview. Chaired by the Attorney General, its mandate
included "review[ing], evaluat[ing] and promot[ing] the co-ordination of the activities of
Federal departments and agencies," "stimulatling] experimentation, innovation and
improvement in Federal programmes," "encourag[ing] co-operation and the sharing of
information between Federal agencies and state, local and private organizations," and
"mak[ing] recommendations." See MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 22.
84. It was precisely to mediate these "warring principalities" that President Johnson
appointed Sargent Shriver, a neutral party, to head the Task Force mandated to draw up the
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
a cost-effective means of ensuring comprehensive planning, coordination
of resources, and targeted evaluation in anti-poverty efforts, thereby
"impos[ing] order . . . on the chaos of government programs that had
descended on the American city."" The fact that it could be done from the
bottom-up, while protecting the interests of the President and carrying out
the intent of Congress, only made it more attractive.
Provided for in section 202 of the EOA, the first framework part of Title
II thus authorized the establishment of a broad set of new non-profit
community action agencies (CAAs), "the prime offensive weapon in the
war on poverty."' Recognizing that neither private agencies nor state or
local government had the coordinating capacity to run these programs
alone, CAAs were to be federally created entities, entitled to federal
funding for ninety percent of their program costs for the first two years of
operation, after which the percentage of federal funds would decrease."
The remaining costs were to be contributed from community resources.
The program was, in this way, structured to incentivize the increasing
coordination of resources from public and private stakeholders at the
community level, such that community action programs would become
locally self-sustaining.
Administration of the new agencies was nevertheless to be entirely
local from the start. The only condition on agency structure was that CAPs
could not be administered by political parties and must be "developed,
conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of
residents of the areas and members of the groups served."' The precise
meaning of this latter phrase was not specified in the legislative text. As
conflicts grew over what it mandated, the Office of Economic Opportunity
issued Instructions to Applicants, which sought to give the MFP mandate as
expansive a meaning as possible.' It nonetheless issued advice to CAAs
informally, recommending a tripartite structure for CAA Boards, with one-
third members elected from local government, one third from the private
sector, and one-third from members of the groups served. CAAs were, in
this way, to coordinate the input of all community stakeholders in local
efforts to break the cycle of poverty.
Finally, in structuring CAAs, a decision had to be made about how
much federal oversight there would be over program design and
monitoring of results. Although rigorous planning, evaluation, and
demonstration components had been part of the initial drafting design of
CAPs, with an estimation that it would take at least a year for any adequate
Economic Opportunity Act. Shriver mediated by adopting a portion of everyone's program:
the Labor Department's employment program became Title I of the Bill, the Budget Bureau's
CAP program became Title II. MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at xv.
85. MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 78.
86. Id. at 153 (quoting OEO Director).
87. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 208(a), 78 Stat. 508, 519
(repealed 1981).
88. Id. at 516, § 202(a)(3-4) (defining "community action program").
89. See CAP Guide, supra note 75, at 16-18 (defining "means to ensure participation" and
"minimum standards for representation").
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plan to be assembled, the final bill abandoned any significant requirements
in these respects.' Rather, to receive funds an applicant need only show
that the proposed program involves "activities of sufficient scope and size
to give promise of progress towoard elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of
poverty. . . ."9 Application funding decisions were, consequently, structured
to be based primarily on state need, not on project quality or expected
impact. Characterized by some as a retreat from rational planning,' this
decision responded to Washington concerns that federal funds in the War
on Poverty be distributed quickly and with as little bureaucratic oversight
as possible. This would both ensure rapid receipt by the neediest of
communities (who might otherwise be disadvantaged in funding decisions
by comprehensive planning requirements) and, more coarsely, allow the
hopefully dramatic results of the anti-poverty campaign to influence the
upcoming election cycle.'
For similar reasons, early provisions requiring that CAPs be "broadly
representative of the community" and that result-oriented research and
analysis be integrated into program design were likewise abandoned in the
drafting and legislative approval processes.95 Both omissions served to
significantly loosen the discretion of the OEO Director to disperse federal
monies rapidly to a broad array of often quickly assembled and loosely
justified project proposals."
The second essential framework part of the MFP program was the
creation of an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), designed to ensure
that this highly decentralized structure of the War on Poverty did not
"degenerate into a series of uncoordinated and unrelated efforts.""
Mandated to coordinate all elements of that war and to serve more
generally as a national headquarters on poverty alleviation, its
responsibilities were substantial. Not only did it have direct administration
responsibilities over nine of the eleven new programs created by the EOA,
including Community Action, but it was also responsible for coordinating
the full set of anti-poverty programs administered by other Federal
departments and agencies. To give it the stature necessary to accomplish
90. See MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 212 ("The methodical exploration of means was
overtake in impatience to put them to use."); MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 82-83.
91. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(a)(2), 78 Stat. 508, 516
(repealed 1981) (emphasis added).
92. MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 211-213 (recording five basic questions for an
acceptable plan and noting that 80 percent of federal CAP funding was mandatorily to be
allotted to states in proportion to the numbers receiving public assistance, numbers of
unemployed, and numbers of children in families with incomes below $1,000; the remaining
20 percent could be distributed at the discretion of the OEO Administrator).
93. Id. at 213.
94. MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 82 (recalling concerns of Shriver); see generally id. at 93
("Congress . . . wanted action without too much forethought, preparation, planning,
negotiating, agreeing, staging. That is what it got.").
95. See, e.g., id. at 92.
96. Id. at 93, 95-96; MARRIS & REIN, supra note 61, at 214.
97. See LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5.
98. See Stephen J. Pollak, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, in MAJOR Acrs OF CONGRESS
220, 220 (Brian K. Landsberg ed., 2004) (specifying EOA programs and OEO mandate);
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these broad interagency coordination ends, the OEO was to be located in
the Executive Office of the President and chaired by the President's
personal Chief of Staff for the War on Poverty. It was also to be assisted by
an Economic Opportunity Council, which, chaired by the OEO director,
was to be composed of all members of the President's Cabinet and "such
other agency heads as the President may designate."" Through this
national orchestrating structure, the OEO was to ensure that all national
anti-poverty efforts were effectively coordinated in taking forward the
nation's fight against "the paradox of poverty amidst plenty.""
Despite this extensive mandate, the OEO's orchestration role with
respect to CAPs was in fact quite limited. This limited role resulted from
Congress's removal of the comprehensive planning, "broadly
representative," and research and analysis requirements from CAP
application criteria. Indeed, without a basis for systematic appraisal of
what was happening on the ground (and with all of the other direct
program administration responsibilities with which it was encumbered),
the OEO could not effectively engage in one of its most important
orchestration roles: coordinating data on comparative CAP effectiveness
and sharing best practices as the basis for promoting innovative
experimentation, enhancing responsiveness, and maximizing the
achievement of program goals. This gap left the OEO's orchestration role
with respect to CAPs largely limited to dueling with states and localities
about whether MFP meant controlling or noncontrolling representation by
the poor on CAP boards.' As militant activists increasingly demanded the
latter and gained the OEO's backing, a collision course with the political
establishment was set in motion.
C. Assessing Outcomes: What Went Wrong
Predictably, community interest in CAPs exploded with the 1964
announcement of federal funding for community-based efforts to break the
cycle of poverty. The OEO responded by moving swiftly to fund new
applications, with over 1,600 CAAs established by 1968, covering two-
thirds of the nation's counties. Many of these programs brought important
concrete benefits to their communities."" Yet critiques of CAPs were just as
MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 100 (noting two programs immediately turned over to other
departments); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 604(a), 78 Stat. 508, 531
(repealed 1981) (recognizing "coordination of antipoverty efforts by all segments of the
federal Government" as key function of the OEO Director).
99. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 604, 78 Stat. 508, 531
(repealed 1981). The Act also established within the OEO a National Advisory Council,
chaired by the OEO Director and composed by representatives of the public. Id. at 531, § 605.
100. Id. at 508, § 2 (declaring it to be "the policy of the United States to eliminate the
paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation .... " and, the purpose of the Act to
be "to strengthen, supplement, and coordinate efforts in furtherance of that policy").
101. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 131, 144-47, 154 (noting political battles for
control of CAPs).
102. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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strong, with contemporary observers noting they produced few actual real
benefits for communities and little actual participation, were "rent with
endless quarrels" and petty infighting, and in fact made "organized
'ghetto' political activity" more difficult, not less.' Regardless, by early
1965 battles over who wielded ultimate control over community
decisionmaking authority and use of poverty funds had unleashed a
monumental clash between CAPs and the formal political establishment.
Consequently, by 1967 federal funding of the most active CAPs had been
withdrawn and new restrictions on their activities and memberships were
being added by Congress.' By 1974, the Office of Economic Opportunity
was itself dismantled, its programs distributed to other federal agencies,
and the War on Poverty was at a decisive end."os
What lessons should one draw from this? The lesson that should not be
drawn, I argue, is that pursuing new institutional channels for ensuring the
participation of the poor in poverty alleviation efforts is an unfruitful path,
destined only to lead to conflict and confrontation. Such a lesson could
only be drawn by conflating participation with a particular historically
contingent set of social protest tactics and with a particular structure of
sanctioned community participation. The better lesson, I contend, is that
the structure of a program and, specifically, the relationship between that
structure and the social context in which it is embedded, is fundamental to the
success of any democratic reform project.
In this regard, it is important to note that while the MFP policy
suffered serious shortcomings in its design, those shortcomings derived
not from the participatory theory that commended that design, but rather
from the failure to take contemporary social context into account while
giving substance to that theory. In this respect, the drafters of the MFP
policy appeared strangely oblivious to the key social trends that
characterized the 1960s political environment: the increasing militancy and
rights absolutism of the civil and welfare rights movements and,
correspondingly, the progressive shift in the U.S. regulatory apparatus
toward a more centralized legal-bureaucratic model that, eschewing the
emphasis on discretion, flexibility, and experimentalism of the prior social
work model, favored federally-defined and rigidly-enforced uniform rules.
Neither of these trends was amenable to the decentralized, coordinated,
cooperative, and flexibly responsive policy orientation on which the MFP
103. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 137, 130-142; Miller & Roby, supra note 33.
104. See, e.g., Economic Opportunity (Green and Quie) Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-222, 81 Stat. 672 (repealed 1981).
105. See Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and Community Partnership Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-644, 88 Stat. 2291 Economic Opportunity Act (repealed 1981) (dismantling Office of
Economic Opportunity and replacing it with Community Services Administration). In 1981,
the first year of the Reagan administration, the Economic Opportunity Act was repealed and
the Community Services Administration was abolished. Community Services Block Grant
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §683(a), 95 Stat. 511, 519 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9901
(2006)). It was replaced by the Community Services Block Grant, which delegated
responsibility for the administration of Community Action Agencies to the states. Id. §§ 671-
83.
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model was conceptually based. That this discrepancy was not taken into
explicit account by the MFP sponsors demonstrates major shortcomings in
their process of thinking about effective and sustainable real-world reform
in the 1960s U.S. political context.'0
It has been noted, in this regard, that the Johnson administration's
principal failure rested in not being more forthrightly aware that there
were at least four distinct conceptions of MFP circulating amongst social
actors at the time, each in potential direct tension with the others.'" Official
Washington had one conception. It focused on institutional cooperation and
the cooperative division of labor between stakeholders at all levels of
society, all designed to assist government in the common consensual
project of poverty alleviation. Social service and philanthropic agencies, for
their part, tended to see MFP as a way to improve program effectiveness,
especially by opening new sub-professional work opportunities for the poor at
the community level." Under this view, the poor need not participate at
the programming stage, but rather principally in street-level
implementation." The rising civil and welfare rights movements, by
contrast, understood MFP in stark power terms: it meant the redistribution
of power to the poor through majority control of decisionmaking
authority."' State and local governments, intent on retaining their own
legitimate decisionmaking authority, were unyielding to this view. They
saw MFP as a directive for formal representation of the poor in CAAs,
bringing more stakeholders to the table without relinquishing local
government's primary authority over how community funds were to be
allocated."'
106. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 168 ("a good many men [in government] did
inexcusably sloppy work"); Rubin, supra note 60, at 28 (attributing this surprising omission to
"preconceptions about poverty, race, and welfare that grip American thought and distort our
vision").
107. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at xvii (noting feeling in 1964, while still in
government, "that official Washington had an entirely different, almost antithetical view of
the style and function of 'community action' from that of its proponents in the field"). In
contrast to the characterization used here, Moynihan characterized these four conceptions as:
organizing the power structure, expanding the power structure, confronting the power structure,
and assisting the power structure. See id. at 168.
108. See Rubin, supra note 60, at 22-24.
109. Increasingly disenchanted with the growing militancy of CAPs, the Budget Bureau
(initially CAPs strongest champion in government) made clear to the OEO in 1965 that "it
would prefer less emphasis on policy-making by the poor in planning community projects.
'Maximum feasible participation' by the poor in the anti-poverty program is called for by the
law. In the bureau's view, this means primarily using the poor to carry out the program, not to
design it." See MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 145 (quoting Joseph A. Loftus, Wide Policy Role for
Poor Opposed by Budget Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1965, at 1) (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., id. at 182-83 (noting that "in reality this took the form of denying the
legitimacy of those institutions of electoral representation that had developed over the years -
indeed, the centuries - and which nominally did provide community control.").
111. One task force member commented:
I had never really conceived that it [participation] would mean control by
the poor of the community action organization itself.... I expected that
the poor would be represented on the community action organization but
that such representation would be something in the order of 15 to 25% of
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The problem is that CAAs, as a single institutional entity, could not
serve all of these important functions at once. In particular, they could not
redistribute controlling decisionmaking authority to one social
constituency and act as an apolitical arbiter of conflicting community
interests and priorities."2 By embedding CAAs with the mandate to do
both, rather than recognizing the necessary conflicts of interest from which
all policy evolves, a clash between two different conceptions of democratic
accountability was set in motion in which the MFP policy was not to
survive.
Within this context, it has been noted, "[t]he task of government ...
was first to discern these four different meanings, to make sure they were
understood by those who had to make decisions about them, and to keep
all concerned alert to the dangers of not keeping the distinctions clearly
enough in mind.""1 The lesson to be drawn, then, is not that MFP as a
policy priority was destined to fail in the political context of the 1960s.
Rather, it is that the participatory policy concept was not given a design
structure in which it could succeed in that context. That is, a different design
structure and implementation strategy would have been necessary to
ensure that each of the independently important functions participation
was understood to serve could be given autonomous expression in
community-based anti-poverty efforts.
This point is crucial as it underscores the opportunities available for
reembracing the MFP priority today as the basis of a new national poverty
commitment. The key to such a re-embrace, I argue, is a careful thinking
about how to structure such a policy, both at the national and subnational
levels, such that it maximizes both the instrumental and intrinsic benefits
of participation, while avoiding foreseeable pitfalls in inter-social relations
and competing accounts of democratic legitimacy. This requires, in turn,
making sure that the chosen design structure and implementation strategy
is compatible with the dominant methodologies and frameworks through
which modem society operates.
The next two Parts examine precisely these dominant methodologies in
modern U.S. society. Part II focuses on the U.S. regulatory apparatus and
how it operates today with respect to social welfare programs. In
particular, it examines the modern shift away from the earlier "legal-
bureaucratic" model toward a more flexible and results-oriented "new
governance" model that, in its operational design, largely replicates the
principles upon which the early MFP concept was conceived. Part III then
turns to the new methodologies of U.S. social movements of the poor,
emphasizing the shift from the confrontational rights-absolutism of the
1960s to a modern "new accountability" framework that is likewise
operationally rooted in the same set of motivating principles that gave rise
the board . . . Moreover, I don't think it ever occurred to me, or to many others,
that the representatives of the poor must necessarily be poor themselves.
Rubin, supra note 60, at 21-22 (emphasis in original).
112. MARRIS & REIN, supra note 62, at 216-17.
113. MOYNIHAN, supra note 6, at 168.
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to the early MFP policy. These include decentralization and broad
stakeholder participation, flexible results-oriented policy planning,
coordinated public-private partnerships, innovation and competitive
experimentalism, rigorous monitoring and performance evaluation, and
nationally-orchestrated incentive systems around defined performance
goals. While neither paradigm in its isolated operation can effectively
achieve all of these principles, as the analysis below underscores, when
brought together in constructive synergy, each functions to redress the
major deficiencies of the other. How they can be brought together in an
effective modern design structure is taken up in Part IV.
11. "NEW GOVERNANCE" AND SOCIAL WELFARE REGULATION: FROM FIXED
MATERIAL ENTITLEMENTS TO COMPETITIVE DISCRETION
A. Regulation in the 21st Century: Embracing a New Governance
Model
A vast literature has emerged over the last decade and a half on the
rise of new governance theory in regulatory law. Indeed, new governance
has become the darling child of both administration officials and
prominent academics since the early 1990s."' It is now a dominant model in
fields as diverse as environmental law,"s occupational safety and health
administration,"' welfare administration,"'7 labor and employment
discrimination law,"8 vocational training;"'9 health care," prison and school
114. It is reflected in the Clinton Administration's unleashing of an ambitious federal
reform agenda, the National Performance Review (NPR), in March 1993. The NPR was
renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government in 1995, undertaking a series
of aggressive reforms under the leadership of Vice-President Gore. Initiatives for increased
non-governmental participation in public regulatory processes have nevertheless been made
since the early 1970s, particularly in the environmental programs. See Roger C. Cramton, The
Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J.
525 (1972).
115. See, e.g., DEWITT JOHN, Civic ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN
STATES AND COMMUNITIES (1994); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism:
Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 LAW & POL'Y 49 (1999); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law,
89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (1994-1995).
116. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA 2003-
2008 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN, http://www.osha.gov/StratPlanPublic/
strategicmanagementplan-final.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010); JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE
WORKPLACE 134-74 (1988); Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 (2003).
117. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42
U.S.C); Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1739 (2002); Joel F. Handler, U.S. Welfare Reform: The Big Experiment, in GOVERNING WORK
AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 215 (Jonathan
Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
118. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2146 (2003); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
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administration,12 1 community policing,1 2  housing,'" securities regulation,12 4
and digital technology law.1"
As has been widely noted, new governance as a regulatory approach
represents a response to the bureaucratic command-and-control regulatory
model that emerged in the 1930s and 1940s out of the New Deal and that,
in the social welfare field, replaced the "social work" or "rehabilitation"
model from the 1970s onward. 126 This model was characterized by top-
down rule promulgation, expert agency control, and adversarial
enforcement activities. While that broader model was undoubtedly
responsive to the times - representing the need to consolidate widely
dispersed powers and centralize government activities in response to the
economic and social tumult of world war and the Great Depression - the
changing backdrop of the twenty-first century, with its increased global
market competition, breakdown of information and communication
barriers, and increased market complexity, diversity and volatility, has
revealed deep clefts in the effectiveness of the New Deal model. As such,
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); David M. Trubek &
James S. Mosher, New Governance, Employment Policy, and the European Social Model, in
GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
EXPERIMENTS 33 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
119. See, e.g., Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 20 U.S.C.); Nan Ellis, Individual
Training Accounts Under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998: Is Choice a Good Thing?, 8 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 235 (2001).
120. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in
Transition, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (2003).
121. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 36; Susan
Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 805 (1989-1990).
122. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in
Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & SOC'Y 73 (2001); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the
Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 817 (1999).
123. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1047-53 (2004).
124. See, e.g., Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating
Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431 (1986).
125. See, e.g., E-Government Act of 2002, § 202, 116 Stat. 2899, 2911 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Cary
Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
353 (2004); Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277
(1998).
126. Three central paradigms have dominated United States social welfare policy since its
overarching structure was first established in the 1935 Social Security Act, a hallmark of
President Roosevelt's New Deal revolution. These include the "social work" or
"rehabilitation" model (1935-1970), the "legal-bureaucratic" model (1970-1996) and, most
recently, the "new governance" model. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 48, at 113540
(distinguishing "social work" and "legal-bureaucratic" models); Amy Mulzer, Note, The
Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested
Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 663,667-71 (2005).
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new forms of regulatory governance have emerged."'
These new models seek to draw on "leaner" private sector
management techniques that emphasize efficiency scale, competition,
flexibility, stakeholder negotiation, and continuously revised performance
measures in public administration.1 2 They tend to eschew reliance on
formal rules, investing local administrators and an increasingly privatized
set of agents with substantial discretion in determining the means through
which goal-specific performance indicators will be met. At the same time,
they seek to retain democratic legitimacy by incorporating new
mechanisms of stakeholder participation and public accountability,
principally through incentive and result-based performance evaluation
systems that impose information-generation and disclosure requirements
on service-delivery entities and reward them for meeting performance
benchmarks. It is believed that financial incentives, together with
stakeholder-accessible performance evaluation, will lead to greater local
competition, the scaling up of best practices, and the potential for constant
renewal and responsiveness to changing circumstances and the diversity of
local needs. State-society interactions within new governance regimes are
hence redefined under an entrepreneurial model, with multiple
stakeholders assuming traditional roles of governance.12 9
The academic literature has been sanguine, even exultant about this
shift, characterizing it at times in full Fukuyaman relish as an end-of-
history moment in its capacity for continual self-renewal and renovation.
Commentators have proposed a myriad of theoretical models to reflect this
practical shift, including "reflexive law," "collaborative governance,"
"decentered regulation," and "democratic experimentalism."1 3 1
International financial institutions and national civil service sectors, for
their part, embrace the model under a "new public management" rubric,12
127. See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Initiative to
Streamline Government (Mar. 3, 1993) http://govinfo.1ibrary.unt.edu/npr/library/
speeches/030393.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Clinton Remarks] (noting that
many important federal programs were initiated when state institutional capacity was weak,
but that "times change and in many cases state and local governments are now better suited
to handle these programs").
128. For an excellent summary of this model, see for example Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV.
342 (2004). See also sources cited supra at nn.114-125.
129. The central organizing principles of the model have thus been defined as:
decentralization and subsidiarity; increased stakeholder collaboration and participation of
nonstate actors; the diversification and pluralization of solutions; increased performance-
based competition; integration of policy domains; flexibility and noncoerciveness; fallibility,
adaptability and dynamic learning; and legal orchestration among proliferated norm-
generating entities. See Lobel, supra note 123, at 348, 371-404.
130. See, e.g., id.
131. Others include "soft law," "outsourcing regulation," "reconstitutive law,"
"revitalizing regulation," "regulatory pluralism," "meta-regulation," "negotiated
governance," "responsive regulation," and "post-regulatory law." For citations to intellectual
authors of these and other recent scholarly theories on new governance, see id. at 346-47 and
accompanying notes.
132. See, e.g., MICHAEL BARZELAY, THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: IMPROVING RESEARCH
AND POLICY DIALOGUE 3-5 (2001); DONALD F. KETfL, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
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while the European Union applies it as a supranational governance tool
through the Open Method of Coordination.33 Noting this convergence in
contemporary legal thought and administrative practice, one commentator
has systematized the vast literature on new governance approaches,
integrating it usefully into a single framework she calls the "Renew Deal"
school.' This theoretically-integrated model reflects new governance in its
purest state. Promising important improvements in the way services are
delivered, public and private practices are monitored, and externalities are
addressed around the nation, it represents a compelling articulation of how
government may ideally organize itself and its functions to maximize both
economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy.
Yet, the approach, while tantalizing in theory, rarely lives up to its
promise in practical application, particularly as viewed within discrete
regulatory regimes and from the lens of democratic theory. This is perhaps
nowhere more true than in the social welfare field, where it must interface
with, and ultimately absorb, traditional fears and suspicions of the poor
that are deeply enmeshed in the cultural and political landscape."' The
1996 Welfare Reform Law, while based decisively in new governance
theory, has thus come under blistering attacks from the poor and their
advocates as constituting a new "war against the poor."1 6 This is especially
true in its growing use of sanctions to restrict access to benefits and the
increasing trend toward linking the welfare system with the criminal
justice system. Because these critiques call into question the fidelity of
recent welfare reform policies to the organizing principles of new
governance theory from which they gave rise, it is useful to break those
principles down to see where the public accountability failures are arising
and where performance has been subpar. This should, in turn, reveal
REVOLUTION: A REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE 3-4 (2000); Nick Manning,
The New Public Management and its Legacy, WORLD BANK,
http://web.archive.org/web/20051112074952/wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservi
ce/debatel.htm.
133. See Kenneth A. Armstrong, Tackling Social Exclusion Through OMC: Reshaping the
Boundaries of EU Governance, in 6 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 170, 190-93 (Tanja A. Borzel & Rachel A. Cichowski eds., 2003); David M. Trubek &
Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open
Method of Coordination, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005).
134. Lobel, supra note 118, at 347 (proposing a "theoretically-integrated, Renew Deal
model").
135. See KATZ supra note 55, at 12-13 (discussing stigma historically attached to the label
"pauper," including criminality, prostitution, delinquency, corruption, drunkenness, and
general threats to the social order); see also J. GILLIN, POVERTY AND DEPENDENCY 21-22 (3d ed.
1937); C. HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF DEPENDENT, DEFECTIVE, AND
DELINQUENT CLASSES 10 (2nd ed. 1906); J. HANDLER & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, THE "DESERVING
POOR": A STUDY OF WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 17 (1971); J. LOWELL, PUBLIC RELIEF AND
PRIVATE CHARITY 111 (Arno Press & The New York Times 1971) (1884); H. RODGERS, JR.,
POVERTY AMID PLENTY: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3 (1979).
136. See, e.g., Betty Reid Mandell, Welfare Reform: The War Against the Poor, NEW POL.,
Winter 2001, at 37.
137. For an important recent look at this growing linkage between the welfare and
criminal justice systems, see Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009).
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important clues as to how such failures can be redressed through
supplementary processes and procedures.
B. New Governance and Welfare Regulation: The 1996 Welfare
Reform Law
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),'" under the promise that it
would "end welfare as we know it."'13 The impetus was a sense that
welfare was "broken" - that it had become a bureaucratic machine that
created and sustained dependency. A complete overhaul was thus needed,
one that would change welfare administration from the inside out, making
it leaner, more responsive, more efficient, and more results-oriented. Most
importantly for its supporters, it had to be capable of breaking the cycle of
dependency that, conservative critics argued, the legal-bureaucratic model
had entrenched since its triumph in the 1970s over the social work model. 40
Getting recipients off public assistance and into the labor market was thus
to be the central guiding norm animating government assistance.
New governance theory was the ready model, already a part of the
Clinton administration's ambitious federal reform agenda under the
National Partnership for Reinventing Government, formerly the National
Performance Review." In creating that agenda, President Clinton
announced: "Our goal is to make the entire federal government less
expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our national
bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and
empowerment."1 42 Given new governance's emphasis on cultural change,
private sector management techniques, private responsibility,
decentralization, and paring back of government functions, it was a model
that could be embraced both by liberal-leaning Democrats and
conservative Republicans who favored lower levels of federal involvement
in social policy issues across the board. To understand the way that new
governance theory has influenced U.S. welfare regulation, it is thus useful
to look at the PRWORA, as implemented, with respect to the principal
organizing tenets of the new governance model.
138. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C).
139. President Bill Clinton had made this a campaign promise in 1992. See Jason DeParle,
The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at Al.
140. For fuller discussions of the "social work" and "legal bureaucratic" models of welfare
administration, see sources cited in supra note 126.
141. See Clinton Remarks, supra note 127.
142. Id.; see also ALBERT GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT
THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1993)
(defining agenda as "cutting red tape," "putting customers first," "empowering employees to
get results" and "cutting back to basics").
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1. Decentralization, Subsidiarity, and Public-Private Partnerships
A central tenet of new governance derives from the principle of
subsidiarity: the idea that decisionmaking authority should be designed to
take place at the level closest to the individual affected by it, with higher-
order authorities intervening only to the extent necessary to strengthen
lower-order capacities to meet common standards and community goals
on their own.' 3 New governance thus proceeds under the conviction,
congruent with modern localist discourses,'" that the federal government
should not be in the business of making detailed regulatory decisions that
can better be made at the local level, where they can more authentically
accord with local understandings, mores, economic shifts, and
particularized conditions. Rather, central authorities should be required to
leave administrative and programmatic details to local discretion, leaving
the widest possible margin for local authorities to fill in the details of
broadly defined goals or policies. Federal involvement can thus be kept as
lean and efficient as possible, while maximizing the space for local
innovation and competitive experimentation.
Accordingly, new governance advocates a movement "downward and
outward," with responsibilities increasingly transferred away from
centralized federal bureaucracies toward the states and localities and to the
private sector, including private businesses and nonprofits."'5
Decentralization and private-public partnerships are thus a central core of
new governance theory, emanating from the conviction that centralized
regulatory control stifles innovation, competition, creativity, economic
efficiency, and local responsiveness.'
The PRWORA follows this model closely. Devolution to states and
localities and privatization of welfare administration and service delivery
are two of its most notable features. Indeed, under PRWORA, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal aid program
established by the 1935 Social Security Act as a federally-guaranteed
entitlement to all eligible recipients, was abolished. It was replaced by
143. That principle, with an historical provenance tracing back to the polity theory of
classical Greece, "requires that problems be solved where they occur, by those who
understand them best, and by those who are most affected by them." Dinah Shelton,
Subsidiarity, Democracy and Human Rights, in BROADENING THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJORN EIDE 43, 43 (Donna Gomien ed., 1993) (citing J.E. Linnan,
Subsidiarity, Collegiality, Catholic Diversity, and Their Relevance to Apostolic Visitations, 49 THE
JURIST 399, 403 (1989)); see also Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, n.1 (2003). This approach is based both on
the instrumental fact that information quality and responsive flexibility is generally highest at
the level closest to the problem source and, equally, on the intrinsic value benefit to individual
dignity and agency that comes from solving problems locally.
144. See, e.g., Matthew Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84
DENv. U. L. REV. 1061 (2007).
145. Lobel, supra note 130, at 345.
146. For a view that economic efficiency does not always create better outcomes, see
ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATIZATION (2000).
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block grants under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program, to be administered entirely by the states with minimal federal
oversight. 7 States were thus to have a virtual free hand at reinventing
welfare administration at the local level, where it could theoretically be
most responsive to community needs and changing priorities. There is, as a
result, today no single model of welfare in any state under TANF."
Many states have in fact chosen to go even further down the path of
devolution, leaving a wide range of welfare decisions to their counties and
hence further localizing and diversifying welfare administration models.
The States of California, Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, and Ohio, for example, immediately gave discretion to local
counties to shape their own cash assistance programs under TANF."' At
the same time, many states and counties have further devolved welfare
administration to private contractors of services. This has particularly been
true of parts of TANF related to case management, job placement, job
search, child care, transportation, and training services."s These services are
increasingly contracted out to private companies who are then held to the
same performance measures that states and counties would otherwise be
subject, albeit without federal regulatory standards or safeguards as to how
those performance measures are met. In some states, county-specific
privatization of welfare administration has in fact been state mandated
where county-level public agencies have failed to meet certain performance
151measures.
Such diversification of public and private models is the goal of new
governance. It is believed that it leads to greater competition, greater
efficiency and opportunities for scaling up, more responsiveness, and
better processes for learning and sharing knowledge. The resulting
devolution nevertheless raises a series of accountability questions,
particularly with respect to consistency, fairness, choice of indicators,
minimum standards, and protection against discretion-related abuses.
Given that devolution may either increase or decrease responsiveness and
accountability depending on how it is administered - from both above and
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 617 ("No officer or employee of the Federal Government may regulate
the conduct of States under this part or enforce any provision of this part, except to the extent
expressly provided in this part.").
148. Diller, supra note 48, at 1147 (noting vast diversity of models).
149. See L. JEROME GALLAGHER, ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, ONE YEAR AFTER FEDERAL
WELFARE REFORM: A DESCRIPTION OF STATE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES
(TANF) DECISIONS AS OF OCTOBER 1997, at VII-3-4 (referring to tables VII.1-2) (1998).
150. The fact that total transfer of welfare administration to private contractors has not
taken place in more states and localities has been attributed to the fact that the "Clinton
Administration... refused to permit nongovernmental personnel to make eligibility
determinations for food stamps and Medicaid." Diller, supra note 48, at 1181.
151. In Wisconsin, for example, welfare administration in Milwaukee, where more than
sixty percent of the state's recipients live, was handed over to six non-profit and for-profit
operators after the county was unable to meet certain performance standards including a
projected decline in caseloads. See THOMAS KAPLAN, WISCONSIN'S W-2 PROGRAM: WELFARE AS
WE MIGHT COME TO KNOW IT 14, 17 (1998); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The End of Welfare and
Constitutional Protections for the Poor: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Works Program and Due
Process Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 153, 155-56 (1998).
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below - it is important to review devolutionary welfare reform from other
angles of new governance theory.
2. From Fixed Rules to Performance-Based Competitive Discretion
A second principal tenet of new governance, closely related to the first,
reflects an aversion to fixed rules imposed from the center. Rather,
flexibility and local discretion in meeting broadly-articulated public goals
is deemed the more efficient and effective model. This preference is
responsive to a growing sense that public administration should be results-
oriented, rather than rule-oriented, and that compliance with fixed rules
does not always lead to better outcomes.15 2 Since it is improved outcomes
that we ultimately care about - and the rules only a means toward
achieving them - we should focus on the outcomes and allow the rules to
take a plurality of forms according to locally-assessed needs and
particularized circumstances.'
Under this view, incorporated into U.S. public administration through
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the federal
government should avoid instructing regulated entities on "what" or
"what not" to do, i.e., stipulating means and tasks. Rather, it should seek to
hold them to certain result-oriented performance goals: improved test
scores, increased job placements, reduced welfare rolls." The regulated
entity, whether public or private, would then be held to performance-based
standards to meet those goals, flexibly and competitively, by whatever
means it considered most effective. Programs that do not meet such
performance standards would then be subject to certain sanctions, such as
financial penalty, mandatory redesign, or termination. 15 Consistent with
this approach, all federal agencies are today required to prepare an annual
performance plan with respect to each program activity in its budget, plans
that must include measurable performance goals, performance indicators,
and a basis for comparing actual results with the performance goals. in
152. See, e.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 138-65 (1992) (arguing that
government agencies should be driven by missions that they seek to accomplish and should
evaluate their success in terms of results, rather than completion of tasks); MICHAEL
BARZELAY, BREAKING THROUGH BUREAUCRACY: A NEW VISION FOR MANAGING IN
GOVERNMENT (1992) (similar).
153. This, of course, makes the process of adequately defining the desired "outcomes,"
with the full participation of stakeholders, extremely critical to the democratic "success" of the
model.
154. Pub. L. No. 103-62, §§ 3(a), 4(b), 107 Stat. 285, 286-87 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 1115-1116(a), (b) (2000).
155. Under the policy framework of Results Oriented Management Accountability
("ROMA"), created under the Government Performance and Results Act, these latter two
consequences apply to the community action programs that survive Johnson's War on
Poverty. As a mandatory reporting framework, ROMA requires CAP agencies to terminate or
redesign programs that do not verify specific, measurable permanent changes in client or
customer behavior, as documented in client files.
156. These performance-based plans must be provided to the Office of Management and
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this way, new governance seeks to promote diversification, pluralization of
solutions, and increased competition at the local level, all in the service of
common publicly-ratified outcomes.5 7
This shift is widely viewed as a decisive departure from the New Deal
command-and-control regulatory model - or, more accurate to the welfare
administration context, the legal-bureaucratic model that prevailed from
the end of the 1960s through 1996.' Designed to constrain the arbitrariness
and discrimination that often accompanied individualized professional
discretion under the prior "social work model," especially in contexts
where race and poverty-based animus was high, that regulatory model
aimed to standardize tasks and routinize activities across regulatory
entities. Correspondingly, it favored federally-guaranteed entitlement and
fixed eligibility standards of general applicability, any arbitrary application
of which could be legally challenged in fair hearings before quasi-judicial
bodies."' The model thus emphasized fixed rules over discretion,
centralization over localism, entitlement over reward, and a bureaucratic
rather than skilled-professional interface. In adopting the new governance
model, the literature of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
thus describes the change from AFDC to TANF block grants as a shift from
a program driven by "absolute rules and policies for compliance," toward
one characterized as "flexible [with] open policies for results.""
Yet, while the shift from fixed-rules to competitive discretion opens
important spaces for local experimentation in achieving certain desirable
results, it also raises the specter of arbitrary decisionmaking and weakened
accountability structures, in which power relationships between ground-
level administrators and benefit recipients are increasingly mismatched.
This is true not only because welfare under PRWORA is no longer a federal
entitlement, owed to every eligible individual under state-administered
plans and demandable as such, but also because the discretion given to
local administrators over eligibility and sanctions now extends far down
the food-chain and, most significantly, is linked to result-oriented
performance indicators that measure welfare-roll reduction, not client-
Budget and Congress each year. See Pub. L. No. 103-62, §§ 3(a), 4(b), 107 Stat. 285, 286-87
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1115-1116(a), (b) (2000)) (specifying contents of
performance plans). The Government Accounting Office has likewise submitted a report to
Congress calling for a more comprehensive national indicators assessment.
157. This is generally done through the use of funding incentives, culture-change
trainings, and performance-based evaluation. See discussion infra at Part II.B.3.
158. See supra text accompanying note 126.
159. Indeed, rejecting the "treatment" or "rehabilitation" focus of the prior supervisory
model, it proceeded under the straightforward understanding that poor families need money,
not moral guidance, and how they spent it was their own business. The job of the welfare
bureaucrat, now "more akin to an assembly line worker than a professional," was thus limited
and defined: verify recipient eligibility in line with objective, predefined criteria, and dispense
money. See Diller, supra note 48, at 1139-40 (describing model as a "machine-like process of
matching up applicants and recipients with the applicable rules and of producing uniform
results").
160. Id. at 1168 (citing OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CULTURE CHANGE TRAINING STRATEGY PROJECT REPORT 4-1 (1996)).
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centered fairness, personal needs, or overall human welfare."' It is this
issue of power relationships that stands as a central challenge to
entrepreneurial-focused new governance models in a wide diversity of
fields, particularly with respect to economically marginal segments of the
population and others without preferential access to information and
financial markets.
In this regard, it is important to recall that the shift in social welfare
policy toward the legal-bureaucratic model in the late 1960s was directed
precisely to avoid the arbitrariness, subjectivity, and consequent
discretionary abuses of the prior social-work model that had prevailed
from the mid-thirties. 2 That model had invested near total discretion in
local-level professional caseworkers, who were empowered to make
individual benefit determinations on the basis of their own "client need"
perceptions, stereotypes, cultural understandings, and sense of whether an
applicant was of worthy moral character" The legal-bureaucratic model
sought to avoid the built-in potential for arbitrariness in this subjective
approach, requiring that states set objective need-based rules to govern
eligibility, rules to which they could then be held by recipients in
individual fair hearings and by federal agencies in broader conformity or
161. It has been noted, for example, that Georgia's heralded eighty percent decline in
TANF caseload between 2004 and 2006 was linked to new application procedures that, by
increasing denials for procedural reasons unrelated to need, cut application approval rates in
half. See Liz SCHor, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, GEORGIA'S INCREASED TANF WORK
PARTICIPATION RATE IS DRIVEN BY SHARP CASELOAD DECLINE (2009),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-6-07tanf.pdf. The same was true with respect to New York
City's sixty-one percent decline in TANF caseload from 1997 to 2008. See FED. OF PROTESTANT
WELFARE AGENCIES, THE STATE OF NEW YORK'S SOCIAL SAFETY NET FOR TODAY'S HARD TIMES 7
(2009), http://www.fpwa.org/binary-data/FPWABINARY/file/000/000/127-3.pdf.
162. These abusive applications, increasingly challenged in popular movements of the
1960s and, in many cases, struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, included racially
discriminatory and selective provision of grant information, demeaning and moralistic
oversight of spending and lifestyle choices, and invasive intrusions on privacy through home-
visits, man-in-the-house rules, midnight raids, and other invasive verification procedures
designed to distinguish between morally "deserving" and "undeserving" households. These
abuses only increased with the growing African-Americanization of the welfare rolls in the
1960s. See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 46 (1993) (describing wide variation in allocation of discretionary
grants among recipients with the same level of need); WINIFRED BELL, AID To DEPENDENT
CHILDREN 181-86 (1965) (describing methods that excluded African-Americans from
coverage); Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J.
1347, 1347 (1963) (describing midnight raids against welfare recipients that implicitly
disadvantaged racial minorities).
163. Reaching its apogee in the early 1960s, the "social work model" embraced a casework
methodology in which a professional social worker worked with poor mothers under a
"treatment" or "rehabilitation" approach in which they sought to impart the skills, tools, and
material resources necessary to create safe and moral home environments for children. With
an emphasis on partnership and taking individualized needs and circumstances into account,
the model eschewed one-size-fits-all solutions. Rather, it called for broad subjective
assessments of family needs and discretionary assistance in line with professional judgment
and integrated service-delivery goals. For a strong defense of this professional discretionary
model, see William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198 (1983).
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practice hearings."
The move back towards discretion and flexibility in PRWORA
responds to certain inefficiencies and false incentives in the legal-
bureaucratic model," and a sense that welfare reform requires a new
"change in culture" ("from complacency to initiative") in the way welfare
is administered - both for recipients and administrators. Entitlements and
fixed rules, it is said, foster dependency and sap initiative.
In an effort to reinvigorate the "competitive spirit" of both recipients
and administrators, PRWORA thus proceeds along four interrelated lines,
each aimed toward the replacement of rules for low-level discretion. First,
it removes the federal entitlement aspect of welfare, preventing recipients
from claiming a "right" to anything and administrators from dispensing
benefits as a "right." It then grants broad discretion to ground-level welfare
workers to deny benefits or remove people from the rolls for a series of
non-need-based reasons, including work or life-style training
requirements, aggressive use of sanctions for minimal infringements
thereof (to "motivate" recipients)," life-time limits, 6 7 and diversionary
programs that seek to dissuade, sometimes quite abusively, potentially
eligible individuals from applying for benefits." Third, those discretionary
decisions are then tied to roll-reduction benchmarks and performance-
monitoring systems, such that workers in fact face institutional incentives
to deny benefits, sanction, or otherwise dissuade eligible individuals from
applying.' Given their operation to restrain excessively generous
164. PRWORA does require that state plans "set forth objective criteria for the delivery of
benefits and the determination of eligibility and for fair and equitable treatment, including an
explanation of how the State will provide opportunities for recipients who have been
adversely affected to be heard in a State administrative or appeal process." 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). Nonetheless, it is not clear how this can be enforced. These "criteria"
remain, moreover, subject to the flexible approach that invests substantial discretion in
ground-level administrators to deny assistance for a wide variety of non-need-related factors,
such as sanctions, diversion programs, time-limits, and other factors that help them achieve
their incentive-based goals of competitive roll reduction.
165. Indeed, a seemingly rational response to the rampant abuses of the social-work
model, the legal-bureaucratic model itself came under growing attack through the 1980s and
1990s from conservative and liberal critics alike. While liberals argued that the model had
become "legalistic and overly rule-bound," conservative critics denounced the entitlement
culture it had created, which, they argued, sustained dependency, and in which recipients
were seen to have "rights, but no obligations." Diller, supra note 48, at 1145-46.
166. In fact, during a study of one three-month period in 1998, "almost forty-percent of
recipients who left welfare did so because of sanctions." See Diller, supra note 48, at 1159-60
(citing Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, Sanctions: A Force Behind Falling Welfare Rolls;
States Are Cutting Off Tens of Thousands Who Won't Seek Work or Follow Rules, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 1998, at Al).
167. PWRORA limits benefit receipt to five years and permits states to impose shorter
time limits. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006).
168. These built-in aspects of PRWORA expand worker discretion significantly by
investing the worker with power over whether to apply exemptions in any particular case and
what information to convey to clients. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon & Tamara Watts, Welfare Time
Limits on the Ground: An Empirical Study of Connecticut's Jobs First Program, 32 CONN. L. REV.
717, 757-59 (2000) (noting that lack of guidelines gave caseworkers "unbounded discretion" in
making good cause determinations concerning extension of time limits).
169. See, e.g., Stephanie Mencimer, Brave New Welfare, MOTHER JONES, Jan.-Feb. 2009
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administration of a program, David Super refers to these types of
performance incentives and auditing systems as "counter-entitlements.,,wo
And, fourth, a federal "culture change" promotion program seeks to assist
local workers by channeling the exercise of their discretion toward acting
as coaches, motivators, and cheerleaders for "self-sufficiency." As one
commentator has summarized, "workers are given license to exhort,
advise, and ultimately threaten clients, while clients are disabused of the
notion that they have rights and can make demands.""'
While this informalization of the welfare exchange may help some
recipients - and has, indeed, led to significant declines in the national
welfare rolls - it also opens the door to new types of arbitrary
administration and unbalanced power relationships, as decisions are
increasingly made at levels so low as to evade traditional public oversight
mechanisms. 7 2 Indeed, clients are dropped from the rolls for such
"offenses" as a family member missing a single appointment for a job
interview or may be denied benefits for a series of reasons unrelated to
need.1 7 ' National and state-level surveys conducted by the Department of
Health and Human Services in fact reveal that a substantial fraction of
families may remain eligible for assistance at the time their case is closed.
While ground-level workers can, within certain limits, make discretionary
(documenting instances in which caseworkers falsely tell welfare applicants that eligibility
rules prevent them from applying for assistance if, for example, they are pregnant or have not
been surgically sterilized).
170. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of
Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1058 (2005).
171. Diller, supra note 48, at 1219 ("Although cloaked in the rhetoric of 'partnership' and
'empowerment,' the new system of welfare administration substantially redistributes power
between clients and ground-level workers. Workers are given license to exhort, advise, and
ultimately threaten clients, while clients are disabused of the notion that they have rights and
can make demands.").
172. The TANF rolls have indeed declined almost continuously since PRWORA was
enacted. From 1996 to 2008 the monthly average of 4.4 million enrolled families declined to 1.7
million. The Department of Health and Human Services documents this participation rate as
declining from eighty-four percent of eligible families in 1995, the last full year of AFDC, to
forty percent of eligible families in 2005. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., INDICATORS
OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2008, tbl. IND 4-a, available at
http:// aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators08/ch2.shtml#ind4. Given increases in unemployment
and significant increases in applications for food stamps during the very same period, it
appears that decreased participation of families in TANF is not due to decreased family
poverty, but rather to disincentives to application. See, e.g., Mencimer, supra note 169, at 41
(noting that nearly 11 million more people received food stamps in 2008 than did in 2000,
even as TANF receipt declined by forty percent, while reporting a ninety percent decline in
adults receiving benefits in Georgia - down to fewer than 2,500 in 2008 from 28,000 in 2004 -
and an eighty percent decline in Louisiana, Texas, and Illinois since January 2001).
173. Life-time limits apply, moreover, even where a former recipient has no chance of
success on the competitive job market.
174. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2008, at tbl. IND 10a, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
hsp/indicators08/ch2.shtml#indl0. For summary of key findings of surveys, see H. COMM.
ON WAYS & MEANS, 110TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 2008, at 7:84-7:86 (2008),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=2168.
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decisions to avoid such abusive results,' they also have the unfettered
power not to do so, a power supported by significant financial and
institutional incentives. This makes seeking the approval of the caseworker
imperative and, coordinately, questioning or challenging her perilous.' As
Diller notes, "In the new regime, recipients must recognize the greatly
enhanced position of the worker, or risk the consequences."
From this perspective, while the move from fixed rules to caseworker
discretion has in fact served certain formally-sanctioned ends - i.e.,
national welfare roll reduction - it is not clear at all that it has improved
client welfare. Stories from the grassroots, and national statistical surveys,
make plain that it has not.17" The failure of the program to systematically
measure performance indicators related to human well-being and security
speaks to this power of flexible discretion to breed arbitrariness and abuse
- at least in the absence of more human-friendly performance measures
and other framework accountability mechanisms.
3. Orchestration through Performance Monitoring
The third principal tenet of new governance - legal orchestration - is
perhaps the most operationally important feature of the model and, when
effectively deployed, can serve as a powerful mechanism for channeling
discretion toward desired ends at the local level. Specifically, it can
function to avoid or minimize the arbitrariness that may result from
decentralized, results-oriented policies. Indeed, as Professor Lobel has
noted - and President Johnson put into practice through his creation of a
national Office of Economic Opportunity - legal orchestration is what
"renders all other aspects of the governance model meaningful, separating
the model from flat processes of devolution and deregulation."'79 Following
the subsidiarity principle,"8 legal orchestration thus functions to prevent
the isolation or abandonment of decentralized initiatives, ensuring that
175. See Diller, supra note 48, at 1166. Noting the positive side of the shift to discretion,
Diller observes that "[a] system in which workers can help clients find jobs and obtain
necessary supports such as child care and transportation has advantages over a system in
which workers simply complete paperwork." Nevertheless, "[ulnless agencies provide
workers with the tools and resources to enable them to offer meaningful assistance ... these
benefits are likely to be more rhetorical than real." Id. at 1166.
176. See, e.g., Mencimer, supra note 169, at 42 (documenting requests for sex made to
recipients by male caseworkers).
177. Diller, supra note 48, at 1166; see also id. at 1172 (observing that welfare thereby moves
closer to the uncertainty of low-wage, at-will employment, with powerful caseworkers able to
make eligibility determinations largely without oversight or accountability to the client).
178. See, e.g., statistics cited at note 24, supra.
179. Lobel, supra note 130, at 400.
180. Indeed, just as subsidiarity does not tolerate preemption of smaller social or political
units, neither does it support wholesale devolution to them. See generally Robert K. Vischer,
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REv. 103 (2001) (arguing
that the "compassionate conservatism" platform of the Republican party purports to enact the
lessons of Catholic teachings on subsidiarity, but in so doing advocates wholesale devolution
to local authorities, neglecting subsidiarity's core focus on assistance from higher authorities).
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they are linked together within a supportive federal framework. Through
this framework, national and regional authorities can observe the plurality
of proliferating practices that emerge in the market, intervening with a
facilitative hand for purposes of "scaling up, facilitating innovation,
standardizing good practices ... researching and replicating success stories
from local or private levels,""m and communicating information to all
stakeholders transparently and comprehensively. In this way, it is said,
orchestration has the potential to result in a "virtuous cycle of innovation
and improvement."l8
Such orchestration generally involves three principal types of activities:
(a) goal articulation and identification of performance indicators; (b)
performance monitoring and incentivizing through federal supports; and,
(c) the channeling of local discretion through training programs and public
outreach. We look at each in the context of the 1996 welfare reform.
a) Performance Goals, Indicators, and Targets
Successful orchestration of an increasingly decentralized and
pluralized marketplace generally requires that a common set of goals,
objectives, or policy outcomes are identified and assumed as a community
project. To ensure progressive achievement of these common goals, a set of
performance indicators must then be developed to measure
intrajurisdictional outcomes and, correspondingly, to assess the relative
"success" or "failure" of different models in the market.' These are often
accompanied by "targets" designed to incentivize a given level of
performance achievement within a defined timeline. Such a performance-
based model means, of course, that the adequacy of the process for
determining performance measures is of vital importance to the democratic
legitimacy of the larger governance project. Otherwise, orchestration may
181. Lobel, supra note 128, at 401.
182. PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEw LABOR
MARKET 178 (2001). In promoting the National Policy on Reinventing Government, President
Clinton acknowledged this federal duty as "put[tingl the M back in the OMB [Office of
Management and Budget]." Clinton Remarks, supra note 127. That is, government must be
given a greater role in "managing" or coordinating change at the local level, even while
allowing precise means to be determined by local administrators and workers. The federal
government's role is thus "less one of direct action than one of providing financial support,
strategic direction, and leadership for other governmental actors.... mobilizing resources,
encouraging experimentation, facilitating comparison and evaluation of alternative
approaches, and diffusing the best practices." OSTERMAN, supra, at 151.
183. Performance indicators are established in a wide variety of recent U.S. statutes. See,
e.g., Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 2871 (2006) (listing core performance
indicators to be used to evaluate state workforce investment activities). The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) is in fact exploring options for the creation of a National
Indicator System to help the U.S. assess its position and progress, both nationally and within
the larger world. See generally GAO, INFORMING OUR NATION: IMPROVING How TO
UNDERSTAND AND ASSESS THE USA's POSITION AND PROGRESS (2004) (report to Congress)
[hereinafter GAO, INFORMING OUR NATION] (surveying current state of practice in indicator
systems worldwide and discussing options for Congress to consider in identifying an
organization to develop and implement a national system).
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function to be jurispathic,'" closing off spaces for legitimate or sanctioned
participation of particular actors and thus contributing to democratically
distorted policy outcomes or mis-signals to the "market" on what
constitutes policy-based success. In the public policy sphere, this will occur
most frequently where policy goals are identified in ways that do not
authentically correspond to improvements in human well-being, or are
oriented too much toward economic criteria rather than social ones.'"
In the welfare context, identifying the primary "goal" of public policy
has been a perennial and hotly contested challenge over the last four
decades.'" As Professor Edelman has noted, the contest has revolved
around two competing "stories" of U.S. poverty: the "structural" and the
"pathological."' 87 The structural story sees welfare recipients as facing
external obstacles to achieving self-sufficiency, including underlying
economic conditions and barriers to work such as lack of skills, racial and
ethnic discrimination, training, education, child care, and lack of
reasonable accommodation. "It says people are willing to work if jobs are
available for which they are qualified, if they are better off working than
not working, and if they can find care for their children while they are at
work." '" Under this view, the "goal" of welfare policy might be said to be
removing structural barriers to opportunity. Performance indicators would
then measure such factors as the number of available jobs, the number of
people in training programs and their success rate in finding and staying in
jobs over time, the ratio of child care need to provision, and other similar
indicators of opportunity or well-being.
184. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-44 (1983) (coining term "jurispathic" to represent the violence of state-
sanctioned legal ordering upon other non-state-sanctioned normative orders).
185. The European Union engages in an intergovernmental means of governance called
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which is based on soft law mechanisms such as
guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and sharing of best practices. See generally Trubek &
Trubek, supra note 133 (discussing the OMC in relation to European integration). While the
OMC has proved quite successful in many areas, such as employment law in the member
states of the EU, see, e.g., id. at 350-51, it has been argued that the quality of the indicators in
the field of social protection is not high enough and that this has limited the effectiveness of
the OMC process in that area. See, e.g., Council of European Municipalities and Regions,
Summary of Key Recommendations from CEMR for the Streamlining of the OMC in Social Fields,
Part 3, http://www.ccre.org/prises-de-positions-detail_en.htm?ID=52 (last visited Mar. 19,
2009) (noting that national level indicators sometimes fail to capture the diverse situations
between and among different member states such that local level indicators more successfully
reflect the realities of poverty). In this sense the choice of indicators is of vital consequence for
new governance initiatives in all of its global manifestations.
186. This four-decade focus is owed to the fact that, until the 1960s, poverty in America
was still broadly attributed to the Great Depression. By the 1960s, there was public
recognition that poverty persisted even in times of great economic prosperity, and hence
public tools needed to be employed to address it. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
187. Edelman, Silver Bullet, supra note 8, at 1700-01; see id. at 1702 (coining terms and
noting that, by 1993, the two stories "have been competing in a historical epoch of about three
decades duration"). These stories may be contrasted to prominent economists' views in the
1950s, including those of John Kenneth Galbraith, Milton Friedman, and Robert Theobald,
who promoted a national guaranteed income or a close variant on very different grounds. See
infra notes 249-250.
188. Edelman, Silver Bullet, supra note 8, at 1701.
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The "pathological" story, by contrast, holds that the problem is the
poor themselves: "they prefer to be dependent, will not work unless
coerced, and have bad morals; government programs to help them just
make matters worse, cementing them in their dependency with its
associated depravity.""' President George H.W. Bush articulated this
popular view in a 1991 speech, arguing that "programs intended to help
people out of poverty invited dependency."" Professor Diller has
alternatively described the story as viewing recipients as "too depressed
and unmotivated to take control of their lives and therefore need[ing] a
strong dose of both exhortation and threats to get them moving."l' Under
this pathological view, the role of government is to get them, and keep
them, off welfare as a way to break the cycle of dependency. "Success" of
any welfare program, therefore, is measured by how quickly the number of
welfare recipients in any single program declines.
The 1996 welfare reform represented in many ways the victory of this
latter story in the construction of federal welfare policy.1 92 As a result,
getting people off of welfare and into the workforce - to be "self-sufficient"
or "personally responsible," understood to mean off the public dole - was
the primary goal articulated under the PRWORA.'9 Welfare roll reduction,
as an easily measurable (if inadequate) proxy for that goal was,
consequently, the most directly responsive indicator of a "successful"
program. In recognizing this, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services developed training materials for state welfare reform
administrators in which it recommended that local welfare workers be told
directly that their performance would be evaluated in accordance with the
new goals of the program: "Your main objective is to get clients off of
welfare and into the workforce and assist the clients in learning what it
takes to maintain a job." 194 Consequently, TANF caseload reduction has
become the most common performance measure used by local welfare
agencies. "Political leaders now compete for the largest declines in welfare
enrollment. Where enrollment has not plummeted as quickly as elsewhere,
welfare reform is deemed a failure." 1 95
While other indicators of a successful program are likewise monitored
- such as the number of former recipients now in jobs" - these indicators
189. Id. at 1700.
190. R.W. Apple, Jr., Bush Says Largesse Won't Help Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at A22
(quoting President George H.W. Bush).
191. Diller, supra note 48, at 1127.
192. Certain members of the Department of Health and Human Services consequently
resigned in protest. See Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New Agenda for
Poverty Lawyers, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 547 n.* (1998) (noting own resignation).
193. 42 U.S.C § 601 (2006) (naming purpose of TANF block grants as helping States to
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage.").
194. Diller, supra note 48, at 1168-69 (quoting OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CULTURE CHANGE TRAINING STRATEGY PROJECT REPORT at Course
1, mod. 2, p. 11-12 (1996).
195. Id. at 1183.
196. Id. ("Almost as many TANF agencies report collecting data on job entries as on
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do not tend to be tracked over time and do not measure the "quality" or
"appropriateness" of the jobs or whether they have in fact led to improved
outcomes for the job-holders and their families. At the same time, the
economic security of the eligible recipients who are increasingly turned
away from welfare programs through the increase in diversion policies
generally are not tracked at all. This stands as a noteworthy omission in a
regime centered on achieving positive "outcomes." As Diller observes,
"[tihe absence of performance measures for a subject can speak as clearly to
the purposes of the program as their inclusion."'97 In the case of welfare
reform, with a federally-orchestrated goal of "jobs first" - measured
principally through comparative caseload reduction - the question of
whether people are better-off or worse-off in terms of their access to
healthcare, food sources, appropriate jobs, education, and other general
indicators of well-being simply is not deemed relevant to successful
achievement of the primary goal of welfare reform. Accordingly, such
outcomes are not measured as performance indicators for a "successful"
program. This may be viewed as one of the system's primary
accountability failures. It is an area to which we will return below.
b) Information Disclosure and Incentive Systems
Once a clear goal or set of goals and corresponding performance
indicators are identified, successful orchestration generally requires that a
wider system of information-sharing be established through which
performance indicators can be measured and comparative results assessed
and communicated to all relevant stakeholders. Through funding
incentives and other inducements to exemplary goal achievement, a
competitive environment is thus stimulated in which stakeholders strive to
achieve certain performance outcomes and vie for top-finisher status.
Under PRWORA, the federal government has sought to stimulate
stakeholder competition around the primary goal of "welfare roll
reduction" through three principal devices. First, it transformed welfare
from an individual entitlement regime into a fixed block grant program."
Delinking welfare funding from actual numbers of eligible recipients, it
thus functions to reward with windfall "profits" those states that reduce
their rolls, while disadvantaging those that do not.'" Second, it offers
caseload reduction.").
197. Id. at 1186.
198. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 602 (2006).
199. Nationally, the number of recipients of AFDC and its successor, TANF, declined
forty-two percent between 1993 and 1998. See Diller, supra note 48, at 1123. This occurred even
while the number of households with incomes below fifty percent of the poverty level
increased, even in the robust economy of the late nineties, and the average disposable income
of the poorest single-parent families declined. Id. Indeed, the fact that declining TANF receipt
does not correlate with actual decreases in need is underscored by the fact the numbers of
those receiving food stamps - which were exempt from PRWORA and remain federally-
guaranteed individual entitlements - has continued to increase, even as TANF receipt
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federal financial incentives to the highest-scoring states on a series of
performance measures contained in PRWORA.2 And, third, it creates an
annual ranking system of states on those same issues, in an attempt to get
them to compete for bragging rights and to avoid being judged the "worst"
among peers."
For their part, states have tended to jump into the competition, often
seeking to improve their own competitive edge by extending these
incentive systems to their own localities and private service contractors.
Many states have thus, for example, extended the block grant concept
downward and outward, allowing local providers and private contractors
to keep all or most of any block grant "savings" achieved through their
own caseload reduction.
Significantly, how programs get roll numbers to decline is largely
inconsequential to this competitive system: means are left to the discretion
of the local welfare agency and process indicators are generally not
measured.2 2 What matters is that numbers in fact go down. The system
thus, wittingly or unwittingly, creates incentives to reduce caseloads by
any means possible, including through means that make it more difficult
for "eligible" individuals to obtain benefits initially and to maintain
eligibility once on the rolls.203 Programs that emphasize overzealous
diversionary programs, abusive sanctions, and arbitrary barriers to
eligibility may thus be held up as "successful" models to be emulated in a
competitive system, with the government sharing such "success" stories,
providing financial incentives, and seeking the "scaling up" of best
practices.20
declined. See Mencimer, supra note 169, at 41. The Government Accountability Office found in
2006, moreover, that many states were moving federal welfare funds away from cash
assistance to the poor, or even "work supports" like childcare, to plug holes in state budgets.
Id. Notwithstanding, in twelve years federal regulators have cited states only 11 times for
misusing their TANF block grant. Id. at 44 (noting that Georgia spokesman for administration
for Children and Families noted "As far as the federal government is concerned, it's not a big
problem").
200. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(4) (2006) (providing bonuses for "high performance"
states).
201. 42 U.S.C.A. § 613(d)-(e) (providing for annual ranking of state work programs and
for annual ranking of states by rate of out-of-wedlock births).
202. See text accompanying infra note 392 for more on process indicators.
203. See, e.g., Mulzer, supra note 126, at 689-700 (citing examples of stringent verification
procedures that cause erroneous deprivations, discourage applications, and lead to routine
invasion of claimants' privacy); Mencimer, supra note 169, (citing examples of fraudulent
requirements expressed to claimants to discourage them from applying, as well as procedures
to prevent restoration of benefits once lost in Georgia, Texas, and Florida).
204. See Mencimer, supra note 169, at 43-44 (noting "rock star" status of Georgia
commissioner for Department of Human Resources as a result of her "push to get virtually
every adult off the state's public assistance rolls"; noting also how Bush administration
officials brought her to Washington for a photo-op and declared Georgia a model for other
states); Diller, supra note 48, at 1183 ("Political leaders now compete for the largest declines in
welfare enrollment. Where enrollment has not plummeted as quickly as elsewhere, welfare
reform is deemed a failure. In fact, TANF caseload reduction is the most common
performance measure used by local agencies."). For statistics from states on bragging rights,
see id. n.323.
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This reality underscores the critical need to ensure that performance
measures are designed in such a way that they in fact serve as a metric for
human wellbeing, rather than simply for raw service (or non-service)
delivery targets. While identification of such human-centered
performance measures may be complex in practice, given the high number
of variables often implicated, it is a central accountability challenge that
new governance must confront.
c) Training and Outreach to Promote New Behaviors
The third mechanism through which legal orchestration is achieved
involves training and outreach designed to change the culture of welfare
administration agencies - shifting job perception from simple arms-length
dispensers of checks to personal motivators for "self-sufficiency" - and
hence to channel the way that discretion is exercised by ground-level
employees within them. This emphasis on governing through the use of
channeled discretion is prominent in many areas of public administration,
an approach borrowed from developments in private sector
management.'
The U.S. federal government has, correspondingly, played an active
role in promoting its particular understanding of welfare reform through
training and outreach programs directed to state and local-level welfare
administration agencies. As has been noted, "Underpinning this approach
is an assumption that the principal problem facing welfare recipients is
perceptual: They believe they cannot succeed in the job market and this
belief is itself the fundamental barrier to success." 2 Training and outreach
has thus sought to encourage welfare workers to use their new broad
discretion to "motivate" recipients or applicants out of the public-welfare
system and toward "self-sufficiency." This message was explained in a
1999 report on welfare reform in five major U.S. cities:
If recipients are to understand the importance of work and the
reality of the time limits [in PRWORA], then welfare agency staff
members must deliver a very different message than the one they gave
to clients in the past. This new message - one that emphasizes the
temporary nature of assistance and the responsibility of parents to
support themselves and their children - must be communicated
205. A similar concern has been expressed in the criminal justice context where numbers
of persons prosecuted often substitute for conceptions of "doing justice." See Mary De Ming
Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 3 (2007) (expressing concern "about numbers becoming an end or target in criminal
justice, becoming the value rather than serving as a technology toward higher aims and
principles").
206. See Super, supra note 170, at 1077. As mentioned, David Super refers to practices of
this kind as "counter-entitlements" - auditing systems that seek to restrain excessively
generous administration of a program. Id. at 1077 n.23.
207. Diller, supra note 48, at 1170.
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clearly, consistently, and with considerable urgency.2
This message tracks that of the Department of Health and Human
Services, which published a series of training materials in 1996 to
accompany PRWORA and to serve as a prototype for the desired cultural
transformation of state welfare agencies. The Culture Change Training
Strategy Project Report, for example, proclaims that "the reinvention of
welfare requires a radical organizational culture change that shifts the
focus of AFDC/JOBS from an entitlement to temporary assistance leading
to work."20 It promotes the complete re-envisioning of the role of agency
personnel, away from entitlement bureaucrats and toward motivators,
guides, and overseers of recipients, constantly promoting the message of
self-sufficiency.
This emphasis on the new role of welfare workers thus returns to core
aspects of the social work model, particularly in the partnering relationship
foreseen between social work professionals and individual welfare
recipients in urging them to change their outlook on work, the home, and
self-sufficiency.21 0 As Professor Diller observes, as a strategy to change the
expectations and "culture" of welfare recipients, these "materials train
workers to be relentlessly upbeat about recipients' prospects for work:" to
"smile rather than frown," to point out the positive rather than negative
side of employment rates, to emphasize individual strengths rather than
barriers to employment, to discuss the value of nondependence, and
thereby to "assist clients in changing their viewpoints and accepting work
as an 'achievable means of self-sufficiency. -2"
These materials thus urge local agencies to transform their role,
moving away from the provision of material assistance toward recipient
motivation and the marketing of "personal responsibility." 2 12 The aim
thereby is to encourage recipients to divert themselves out of the welfare
system - either because they buy in to the marketing or, more likely,
because of the new hurdles to obtaining benefits and/or retaining their
eligibility for them. For example, recipients in many states are today
required to sign "personal responsibility agreements," breach of which
constitute sanctionable offenses.2 13  It is this below-the-surface set of
208. JANET QUINT ET AL., BIG CITIES AND WELFARE REFORM: EARLY IMPLEMENTATION AND
ETHNOGRAPHIC FINDINGS FROM A PROJECT ON DEVOLUTION AND URBAN CHANGE 10 (1999).
The report also notes statements by L.A. Department of Public Social Services officials that "if
welfare reform is to be successful in Los Angeles County, the mind-set of eligibility workers,
and the culture and environment of the eligibility offices that shape that mind-set, must
undergo a fundamental transformation." Id. at 99.
209. Diller, supra note 48, at 1167 (quoting OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CULTURE CHANGE TRAINING STRATEGY PROJECT REPORT 3-4 (1996)).
210. See supra text accompanying note 163.
211. Diller, supra note 48, at 1169 (citing various passages from Department of Health and
Human Services training course materials).
212. Id. at 1170.
213. Id. at 1157-58. According to Diller,
Responsibility 'agreements,' in effect, permit administrators to create new
sanctionable offenses.... For the most part, such agreements are simply
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changes in the way welfare is locally administered by ground-level
employees that, many believe, is primarily responsible for the rapid
declines in the national welfare rolls.214 While the legal-bureaucratic model
sought to constrain this discretion,2'5 new governance actively re-embraces
it.
4. Pluralization (and "Softening") of Flexible Compliance Measures
A fourth organizing principle of the new governance model is a
preference for so-called "cooperative" or "soft" methods of enforcement,
rather than "hard" coercive sanctions, as the most effective means of
influencing the administration of service provision. Thus, while federally-
enforced civil fines, funding cuts, criminal prosecutions, injunctions, and
other rule-based enforcement orders vis-A-vis service providers were the
hallmark of command-and-control regulation, new governance advocates a
shift away from such adversarial legalism toward greater constructive
collaboration between partners. Voluntary codes of conduct, peer
competition and pressure, self-adopted equal employment policies, codes,
and diversity training programs are, therefore, preferred methods of
ensuring administrative program compliance with general federal
performance goals.216 At the same time, there is a preference for leaving
some practices unsanctioned or only partially regulated to encourage
experimentation in preventive policymaking.217
The theory behind this shift is that problem-solving in an increasingly
complex world requires the identification of shared goals among a wide
array of social actors. This, in turn, often requires abandoning entrenched
positions that construct other actors as the problem rather than as partners
in a solution. By removing the ability to construct adversarial positions, a
an additional set of rules laid down by the agency or its workers. For
example, in West Virginia, personal responsibility 'contracts' can include
commitments that parents attend parenting classes and seek training for
skills like 'business etiquette and family budgeting.'
Id. at 1158.
214. It is also the way other "successful" national models of welfare administration, such
as that of Japan, have sought to keep rolls down and welfare rates flat despite increasing
income gaps and economic marginalization. These models have sought to ensure that welfare
is seen not as an entitlement, but as a shameful handout, with city welfare workers
empowered to impose discretionary obstacles on the application process and worker
promotions tied to roll reduction quotas. See Norimitsu Onishi, In Death Diary, Japan Welfare Is
Cast as Killer, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2007, at Al.
215. See supra note 159.
216. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 128, at 388-95, 419-21 (discussing shift toward flexibility
and noncoerciveness in new governance regimes, including specifically in employment
discrimination context).
217. See, e.g., id. at 421; Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A
Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REV. 13, 14 (1992) (arguing superiority
of "partial-industry regulation" over "all-or-nothing regulatory policies"). See also Mencimer,
supra note 169, at 49 (noting federal regulators cited states only eleven times in twelve years
for misusing their TANF block grant, even though Government Accountability Office has
found significant diversion of funds).
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climate of cooperation, it is believed, will be more effective in finding
sustainable solutions to community problems.21 8
This approach nonetheless represents a fundamental shift away from
the adversarial legalism that has been central to recipient-agency
interactions in the welfare context for years and a crucial way for recipients
to assert power and accountability in the otherwise unequal welfare
relationship. At the individual client level, such power has been asserted
through the increasing use of "fair hearings" since the late 1960s to contest
arbitrary agency decisions and to give recipients voice in the process.2 19 At
the systems level, it has occurred through federal conformity hearings and
practice suits that have challenged broader system-wide decisions with
arbitrary effects on the poor. 20 Both mechanisms relied in large part on the
federal entitlement nature of welfare under AFDC and the substantive
federal requirements it imposed on state plans to administer it.
PRWORA, by contrast, has moved in the direction of noncoercive
enforcement mechanisms. This is evident both in PRWORA's emphasis on
incentive systems, state performance rankings, and competition for
bragging rights and, coordinately, in its effort to defederalize and
delegalize welfare assistance. The effect of the latter has been to weaken or
remove the prior tools used by recipients to coerce state compliance with
federal rules. Indeed, from 1935 to 1996, welfare was deemed an
entitlement to which all eligible recipients were entitled as a matter of
federal law.221 The 1996 statutory framework for the TANF program
jettisons this foundation of the legal-bureaucratic model. Under the title
"no individual entitlement," PRWORA expressly stipulates that the TANF
framework "shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to
assistance under any State program funded under this part."2
218. Lobel, supra note 128, at 377. This approach is nonetheless linked to an assumption
that the goals of welfare administration are readily definable and free of significant conflicts,
which they are not.
219. See, e.g., Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1246 (1965) ("[Social Security] Act requires that states afford an opportunity
for a fair hearing to any individual whose claim is denied or not acted upon with reasonable
promptness .... ); A. Delafield Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. L. REV.
266, 266-68 (1949) ("All three of the federal [public assistance] titles require the state, as one of
the conditions of the federal grants, to give the applicant the opportunity of a fair hearing
before the state administrative agency.").
220. See KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 173-74 (discussing NWRO's use of conformity
hearings in late 1960s and early 1970s). But see NICK KOTZ & MARY LYNN KoTZ, PASSION FOR
EQUALITY: GEORGE A. WILEY AND THE MOVEMENT 197 (1977) (noting that HEW brought few
enforcement actions to bring state welfare rules into conformity with federal regulations, even
as it found, in 1966, that 39 of 50 states were operating their welfare systems out of compliance
with those regulations - granting the least amount of money to the fewest possible people).
221. The federal entitlement nature of welfare under AFDC, established in the 1935 Social
Security Act, was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
While states were granted substantial discretion in setting local levels of need, id. at 318 (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 74-615 at 24 (1935); S. Rep. No. 74-628 at 36 (1935)), federal law required that
those meeting eligibility requirements be paid and that any adverse decision could be
challenged through an administrative fair hearing process. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1994)
(repealed 1997).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2006).
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Accordingly, to the extent that any legal entitlement to welfare is retained,
it is a state entitlement that can be raised, lowered, or rescinded by state
legislatures at will, without federal regulatory oversight."
These changes have had significant consequences for the accountability
of service providers to recipients. Defederalization makes it far harder, for
example, to challenge state welfare abuses through traditional adversarial
means. Federal conformity hearings cannot proceed in the absence of
standards to which states must conform. Practice suits are extremely
difficult to bring, while fair hearings are individual-oriented and, as
discussed, far less effective where welfare workers have control over a
wide variety of welfare tasks and hence enhanced leverage over
beneficiaries.224 While most states offer state-level procedural protections
for administrative abuse through their own Administrative Procedure Acts
("APAs"), state APA provisions generally do not extend to the localities
and private contractors to which welfare administration is increasingly
devolved.2
5. Stakeholder Participation
Such weakening of traditional accountability tools and changes in
client-administrator power relationships raise substantial issues for the
fifth, and final, organizing principle of new governance: increased
stakeholder participation. Indeed, one of the most attractive ideas
underlying new governance theory and policy is that it opens the door for
greater civil society participation in the crafting of social policies and
public policy decisionmaking, thus pluralizing the exercise of normative
authority. As one commentator has enthused, "[n]ew governance policies
seek to enable individuals and organizations to act as private attorney
generals and to block watch public action."" The idea is that those affected
by public policies - its stakeholders - can play a decisive role in monitoring
public action to ensure that it meets community standards. 2'
223. See Diller, supra note 48, at 1146 (noting that PROWORA not only lacks any
requirement that eligible families be paid, but also greatly restricts the federal government's
ability to regulate how welfare is provided).
224. This systematic removal of "coercive" federal enforcement mechanisms from the
reach of recipients and their advocates must, however, be contrasted with the addition of
coercive enforcement mechanisms (i.e., sanctions) directed at recipients themselves. Thus, just
as recipient's own power is diminished vis-h-vis local administrators, the power of
administrators to remove them from welfare rolls through coercive sanctions is enhanced. The
implications for accountability have been severe.
225. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("MSAPA"), for example, "excludles]
political subdivision and administrative units of subdivision from definition of 'agency' for
purposes of state administrative procedure." Diller, supra note 48, at 1190 n.358 (citing
MSAPA, § 1-102(1) (1981), 15 U.L.A. 10-11 (1990)).
226. Lobel, supra note 8, at 375 (citing unpublished manuscript of Peter Dobkin Hall).
227. Cf. id. at 374 ("Multiparty involvement is understood as a way of creating norms,
cultivating reform, and managing new market realities.... [Tihe overall goal of participation
is broader than ensuring the achievement of policy goals; it enhances the ability of citizens to
participate in political and civil life.").
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Accounts of increased stakeholder participation have been particularly
strong in the field of environmental regulation where federal
environmental statutes - such as the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") and Endangered Species Act - have created important
mechanisms that multiply and pluralize opportunities for stakeholder
participation. One of these involves the NEPA requirement - increasingly
included in state environmental protection acts as well - that an
environmental impact statement ("EIS") be prepared whenever a proposed
action may have a "significant" effect on the environment.2 2 New outlets
for stakeholder participation are thus created in monitoring agency
decisions, ensuring that EISs are completed, and challenging agency
decisions through legal action where they are insufficient. Other celebrated
examples from the United States of increasing stakeholder participation
include programs in E-Government, business-consumer initiatives to
promote fair labor practices, and the emergence of multistate working
groups on environmental performance.' In the European Union context,
the Open Method of Coordination is a noteworthy example.o
Each of these initiatives nonetheless begs the question: Who
participates? While new governance models have opened spaces for a wide
variety of social actors, particularly those with preferential access to
information and financial markets, they have not tended to be successful in
opening spaces for the economically marginal segments of the population,
who continue to lack a voice in framing the social policies that affect
them." The success of EISs in promoting environmental goals - issues that
tend to attract more affluent social constituencies - have led to calls, for
example, for the broadening of EISs to include Housing Impact
Assessments.2 Triggered wherever a proposed action would have a
significant effect on housing availability, accessibility, quality or adequacy,
such assessments would open a particularly important participatory space
228. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2006). While NEPA mandates that an EIS be prepared, it
nevertheless entails no corresponding requirement that the assessment actually be taken into
account.
229. One such example is the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Performance
("MSWG"), organized in 1996 among regulators, businesses, environmentalists, and scholars
focused on studying environmental management systems and their potential to achieve
environmental results. See Welcome to the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental
Performance, http://www.mswg.org (last visited Feb. 2,2010).
230. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 133.
231. The World Bank has noted, for example, a concern that "the views of poor people
and other marginalized groups [as distinct from less marginalized groups in civil society]
have not been adequately reflected in poverty reduction strategies." The Bank attributes this
to the fact that "direct engagement of poor people takes more time than existing planning
cycles allow, and empowerment of the most vulnerable members of society is fundamentally
difficult to do" given that "[viulnerable, marginalized, and disempowered populations
generally have less voice, fewer assets, weaker networks, and suffer more from the effects of
non-income poverty than the average poor person." WORLD BANK & INT'L MONETARY FUND,
2005 REVIEW OF THE POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY APPROACH: BALANCING
ACCOUNTABILIES AND SCALING UP RESULTS 51, 73 (2006) [hereinafter PRSA REVIEW].
232. See Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing
Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433 (2003).
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for low-income housing residents and the homeless to influence ex ante the
design and implementation of public policy affecting them. EISs have
nonetheless to date tended to be interpreted narrowly so as to preclude
consideration of such social impacts.
The question of who participates is even more stark and disconcerting in
the welfare reform context. With a business-model emphasis on growing
public-private partnerships, "stakeholder participation" in welfare reform
has tended to be confined to the increasing involvement of service delivery
providers - schools, prisons, job centers, and the larger business community
that will be the source of new jobs - not service consumers. Welfare
recipients, applicants, and potential applicants do not tend to be
considered "stakeholders" in this project, at least not from the perspective
of programmatic decisionmaking about welfare or at the level of policy
design or implementation. Rather, they are deemed "partners" only at the
individual level, in decisionmaking about how to navigate within the
options already decided upon by other non-recipient stakeholders. This
lack of voice is further exacerbated where localities or private contractors
take over administration of TANF or supervise local administration, given
the lack of applicability of even state APAs and public access laws to such
entities.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there are multiple public
accountability shortcomings to the actual implementation and roll-out of
many new governance regimes, particularly as they affect low-income
stakeholders. These shortcomings have generally resulted from the failure
to ensure that all stakeholders have an active voice in first defining and
then monitoring performance measures. In the welfare context, this
unbalanced representation has allowed the goal of poverty alleviation to be
dominated by and frequently conflated with that of welfare roll reduction,
thereby serving the interests of those who seek to reduce or eliminate the
role of the state in public service provision. The central challenge, then, is
to reassess current models of regulatory governance to ensure that they are
designed in a way that facilitates the participation and voice of all
stakeholders, particularly in the definition and monitoring of the publicly-
sanctioned goals to which new governance regimes are directed.
In this project, three questions must continually be asked: Who can
realistically participate? How are national goals and performance indicators
233. Id.
234. See supra note 225. While a "number of states and localities have in fact established
certain creative avenues for public participation in setting welfare policy," the reality of
participation, as has been noted, frequently differs quite significantly from its appearance. See
Diller, supra note 48, at 1213-15. This formal representation model, in which recipient groups
have limited voice and control over the selection of program priorities and funding decisions,
has tended to dominate the Community Action Program ("CAP") agencies that survived the
dismantling of President Johnson's early War on Poverty.
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initially defined and thereafter monitored? and What roles do local, state,
and federal governments play in policing the boundaries? In the welfare
context, review of these questions reveals three significant areas of concern:
(1) the limited opportunities for low-income beneficiaries to participate as
full stakeholders in institutional performance design, monitoring, and
evaluation processes; (2) the lack of performance-based indicators and
benchmarks that can serve as a metric for human well-being, rather than
raw numerical service delivery targets; and (3) the inadequacy of federal
orchestration of locally-devolved authority in achieving performance
outcomes. Significantly, it is precisely to these issues that a growing
movement from the grassroots, using interjurisdictional human rights and
comparative law resources, seeks to respond. Given its aim of inserting
itself into democratic processes to create new structures and relationships
for holding power holders to account for the impacts of policies and
practices on the rights of the socially disadvantaged, I call this the "New
Accountability" movement.
II. "NEw ACCOUNTABILITY" AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF THE POOR: FROM
FIXED MATERIAL GOODS TO INCLUSIVE, RIGHTS-BASED PARTICIPATION
Just as regulatory understandings have shifted radically since the
1960s, so too have the strategies undertaken by those historically
marginalized from institutional processes. This is evident upon reviewing
the changing methodologies, rhetorical influences, and mobilization
strategies of the U.S. welfare rights movement over the last forty to fifty
years. What is revealed is a decisive shift away from nonnegotiable
material demands and mass confrontation - the preferred tactics of 1960s
activism - toward participatory and process-oriented ones that seek to
address precisely the accountability shortcomings identified above: Who
participates? How are those perspectives taken into account? What norms
and standards guide the process? And what orchestrating role do state and
federal governments play?
Significantly, while such movements generally reject the policies and
practices of new governance regulatory regimes, such as PRWORA, as
antipoor and exclusionary, their approaches and organizational tactics in
fact closely overlap with those of new governance theory. They, too,
emphasize the expansion and pluralization of stakeholder participation,
the identification of national performance goals and targets, more flexible
and cooperative approaches to achieving desired outcomes, the monitoring
and assessment of comparative performance through indicators and
benchmarks, and the identification of new oversight bodies and processes
through which legal orchestration can be managed. It is through these
performance-centered organizational tactics - themselves foundational to
the structure and practice of modern human rights law - that the
historically powerless today seek to reinsert themselves as full and equal
stakeholders into the policymaking processes that affect their lives. This is
particularly true as those processes affect core rights of access to adequate
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housing, health care, education, nutrition, social security, and living-wage
employment.
I call this tactical model the "New Accountability" movement. That
nomenclature reflects the priority held within modern social movements
for creating new tools and social arrangements through which historically
marginalized groups can hold decisionmaking entities, both public and
private, to more direct account for conduct that fails to meet minimum
community standards of performance, transparency, and participatory
engagement. They are doing so not through exclusive reliance on the
formal police power, centralized regulatory rules, or lawyer-led judicial
process, but rather through new strategies designed to more immediately
leverage social and consumer power over the delivery of the goods and
services necessary for human dignity and wellbeing.
While the struggle for greater accountability to the needs of the socially
disadvantaged is certainly not new to social movement advocacy, what is
new is the distinctly more pluralized (and privatized) set of mechanisms
and relationships through which accountability is understood to be
legitimately, even necessarily, pursued in the modern era. That is, the
twenty-first century has brought changes that have rendered traditional
tools of democratic accountability and older usages of rights language
increasingly inadequate as a means for achieving the participatory
relevance of the poor and other socially marginalized actors." These
changes include, in particular, the increasing privatization of power that
has accompanied economic globalization and the corresponding
weakening of the centrality of the state in regulating conduct within
territorial borders. Relying on new information-sharing technologies and
rights methodologies, civil society actors have responded by seeking new
ways to hold a broader array of public and private actors to more direct
account for abusive and socially irresponsible behavior, including through
the harnessing of consumer and investor leverage over private sector
profits and public sector priorities.3 Indeed, disillusioned with both the
money-driven limits of electoral politics and the jurisdictionally
constrained role of the courts to protect the livelihood rights of the poor,
social movements of the poor the world over have opted to seek new, more
flexible and accessible spaces in which creative forms of social
accountability can be explored."
235. See discussion infra notes 289-305.
236. The new accountability movement may, in this way, be said to be directly responsive
to four of the major defining political transformations of the late twentieth century: economic
globalization, political democratization, the rapid breakdown of communication barriers
across borders, and the growth and sophistication of human rights law and its implementing
institutions. Each of these transformations has created the conditions enabling, even
compelling, the new accountability movement's emergence. They have done so either by
accentuating the growing inadequacies in the modem era of traditional accountability
mechanisms or, alternatively, by providing marginalized communities with a new set of tools
and comparative resources to confront and challenge those inadequacies directly.
237. It may be noted that this increased movement toward social accountability has been
accompanied, particularly in newer and less institutionalized democracies, by a congruent
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The "new accountability" nomenclature reflects in this regard the fact
that accountability - and particularly how accountability systems are
structured in a given society - speak directly to relationships of political
power and access.' Who in society, as a practical matter, can effectively
influence decisionmaking processes? Accountability implies, in this sense,
"that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards,
to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these
responsibilities have not been met."39
Drawing on these core elements - especially those of information
transparency, social actor responsibility, performance measures, and
sanction - social movements of the poor are today engaging in a distinct
type of self-advocacy in an effort to regain their participatory relevance.
Using a new set of human rights methodologies, they are insisting on the
right of those most affected by social welfare policy - the economically
disadvantaged - to hold other community members and social actors to a
set of rights-based performance standards related to progressive
improvements in access to adequate housing, health care, food, education,
employment, social security, and other rights; to independently monitor and
assess compliance with those standards; and to impose some form of penalty
movement toward a complementary emphasis on legal accountability - that is, through the
expansion of strategic litigation involving the rights to health, housing, food, employment,
and access to water. See, e.g., SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008); COURTING SOCIAL
JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
(V. Gauri & D. Brinks eds., 2008); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, COURTS AND THE LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES OF
JUSTICIABILITY (2008); COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? (Roberto Gargarella et al. eds., 2006). Much of this
litigation is nonetheless strategically focused on opening participatory channels and spaces for
the disadvantaged to engage decisionmakers directly in the construction of the public agenda.
238. See Mark Bovens, New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance, 5 COMP. EUR. POL.
104, 105-08 (2007) (explaining that accountability has different meanings in different societies
and political systems, usually blending elements of control, responsibility, and
responsiveness).
239. Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005). See also Anne Marie Goetz & Rob Jenkins, Voice,
Accountability, and Human Development: The Emergence of a New Agenda (UNDP,
Background Paper No. 2002/4, 2002), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2002/papers/Goetz-Jenkins-2002.pdf (defining
accountability as the power of one social actor to demand that another social actor justifies his
or her conduct through reason-giving and explanation (answerability) and/or the power to
impose a penalty or sanction on that social actor for poor performance or for failure to
adequately explain it (enforceability)).
This definition holds true, in principle, irrespective of the accountability model at issue.
See, e.g., Grant & Keohane, supra, at 29-43 (differentiating between "participation" and
"delegation" models of accountability, each based on different conceptions of legitimacy);
Bovens, supra note 238, at 107 (discussing "narrow" and "broad" readings); Manfred Elsig,
Changing Authorities and New Accountability in the World Trade Organization: Addressing
a Research Gap 18-19 (Swiss National Centre of Competition in Research (NCCR) Trade
Regulation, Working Paper No. 2007/30, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1048641
(recognizing internal and external forms of accountability).
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or sanction where performance is objectively inadequate or where
justificatory or process requirements are not met. To establish the
normative and institutional framework within which to do this, new
accountability draws directly on the substantive and procedural standards
of international human rights law, particularly the legal process and
accountability relationships it creates between distinct social actors, both
public and private.240
"New accountability" thus differs from older and narrower models of
rights-based organizing in four key respects: first, its expanded vision of
the relevant set of public and private stakeholders understood as legitimate
objects of accountability processes; second, the more sophisticated rights-
based standards used to hold such stakeholders to account; third, the more
direct role for ordinary people and their associations in demanding
accountability across a more diverse set of jurisdictions; and, finally, the
expanding repertoire of strategies, tactics, tools, and fora for exacting
decisionmaking transparency and social sanction, the hallmarks of
accountability. 24' Through pluralizing and expanding access to these sites -
especially with respect to the practical operation of modern new
governance regimes in the social welfare context - new accountability
seeks to ensure that the needs, experiences, and priorities of those most
affected by social welfare policy are taken directly into account as a
mandatory part of policy formulation and assessment.
Looking at this "new accountability" movement in juxtaposition to the
movement that arose in the context of the 1964 War on the Sources of
Poverty reveals that we are, today, at a very different "moment." That
moment, I argue, is one distinctly amenable to a modern reclaiming of the
MFP ideology of the early War on Poverty. This reclaiming is made
possible by the fact that the principle driving tenets of new accountability
parallel so closely those of new governance. These, in turn, draw from the
same motivating principles that gave rise to the early focus on maximizing
the participatory relevance of the poor as the basis for an effective national
attack on U.S. poverty.
Recognition of this overlap is critical for two reasons, both related to
the future of poverty alleviation efforts in the United States. First, such
recognition is operationally necessary to grasp how new accountability and
new governance regimes may institutionally intersect, and thus how new
240. As has been said, "the raison d'etre of the rights-based approach is accountability."
MALCOLM LANGFORD, UNITED NATIONS, CLAIMING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A
HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 15 (2008). Although it is often claimed that human rights
law applies to governments only, at its core human rights law is based on the notion that
"lelveryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his [or
her] personality is possible." Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 29(1), G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR] (emphasis added).
241. It has been noted that transparency and sanction lie at the heart of virtually all
conceptions of accountability. See Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE
SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 14-17
(Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
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governance regulatory regimes may constructively be altered to
accommodate the positive influences and informational inputs of new
accountability methodologies. Second, and just as critically, a firm
understanding of the changing strategies of social movements of the poor
in the twenty-first century - particularly in their shift from an absolutist
"rule" focus to a more reflexive "process" orientation - is vital for a
national coming-to-terms with the political legacy of the early War on the
Sources of Poverty. Indeed, it is in many ways the political legacy of that
war that has kept "poverty" and the "poor" (and discussions of social
rights more generally) off the national political agenda for the last forty
years.2 42 A failure to confront this legacy directly, and correspondingly to
create a thicker, more fact-driven historical narrative around it, will ensure
continuing resistance to any political re-embrace of the participatory
methodologies of the early War on the Sources of Poverty.
Accordingly, the following Part is divided into two Sections. The first
looks to the early social welfare rights movement in the United States, the
rights-based strategies and tactics it employed, and how those tactics
contributed to the political backlash that continues to surround discussions
of poverty and the rights of the poor in the nation. The second then looks at
the new tactics and strategies employed by the emerging social welfare
rights movement in the United States, what I call the "New Accountability"
movement. These strategies draw on the tools and methodologies of
international human rights law, in ascent around the world today. In so
doing, they seek to recapture both the instrumentalist and intrinsic-value
benefits of President Johnson's early MFP policy, while forcing a new
dignity-based focus to poverty alleviation programs and decisionmaking
processes. It is these new accountability methodologies from "below," I
argue, that, in their increasing intersection with new governance regulatory
policies from "above," create the conditions for a renewed, participation-
focused national commitment to poverty alleviation in the United States.
Ensuring that this constructive intersection in fact takes place, however,
will require the crafting of a new set of national institutions that have this
linkage as their primary end.
A. The Early U.S. Welfare Rights Movement: 1964-1973
There have been a growing number of accounts of the early welfare
rights movement in the United States,24 3 a movement that rose and fell in
less than a decade. At its height in 1969, that movement had a dues-paying
242. Widely seen as a political liability, the plight of the U.S. poor has long been
overlooked or ignored in political and media discussions of the economy in favor of a
preferred focus on the "middle class." See, e.g., Op-Ed., Barbara Ehrenreich, Too Poor to Make
the News, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at WK10 (highlighting noted lack of attention to the effects
of the economic recession on the already poor); see also supra note 76.
243. See, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 47; PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING
CAESARS PALACE: How BLACK MOTHERS FOUGHT THEIR OWN WAR ON POVERTY (2005).
2010]1 59
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
membership base of over 20,000 welfare recipients, organized into
community-based welfare rights organizations around the nation.2" By
1972, it was effectively moribund.245 While many have attributed this
premature end to the growing African-Americanization of the rolls and
rising U.S. commitments in Vietnam, each of which were important
contributors to changing public attitudes about welfare support,246 one
cannot overlook the role of the rights-based strategies used by the
movement and their effects on public opinion. These strategies, in turn,
cannot be separated from the historical epoch in which they arose.
The U.S. Welfare Rights Movement emerged formally in 1966, with the
founding of the National Welfare Rights Organization ("NWRO") and
coordinated marches across the country." This emergence, just two years
after the federal "War on the Sources of Poverty" was announced in 1964,
represented a convergence of historical stimuli and the changing map of
legal, rhetorical, and material resources in the 1960s. These included the
civil rights movement and its expanding use of rights language and civil
disobedience strategies, the rising black power movement and early
feminist discourse, and the dramatic rise in rights consciousness brought
on by the popularization of rights language by the federal judiciary, led by
the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren. These factors,
moreover, were set atop an expanding federal bureaucracy - increasingly
seen as a neutral and solid bulwark against arbitrary abuses at the state
and local levels - and a rapidly expanding post-WWII consumer economy
and consumer-oriented culture. Within this framework, a growing sense
had emerged across an increasing political spectrum in the late 1950s and
early 1960s that citizenship in the new "affluent society"18 meant gaining
access not only to its ballot boxes and courtrooms, but also to its consumer
marketplaces.2 49 Low-income women thus increasingly argued that "full
244. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 295-96 (Vintage Books 1979) (noting there were 22,000 dues-
paying members related to the movement); KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 2 (reporting 20,000-
30,000 card-carrying members and 540 local chapters). Some sources estimate that
membership was as high as 75,000 members. See Tom Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65, 66 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971).
245. See KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 178-79 (noting that the movement began to collapse
in the late summer and fall of 1968); KoTz & KoTz, supra note 220, at 290 (noting plummeting
membership and financial support in 1972, resignation of NWRO executive director, and
closing of office doors in 1975, with movement having "ended").
246. See, e.g., KoRNBLUH, supra note 47, at 10 ("The War on Poverty had been lost, thanks
to federal squeamishness about the conflicts it inevitably inspired as well as the costs of the
war in Vietnam."); ORLECK, supra note 243, at 4 ("The War on Poverty, Martin Luther King Jr.
famously said, was shot down on the battlefields of Vietnam."). See also MICHAEL
HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 20-22, 31 (1984) (attributing failures to Vietnam
War and lack of funding).
247. See KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 38 (describing how organizers proclaimed June 30,
1966, a day of coordinated national actions, "[tihe Birth of the Movement," even as policy
roots and grassroots sympathizers had been growing for years).
248. GALBRAITH supra note 65, at 293.
249. KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 76 ("At the high point of the affluent society and the
rights consciousness... [female welfare recipients thus] demanded the political and material
goods they believed were available to everyone else in their country."). A range of prominent
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citizenship" in the postwar United States "depended not only on having
access to decent schooling for their children, but also on being able to feed
and clothe their children decently, on having furniture in their homes, and
on owning decent goods.""
The early U.S. welfare rights movement was, correspondingly,
decidedly consumerist in orientation. This consumer orientation was itself
a central feature of the "social work" paradigm that dominated welfare
administration from the 1930s through the 1960s and, accordingly,
structured the policy environment within which social movements
operated." This individual casework model saw poverty as stemming
primarily from conditions within the home. The role of social workers,
then, was to supervise mothers in "proper parenting" and "proper
household spending" to ensure "proper family living." 2 These
assessments included not only a mother's skills and character, but also the
items she had in her home. Social workers were thus generally authorized
to dispense to mothers the household items considered necessary for
"normal family living."" With the rise of rights consciousness and the
consumerist culture of the 1950s and 1960s, this emphasis on consumer
goods for "normal family living" and expert-identified "basic needs"
provided a central organizing tool for welfare mothers intent on being
treated "fairly" and with dignity in post-war, post-Brown society. Gaining
immediate, mandatory access to government-provided hats, winter coats,
shoes, linens, tables, beds, and other household items thus became a central
organizing strategy for local groups of AFDC-recipient mothers in the mid-
1960s.&
economists shared this sense. See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 65, at 289-90, 293 (arguing that,
given the inability of the private market to ensure productive jobs that could secure economic
security to all, government had obligation to secure "reasonably satisfactory substitute for
production as a source of income"); ROBERT THEOBALD, FREE MEN AND FREE MARKETs 3 (1963)
(calling for guaranteed minimum income under U.S. Constitution); GALBRAITH, supra note 65,
at 266-67 (2d ed. 1969) (advocating national guaranteed income). Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN &
ROSE FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 178 (1962) (advocating negative income tax or
guaranteed income administered by Internal Revenue Service as alternative to government in-
kind welfare programs).
250. KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 40. For an argument that this broader understanding of
civil rights to include economic rights and economic justice, particularly rights to work and
just conditions of work, was apparent in the social mobilizations of the 1940s and 1950s, see
RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
251. See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1989-1935 (1994) (describing history of U.S. welfare administration since
1930s).
252. KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 41-44.
253. This was true, for example, in New York State, which required that city welfare
administrations keep public assistance recipients at a "minimum standard of health and
decency." To fulfill this mandate, New York City issued to each caseworker a thick manual of
procedures, which included lists of "minimum standards" containing items that every "adult
woman" and "good home" must have for "normal family living." Id.
254. While these initiatives began in the early 1960s as individual letters sent to
neighborhood welfare departments, small-scale initiatives, or even citywide school boycotts in
an effort to get supplemental grants to keep schoolchildren warm and decently dressed, they
were transformed into a nationwide strategy by 1966 and 1967 under the strategic direction of
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The increasing material resources provided by President Johnson's
"maximum feasible participation" plan, in turn, often made these
organizing strategies possible. Indeed, the War on Poverty administrative
apparatus provided vital financial assistance, including office space and
staff, to neighborhood and community groups that functioned under the
rubric of community action programs ("CAPs")25 These programs became
critical loci of welfare recipient organizing in the mid-1960s,2 and were
used by poor women's groups to gain voice and to initiate a wide variety
of neighborhood-based nutrition, education, housing, and welfare
programs.
Yet, while the War on the Sources of Poverty envisioned community
groups working on locally-directed plans to address their own unique
experiences with poverty - particularly through the development of local
employment opportunities and locally-grown strategies for improving
human capability and productivitym' - the actual operation of community
action programs was, in practice, often redirected by nonrecipient, middle-
class national welfare rights organizers to a largely contrary, even
antagonistic, end: intentionally deluging local welfare offices with rights-
based claims for the immediate, mandatory provision to every poor
household of a defined set of government-provided consumer goods.'
This strategy, perilous as it might seem today, represented in many ways
the clash between the federally-theorized War on the Sources of Poverty,
with its emphasis on localism and cooperation, and the dominant
paradigm of social movement organizing in the 1960s, with its focus on
confrontation, group power, civil disobedience, and fixed federal
government rules and solutions.
Indeed, by 1967, the National Welfare Rights Organization had
established a National Action Plan pursued under the slogan "More
Money, NOW!"5 This slogan reflected the particular organizing strategy
proposed by liberal academics and espoused by national leaders of the new
movement. While most member organizations of the NWRO were
composed of women welfare recipients working on issues of immediate
the National Welfare Rights Organization. Id. at 44-48.
255. See discussion supra Part I.
256. Largely because of this, funding for CAP initiatives was often cut off early on. For
more on the Nixon administration's practice of defunding CAPs, see JOAN HOFF, NIXON
RECONSIDERED 60-65 (1994).
257. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(a), 78 Stat. 508, 516
(repealed 1981) (defining "community action program").
258. See KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 51-55 (noting conflict between defending War on
Poverty legislation, which promised only the distant possibility of long-term benefits, and
pursuing the immediate economic benefits of minimum standards campaigns, which could
draw new people to campaigns).
259. Id. at 60. The progenitor of this slogan later reflected that it was "really good on the
street for welfare recipients," although "kind of a crass message.... It didn't clothe the idea of
basic needs, you know, with very much dignity." Id. At the first inaugural meeting of the
NWRO in 1967, recipients were promised that through their membership they could gain
"justice, dignity, democracy, and MORE MONEY NOW!" The 300 delegates chose four
principles as the official goals of NWRO: Adequate Income, Dignity, Justice and Democracy.
Id. at 60-61.
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local concern to themselves and their families, the national offices were run
predominantly by external activists and nonrecipient middle-class
organizers, generally men. These organizers had a distinct and specific
political agenda: they wanted a national guaranteed minimum income
plan. Such a plan would replace locally-administered welfare for single
mothers with a unified fixed-rule system that would "solve" the problem
of poverty in the nation by legally guaranteeing to all poor people
minimum income transfers irrespective of work.2 6
To do this, national organizers believed it was necessary to organize
recipients into a benefits-based movement that, through confrontation,
disruption, and the intentional creation of a national "crisis," would
overwhelm local and state administrative systems.2 61 This "crisis strategy"
aimed to get as many people on the public welfare rolls as possible, under
the understanding that adding even a fraction of the qualified poor would
create a bureaucratic and fiscal crisis in cities and states that would "impel
federal action on a guaranteed minimum income plan."2 62 The purpose of
organizing, then, was not to seek local solutions or to work cooperatively
with local government on comprehensive, multisectoral anti-poverty plans
with a variety of stakeholders. Rather, it was to instigate institutional
overloads in city and state welfare offices around the country, using legal
mechanisms and fixed-rights language in an effort to singularize a national
response. In essence, the strategy flipped "maximum feasible
participation" on its head, and it used the War on Poverty's signature
community action programs to do much of the heavy lifting.
This crisis strategy functioned through the synergy of two principal
benefits-based organizing tools: fixed-rule "minimum standards"
campaigns and administrative "fair hearings."2" Organizers used these two
tools - both appropriated directly from the welfare apparatus itself - to
help public aid recipients get what they were told were their "full rights -
260. Prominent among this group were George Wiley, Richard Cloward, and Frances Fox
Piven. See, e.g., Richard Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End
Poverty, THE NATION, May 2, 1966, at 510 (advancing the movement strategy). As Kornbluh
explains in recognizing the gender politics of the issue, NWRO member groups did not
definitively support a guaranteed minimum income plan. See KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 50-
51, 152-53, 168-69; see also id. at 89.
261. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 244, at 264-361 (1977) (discussing strategies of
National Welfare Rights Organization in mid- to late-1960s, and decision of national leaders to
adopt a "strategy of crisis" in which activists would intentionally drive-up welfare rolls in
order create an institutional crisis that would force a "federal solution to poverty" and "major
economic reforms at the national level," although these remained unspecified). Piven and
Cloward were the intellectual authors of this "strategy of crisis." See Cloward & Piven, supra
note 260.
262. KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 37 (citing Piven & Cloward). Piven and Cloward
estimated that, in 1966, three out of five poor people eligible for public assistance were not
receiving it. See Cloward & Piven, supra note 256 at 511.
263. While both fixed-rule "minimum standards" and administrative "fair hearings" were
part of the legal resource map of the New Deal regulatory state, neither was systematically
utilized by recipients until the mid-1960s, when they converged with increasing rights
consciousness and a greater reliance on national organizers and lawyers. See KORNBLUH, Supra
note 47, at 70-73.
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what they are entitled to under the law, immediately."2" The "minimum
standards" of the minimum-standards campaigns were, in fact, drawn
directly from the caseworker manuals issued to social workers under the
"social work" model. That model saw government-funded social workers
as experts in "normal family living." To aid caseworkers in determining
what an AFDC mother might need to make her home more suitable for
parenting, cities and states thus often issued caseworkers thick manuals of
procedures, including lists of "minimum standards" that every "adult
woman" and "good home" must have for "normal family living." 25 These
items, which were numerous and specific 266 - e.g., a "normal" family
kitchen should include a dinette set, a paring knife, an egg beater of the
"rotary type," and a fruit reamer made of glass - could be added to a
welfare client's personalized budget at the discretion of a welfare
caseworker, as could other "special items needed which are considered
essential to clients' comfort and wellbeing."26 7
The content and even existence of these detailed lists were not,
however, shared with recipients; they were kept undisclosed for the
caseworker to dispense at his or her discretion in assessing a client's need.
Beginning in 1964, sympathetic social workers nevertheless began to share
this "minimum standards" information with community organizers.
Shocked by the detailed regulatory rules, yet keenly alert to their
organizing potential, activists responded by quickly condensing the
detailed information on minimum standards into simple and easy-to-read
one-page checklists of material household demands. These were then
circulated to statewide recipients to compare "what they had" versus "what
they were owed." As Kornbluh notes:
Clients who read the checklist learned about the minimum
standards at a glance. Virtually all of them saw that there was a
wide gap between what they had in their homes and the array of
goods the welfare department - in manuals it did not share with its
clients - claimed were necessary for families to live at a minimum
264. Id. at 26 (citing organizational materials of the People's War Council Against Poverty,
the precursor to the Executive Council of the NWRO, quoted in LARRY R. JACKSON, PROTEST BY
THE POOR 124-25 (1974)) (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 44-45.
266. In New York City, for example, "Itihe manuals specified that each adult woman
required one hat, one 'Dressy dress,' one girdle, two cotton dresses, three pairs of panties, and
two pairs of stockings. For living room furniture, the manual specified a couch, which was to
have a 'new cotton linters mattress,' and a 'drop leaf or extension (wood)' table. In the kitchen,
'normal family living' supposedly required a dinette set and, for cooking equipment, a paring
knife, an egg beater of the 'rotary type,' and a fruit reamer made of glass. Minimum standards
in the category called 'General Furnishings' included a shopping cart, alarm clock, towel rack,
and toilet tissue holder, plus a 'runner, 36" wide' for the hallway, and a washable bathroom
rug." KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 43-44.
267. Id. at 44 ("These ran the gamut from a special diet for a diabetic welfare recipient, to
transportation for a doctor's visit, housekeeping services for a recipient who was physically
unable to do her or his own housekeeping, and babysitting or child care help for an
'overburdened mother' who was certified as such by a case supervisor.").
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standard of health and decency.268
[As one neighborhood activist recalled, when she and other
people in her neighborhood saw the minimum standards
checklists, we] "couldn't believe the things that were in [them].
Coats and sweaters. ... There was a law in the books that said you were
entitled to these things and we were going to try to get them." 26 9
NWRO members and their allies thereafter referred to virtually every
contested action - especially denials of specific consumer goods or grant
supplements - by a local caseworker or elected official as an "illegal"
contravention of law, whether of state regulations, the Social Security Act,
the U.S. Constitution, or human rights law. With this use of legal language
as part of their day-to-day political strategies, recipients were then
instructed to check off every item on the checklist that they did not have in
their home and to send it in to the neighborhood welfare office under the
demand (printed at the top of each checklist): "The following are the
furniture and household supplies [and] items that I am lacking in my home
and need in order to be brought up to minimum standards." Claiming it
was "illegal" for caseworkers and bureaucrats to deny such "minimum"
items to clients who asked for them, the forms continued: "I expect an
answer to my request within one week."270
Where requests were not answered promptly with the receipt of the
corresponding monetary sums, recipients were encouraged by organizers
to aggressively pursue formal appeals of welfare department decisions
through fair hearings.2 7 1 These hearings - built into all three titles of the
1935 Social Security Act, including the forerunner to AFDC - required that
states afford an opportunity for a fair hearing to any individual whose
claim is denied or not acted upon with reasonable promptness. These
hearings, though rarely used by clients of public assistance between 1935
and their "rediscovery" in the 1960s, quickly became a highly effective and
coercive tool in securing benefits-based concessions from local and state
welfare agencies.2 72 As Kornbluh notes, they were "one of the few actions
one could use to force the welfare department into a situation where it cost
them more time, money and manpower" to schedule and staff the
268. Id. at 45.
269. Id. at 47 (emphasis added); see also id. at 56 (citing recipient who recalled being
"shocked 'cause [this was a] legal fact sheet with all the items that you were entitled to ... and
you were just to check off if you needed these things. So we did.").
270. Id. at 46 (replicating one of the checklists from New York City).
271. Cloward & Piven, supra note 262. To carry out the strategy, Cloward and Piven (its
intellectual authors) proposed three steps of national strategic action: advertise to the poor
their "rights" to public assistance in terms they can understand; have organizers advocate for
individual clients and coordinate demonstrations on common problems; and use lawyers to
pursue formal appeals of welfare department decisions (e.g., through fair hearings) when
informal means did not succeed. Id.
272. While New York City had a mere 188 fair hearings in 1964, in 1967 it had 4,233.
KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 73.
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hearings, replace the caseworkers who left their regular jobs in order to
participate, and transcribe the proceedings, "than it would cost the client
organization."273
NWRO organizers thus urged recipients to keep request forms
"pouring in," reminding members that their "success depends on everyone
going to their hearing."2 74 In this way, they saw the hearings, combined
with the minimum standards campaign, as a way to overwhelm state
welfare departments with requests in much the same way that civil rights
demonstrators had overwhelmed the Southern justice system. By securing
large cash grants for members of welfare rights groups, they thus sought to
increase NWRO membership, strengthening the organization's "muscle"
and coming closer to a federal solution to poverty.
Yet, while the minimum standards campaign and general "crisis
strategy" were highly successful as a way to secure millions of dollars of
cash grants every month for NWRO members, 75 they were a disaster for
public relations and for winning the hearts and minds of America in a
shared program of poverty alleviation. The increasingly belligerent,
extreme, and confrontational demands for cash grants and consumer credit
by the NWRO, especially in conjunction with its wholesale rejection of any
work requirements for public assistance, created a strong backlash against
welfare provision and AFDC recipients in particular. This was especially
true as the economy turned sour in 1970, city budget deficits grew, and the
war in Southeast Asia intensified. Thus, while politicians across the
political spectrum largely supported a national minimum income plan up
until 1968 - seeing it as an inevitable step forward whose "time had come"
- by 1970 the entire idea was dropped in its tracks, its promoters
transformed into political laughingstocks. 276
The result was a growing view of AFDC recipients, predominantly
poor women on welfare, as "undeserving" freeloaders, more interested in
taking over buildings and staging political demonstrations than supporting
themselves and their families through work. This, in turn, served to
strengthen a growing (and still dominant) "rhetoric of poverty" that, on the
one hand, locates responsibility for poverty in the lack of moral rectitude of
the impoverished and, on the other, portrays society as helpless to address
the underlying causes of poverty, seen as emanating from a lack of
273. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
274. Id. at 75, 86 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
275. By 1968, The New York Times reported that the campaign was costing New York City
$10 million per month, with each hearing costing the state $300 per day. Id. at 85. As Kornbluh
observes, welfare commissioners were eager to prevent fair hearings, often making them
generous beyond the reckoning of low-income recipients. In New York city, ninety percent of
appeals never went to hearing. "In the bulk of the cases, however, local Welfare Centers
contacted the appellants (or sometimes their lawyers) and started offering them furniture,
back-to-school clothes, other goods, and cash, as incentives to abandon their fair hearing
requests.... Generally speaking, the longer clients held out and threatened the welfare
department with a possible hearing, the more they got." Id. at 78.
276. Id. at 6-7, 154.
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personal responsibility.277 This shift in public perception and growing anti-
poverty mood, exacerbated by the increased violence and rioting of the
1960s, led to a host of benefit reductions and new eligibility standards
across the nation, to investigations into roll fraud, and to the rise of a new
grassroots conservative movement, especially among Republicans, that
made welfare its major issue.2 78 With Earl Warren newly retired, this shift in
public attitude was likewise reflected on the U.S. Supreme Court,' which
rejected NWRO claims in case after case starting in 1970.2 In so doing, it
made clear that, from then forward, the U.S. Constitution guarantees no
minimum level of adequate income,281 that different categories of public
assistance beneficiaries need not receive similar levels of entitlement, 2 and
that work requirements as a condition of continued receipt of benefits is a
lawful exercise of governmental authority.'
With these repeated legal defeats and the growing militancy of
antiwelfare politicians and voters, NWRO membership plummeted as
funding sources dried up and recipients lost faith in the possibility of
further social change through current methodologies. By 1972, the NWRO
was in financial crisis, and its leaders dissipated to other causes.2" By 1974,
its national headquarters were closed permanently, as were many former
member organizations. The late 1970s and 1980s were, consequently, a
period of retrenchment for the poor, with decreased government funding
and increased public hostility toward welfare recipients. This public
hostility - increasingly fed by political-campaign rhetoric of widespread
welfare fraud and the Cadillac-driving "welfare queen"" together with
unfavorable media images associating the poor with child neglect, sexual
adventure, and self-indulgent sloth286 - led to growing calls for legislative
reforms under AFDC at the state and national levels. While AFDC waivers
were increasingly granted to states from the late 1980s onward,17 the
backlash against the poor ultimately resulted in the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA"),
277. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1499 (1991).
278. See generally Gustafson, supra note 137 (documenting policy shift toward
criminalization of welfare).
279. See generally William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001) (discussing evolving Supreme Court treatment
of constitutional welfare rights).
280. See, e.g., infra notes 281-283. For broader discussion, see DAVIS, supra note 162
(discussing legal strategies and Supreme Court docket of welfare rights movement).
281. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
282. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
283. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
284. KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 177-81.
285. See Gustafson, supra note 137.
286. Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159 (1995) (noting how media images of the
poor shaped social perceptions of welfare and drove legislative debate in AFDC public policy
issues in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
287. Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and "Welfare"
Reform, 26 MICH. J. L. REFORM 741 (1993).
2010] 67
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
terminating AFDC and replacing the federal entitlement program with
state block grants, lifetime limits, and work requirements with inadequate
or no exceptions for job availability, training, and daycare.
As a product of backlash, the PRWORA stands as the antithesis of the
federal response sought by the early national welfare rights movement. It
nonetheless reflects a decisive political turn away from command-and-
control regulation and, particularly, the "culture of entitlement" that it
supposedly generated among the poor. Political leaders today thus often
continue to associate the welfare rights movement - with its focus on law,
rights, consumption, and an expanding state - with what went wrong with
postwar culture and social life.'
This continuing legacy, and its effects on social policy, defines the
framework in which today's social welfare rights advocates must operate
and seek recognition. It is an environment distinctly hostile to the poor,
associating them with fraud, criminality, dependence, and irresponsible
behavior and preferring that they remain invisible, shamed by their status,
and outside the public square. It is, however, precisely this political
exclusion from policy-making processes that has created the conditions for
a new social welfare rights movement to emerge, albeit one with a very
different set of methodologies and rights-based assumptions than its
predecessor.
B. The Emerging Modem Social Welfare Rights Movement: Embracing
the (Human Rights-Based) "New Accountability" Agenda
Although effectively defunct for three decades, a new modern social
welfare rights movement has begun to emerge in the United States,
stimulated by the "crisis" of accountability under PRWORA and its
impacts on the marginalization and invisibility of the poor. This movement
nonetheless derives its mobilizing logic and rhetorical support from a very
different set of institutional, legal, and rhetorical resources. Indeed, while
the early social welfare rights movement was based largely on
confrontation, non-negotiable and absolutist legal demands for centrally-
defined material entitlements, and reliance on a single-vision "federal
solution" to poverty, the modem movement adopts a more place-based,
process-oriented, and participatory approach to rights protection, more
akin to the policy model upon which the early MFP program was
conceived.
This new emphasis reflects a changing vision of the role of rights in
consolidating citizenship and democratic self-governance in the twenty-
first century political environment. Unlike the prior era, this environment
is characterized not by an expanding federal bureaucracy, centralization of
legal and regulatory authority, and broad distrust of local authority, but by
their converse: the deconcentration of service delivery away from the state,
288. See, e.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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the softening of centralized regulatory rules, rising confidence in state and
local capacity to protect rights, and a growing federal priority for
maximizing governance efficiencies through incentive-based performance
systems and competitive local experimentalism. Within this context, the
federal government has increasingly devolved primary responsibility for
both individual rights protection and social service provision back to state,
local, and private capacities, deemed better suited and more responsive to
the task.m Accordingly, while the more fixed and absolutist vision of rights
embraced by the NWRO and civil rights groups of the 1960s was
undoubtedly responsive to the political environment of that era, it has
proven increasingly anachronistic in the twenty-first century.
U.S. social movements of the poor have, correspondingly, been forced
to look for a new set of legal resources and rights-based strategies for
protecting their dignity interests that are more responsive to the
complexities of the twenty-first century. They have done so not by turning
back to the legalist and consumerist modalities of the 1960s "rights
revolution." Nor, importantly, have they sought to replicate the equally
narrow and absolutist methodologies of the international human rights
movement of the 1980s and 1990s (even as they have turned increasingly
from a "civil rights" to a "human rights" frame).m Rather, recognizing the
inadequacies of these "older" models to the modern era and its new
democratic challenges, U.S. social movements of the poor have turned to
the creative human rights strategies of a new movement. That movement,
289. See generally Clinton Remarks, supra note 127 (noting that while many federal
programs were initiated "to give the states time to develop an institutional capacity to
administer them," "times change and in many cases State and local governments are now
better suited to handle these programs"); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489-504 (1977) (famously urging state
courts to continue to expand strong individual rights protections under state constitutions
given federal judicial "backsliding" and "pullback" in the 1970s under the U.S. Constitution
and federal civil rights laws).
290. Indeed, both the 1960s U.S.-based "rights revolution" and the broader "international
human rights movement" of the 1980s and 1990s tended to understand rights either as a fixed
set of immediately demandable "goods" that government must provide to every individual
on demand or as a set of nonnegotiable policy "trumps" on competing claims, unworthy of or
unsusceptible to discussion. For general discussions of each, see GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK,
supra note 35 (discussing U.S. "rights talk"); and Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A
Critique, 13(2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2006) (employing dominant Western intellectual view of
international human rights law).
291. New technologies, especially the internet and video-link communications, have
dramatically facilitated the cross-border flow of comparative information and learning tools,
enabling the sharing and reproduction of new tactics and strategies at an unprecedented rate.
Social movements of the poor are thus increasingly integrated into a much larger
transnational advocacy network. See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK,
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). These
movements have responded by creatively learning from, adopting, and building upon the
tactical successes and failures of their global counterparts, with some of the most important
learning processes running from the global south to global north. Many of these new tactics
are compiled in the excellent resource, THE NEW TACTICS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, THE CTR.
FOR VICTIMs OF TORTURE, NEW TACTICS IN HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS
(2004) [hereinafter NEW TACTICS], http://www.newtactics.org/sites/newtactics.org/files/
entireworkbook-_english.pdf.
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rising from the global grassroots, embraces a human rights-based "New
Accountability" agenda for the twenty-first century.
Significantly, this new accountability agenda has been promoted most
vigorously and creatively not by social movements in the United States,
but rather by those in the more newly democratic nations of the world,
particularly poorer ones transitioning away from authoritarian, apartheid,
colonial, or neocolonial client-state regimes toward the promise of socially-
inclusive, dignity-based, and participatory democracy." It is in these
contexts that human rights language and ideas were in many ways most
thoroughly deconcentrated in the 1980s and 1990s,93 both by internal
liberation or democracy movements mobilized to throw off oppressive rule
and by the growing transnational advocacy network of activists organized
to end the most repressive tactics of such regimes.2 94 Yet, largely because of
this human rights deconcentration - and, specifically, the participatory and
emancipatory agenda the human rights framework held forth for long
marginalized, impoverished, and excluded majorities" - it is also in these
contexts that the liberal human rights paradigm promoted by leading
Western-based international NGOs throughout the 1980s and 1990s has
been most decisively contested. Indeed, given its growing
unresponsiveness to contemporary social struggles on the ground, that
paradigm is today in "crisis."296 It has, correspondingly, given way to a
292. Particular leadership in the new accountability movement has come from the newly
democratic countries of Latin America, South Africa, and India.
293. The growing institutional sophistication of human rights law and its massive
deconcentration into local discourses of the poor are, in fact, two of the most significant and
defining developments of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. An indication of
this popular deconcentration lies in the almost uniform inclusion in national political
constitutions drafted in the 1980s and 1990s of strong protections for internationally
recognized human rights, including through direct reference to or constitutional incorporation
of the core U.N. human rights treaties. For new constitutional provisions protecting economic,
social, and cultural rights in the Americas, see, for example, PLATAFORMA INTERAMERICANA
DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, DEMOCRACIA Y DESAROLLO (PIDHDD), COMPILACION DE LA
LEGISLACION DE DERECHOS ECONOMICOS, SOCIALES Y CULTURALES EN EL MERCOSUR (2005)
(providing information about Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay).
294. See generally KECK & S[KKINK, supra note 291 (discussing rise of transnational
advocacy networks in 1980s and 1990s to combat human rights abuses of repressive regimes).
295. This emancipatory agenda lies in international human rights law's recognition of not
only a core set of civil liberties and political rights, but, equally important, the right of
"everyone" to "a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of herself and her
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). By recognizing these core human needs as
inherent rights, and insisting that they be ensured on a fair, equitable, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory basis to all, human rights law thus requires that priority attention be
directed to monitoring and assessing the ways in which distinct policies and practices affect
the enjoyment by all social actors of such rights. Accordingly, such rights have become a
central lever through which marginal groups are pressing their poverty-eradication agendas
before national and local decision makers.
296. See, e.g., Martin Abreg, Human Rights for All: From the Struggle Against
Authoritarianism to the Construction of an All-Inclusive Democracy - A View from the Southern Cone
and Andean Region, 5(8) SUR - INT'L J. HUM. RiS. 7, 8 (2008) (recognizing that the old human
rights paradigm is in "crisis").
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new, broader, more democratic understanding of human rights law that, in
its key underlying assumptions, turns the previous paradigm largely on its
head.
This shift follows changing historical circumstances.' Indeed, the
"old" human rights paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s was a direct product
of its unique historical and political context: the post-Cold War democratic
transition from authoritarian to liberal representative political systems.
Within this context, a growing transnational advocacy network of activists,
led by a small number of Western-based international human rights NGOs,
constructed a particular discourse on international human rights law
designed to maximally support what it understood as that law's primary
objective: protecting individuals politically targeted by centralized and
repressive state apparatuses from direct assaults on their bodily integrity
and physical liberty. The resulting discourse was, responsively, state-
centric and confrontational, individualistic and absolutist in its orientation,
focused on a narrow set of liberties from state intervention, and based on a
categorical assertion of universality that insisted that human rights - as
fixed, internationally-determined rules for mandatory uniform compliance
- had "to mean exactly the same thing every place in the world.",9
By contrast, core human dignity claims that were thought to be the
proper subject of local democratic processes and negotiation (including
community-based priority-setting and targeted planning processes
designed to take account of available resources, balancing against
competing rights and interests, and differing local context and cultural
interpretation) were claimed not to be real "rights," or at least not ones the
international human rights movement should take up.' This distinction,
solidly entrenched in the public imagination through the 1980s and 1990s
(and still dominant today in many contexts), was used to remove a vast
sphere of dignity-centered human rights claims from the international
297. See Eugene Kamenka, Human Rights, Peoples' Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 127
(James Crawford ed., 1988) ("All [human] rights arise in specific historical circumstances.
They are claims made, conceded or granted by people who are themselves historically and
socially shaped.... [TJhey cannot be divorced from social content and context.").
298. Neier, supra note 290, at 2. For a general discussion and critique of the central tenets
of the earlier human rights discourse, see Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 727, 730 (1995). Sunstein describes the dominant criticisms against the
individual rights discourse, including its rigidity, indeterminacy, excessive individualism, and
a crowding out of attention to responsibility. See also GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 35
(criticizing the narrowness of rights discourse in the United States); David Kennedy, The
International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 101 (2002)
(noting a similar critique of international human rights discourse).
299. See, e.g., Neier, supra note 290, at 2-3 (arguing that "human rights" are, by definition,
not subject to compromise, balancing against competing rights, or resource constraints and
concluding therefrom that it is therefore "dangerous" to recognize economic, social and
cultural rights as "human rights" given that such rights are properly the object of political
negotiation, democratic compromise, and resource availability); Kenneth Roth, Defending
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights
Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 67-71 (2004) (arguing that international human rights
organizations should limit their powerful naming and shaming methodologies to abuses
involving clear arbitrary or discriminatory conduct on the part of state actors).
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human rights agenda."
Yet, while this decidedly partial and distorting vision of international
human rights law"' might have made strategic sense in a post-Cold War
political context characterized by highly centralized and physically
repressive authoritarian states intent on retaining the power entrenched
under Cold War superpower patronage, it has largely ceased to serve as a
useful paradigm for enhancing human dignity and agency in a twenty-first
century environment in which political liberalization and economic
globalization have dominated trends in comparative national politics.
Hallmarks of the late twentieth century, these dual processes have led to a
situation in which power is increasingly deconcentrated away from
centralized states toward weakly institutionalized local administrative
units and ever more powerful private actors. Within this context, the "old"
human rights paradigm has become ever less relevant to the increasingly
sophisticated social movements rising in new democracies. This is
particularly so as these movements seek to protect socially and
economically disadvantaged communities from a growing range of abusive
activities by private actors who operate increasingly beyond the reach of
state control or through its economic capture12
300. In particular, it was used to entrench a rigid dichotomy between a narrow set of civil
and political liberties and a broader set of economic, social and cultural rights, the former
defined as "human rights" and the latter as "development goals." This distinction is only
slowly being overcome today. U.S. legal academic commentary nevertheless regularly reifies
it. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (2008)
(reifying old stereotype that only "civil and political rights" are immediately enforceable
human rights); James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational
Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217 (2005) (same). But
see Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the "Less as More" Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 171 (2006) (arguing that
the same spectrum of obligations and system-specific justiciability rules applies to all human
rights norms, and hence distinctions between rights - as distinct from the discrete claims
framed under them - are unwarranted).
301. International human rights treaty law explicitly recognizes the non-absoluteness of
individual rights and the corresponding need for balancing competing rights, interests, and
duties in a democratic society. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 240, art. 29
(recognizing that "[elveryone has duties to the community" and that limitations on the
enjoyment of rights are permissible so long as their purpose is "securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirement of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society"); American Convention on
Human Rights art. 32, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (similar); African Charter on Human
and People's Rights art. 27-29 (similar).
302. Indeed, the democratic transition of the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by
widespread hopes and political assurances from the West that the vote, free expression, free
assembly, and other liberal democratic staples of representative government would translate
directly into human development improvements for poor and excluded majorities, including
better access to education, employment, health care, and land resources. Instead, through
government "capture" by more powerful groups, widespread corruption, and continuing
anti-poor bias, decisions on how to spend public funds, deliver services, administer justice,
and regulate economic activity continued to be controlled by the most powerful social groups,
with little change to the unequal power distributions and historic marginality of groups with
little electoral power. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST.
REv. 35 (1993) (adding voice to growing numbers of international experts in eighties and
nineties arguing that the new democratic constitutions of transitional states should limit
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Community-based citizens groups, consumer organizations, workers,
poor mothers, indigenous peoples, the landless, and other historically
marginalized groups have responded by seeking to seize back the mantle
of human rights from the old "international human rights movement."
They have done so not by rejecting the utility of international human rights
law to their struggles, but rather by reconceptualizing that law under a
broader, more democratic and more participation-based understanding of
it and its relevance to community problem-solving and participatory
engagement in democratic self-governance." That understanding is one
that does not conceive rights as absolute "trumps" on, or morally superior
to, local political process and community priority-setting, but rather as a
framework set of tools through which the least economically and politically
powerful can insist that their voices and dignity-based interests be assured
active and targeted consideration in the achievement of community-
defined goals and priorities.?
Indeed, borne in the more democratized, privatized, and rights-
sensitive context of the late twentieth century, this new movement aims to
move beyond the rigid antagonism of the old state-centric rights paradigm
of demand and protest - a model better suited to the centralized legal
bureaucracies of the 1960s and 1970s or struggles against the repressive,
authoritarian, and neocolonial regimes of the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, it
embraces a new participatory paradigm of meaningful, rights-based
themselves to traditional civil and political liberties against the state and strong market
economy protections, and that this would be sufficient to ensure improved human wellbeing
without the need for more direct protections thereof); but see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING
DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 222 (2001) (recognizing that correlation may not hold
true where the poor and marginalized lack political power, and thus that additional rights-
based tools may be necessary).
303. Human rights law - whether presented in treaty form, legislative or constitutional
enactments, or the softer pronouncements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - has
indeed emerged as the common language and principal point of leverage of new
accountability, including in those nations like the United States that have ratified fewer
human rights treaties. For example, the mission statement of the U.S.-based Poor People's
Economic Human Rights Campaign - a broad coalition of over one hundred anti-poverty
groups - draws explicitly on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
We are committed to uniting the poor as the leadership base for a broad
movement to abolish poverty everywhere and forever. We work to
accomplish this aim through the promotion of economic human rights,
named in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Articles 23, 25,
and 26. These articles state our right to such provisions as housing, health
care, a living wage job, and education.
Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign, About the Campaign: Mission Statement,
http:/ /old.economichumanrights.org/about/about.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
304. In many ways, this instrumental conception returns to the original post-WWII
understanding of international human rights law. As Eleanor Roosevelt stressed in presenting
the newly adopted Universal Declaration to communities around the world, the Declaration's
principal value lay in putting rights "in [the] hands" of local groups to act on in local context:
"Without concerted citizen action to uphold the[se rights] close to home [in neighborhoods,
schools, factories, farms, and offices], we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world."
Eleanor Roosevelt, Remarks at the Presentation of In Your Hands: A Guide for Community
Action for the Tenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Mar. 27,
1958), available at http://www.udhr.org/history/inyourhtm.
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engagement in the construction of the public agenda.'
Drawing on the core human rights principles of participation, dignity,
non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability, this model insists
that a rights perspective be directly incorporated into the design,
implementation, and monitoring of the full range of policies and practices
that proliferate in the larger marketplace - especially those that affect core
rights of access to adequate food, housing, health care, education, and
employment. Such a rights perspective requires not only that a set of
dignity-based indicators be established through which successful
performance can be monitored and assessed, but also that all stakeholders
have the genuine right to meaningfully influence or share control over
budgetary priority-setting, substantive policy-making and assessment,
resource allocation, and ensuring fair and equitable access to public goods
and services through participatory monitoring processes and performance-
based incentive systems.'
By embracing this more process-oriented human rights-based approach to
community problem-solving (rather than a fixed rule conception of human
rights law), new accountability seeks to pry open spaces for negotiated
settlement and policy engagement with government actors in the practical
achievement of community-defined goals and priorities, such as poverty
alleviation, local corruption, improved educational opportunities, the
removal of discrimination in housing opportunities, and improved access
to quality health care for all social groups. Equally important, it seeks to
imagine and then establish parallel de facto accountability systems for
private actors. It does so on the clear understanding that poverty is not
only, or even principally, about lack of material resources. It is, at its core,
about lack of power, voice, and inclusive participation in democratic
307governance.
Within this context, the new accountability movement understands
that the role of government has likewise changed. That role is one in which
government is expected to serve as much as a manager of accountability
processes between private actors (both national and transnational) as the
direct object of democratic accountability by citizens for its own
305. Abregu, supra note 296.
306. See PRSA REVIEW, supra note 231, at 44 n.63 (defining participation as "the process
through which stakeholders (those affected by the outcome of reform or capable [of] affecting
the reform) influence or share control over setting priorities, making policy, allocating
resources, and ensuring access to public goods and services").
307. This observation has been made particularly powerfully in the work of Amartya Sen,
Jean Drbze, Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins, and Philip Alston in the context of global
hunger and food poverty. See, e.g., JEAN DRLZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION
(1989); Philip Alston, International Law and the Human Right to Food, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 20
(P. Alston & K. Tomagevski eds., 1984) ("Those groups which are completely excluded from
the decision-making processes affecting them are unlikely to maintain access to adequate food
for very long."). It has likewise been recognized expressly by the U.N. Development Program
for over a decade. See, e.g., UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY:
POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006) (arguing that power and inequality
are at heart of global water crisis, not scarcity); UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000:
HUMAN RIG-fS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000).
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performance. That is, government is increasingly expected to play an
orchestration role in encouraging, facilitating, and coordinating the outputs
of performance-based accountability processes at multiple levels of social
organization and responsibility. By moving these processes "downward"
and "outward," partnering the public and private sectors in common
pursuit of a shared set of goals, and insisting on a federally-orchestrated
institutional structure of facilitative support and assistance, new
accountability thus embraces a stakeholder-centered, performance-based,
and experimentalist model of human rights achievement that, in its core
organizing principles, closely approximates not only the driving tenets of
the early War on Poverty MFP policy but also those of modem regulatory
new governance theory.
It is this overlap that lays the policy foundation for renewing a national
recommitment to poverty alleviation today in the United States. This policy
foundation is made operative by the fact that U.S.-based social movements
of the poor, in responding to their own realities of growing social
marginalization and political exclusion, have increasingly adopted the
tactics and strategies of new accountability.' In particular, the impacts of
PRWORA on poor U.S. communities has triggered the recrudescence of a
new movement of grassroots leaders from the ranks of the nation's poor,
one made up of hundreds of grassroots organizations" This movement
rejects the dominant tactics of its 1960s predecessors, with their focus on
fixed, immediate demands for government-provided consumer goods, top-
down income transfers, and other silo-based approaches as a solution to
poverty.3 o Instead, it embraces community-led, place-based, and results-
oriented strategies that, drawing on human rights principles and insisting
on voice and agency as democratic prerogatives in the formulation of anti-
poverty policies and targeted plans of action, take the improvement of
human dignity and community well-being as their central goals.
To understand precisely how the positive dignity-centered influences
of these new accountability methodologies can be incorporated
constructively into the more efficiency-oriented administrative
arrangements of new governance regimes (including those of PRWORA), it
is therefore useful to take a closer look at the principal motivating tenets
308. See supra note 291. This slower uptake in the United States is largely a reflection of
both the nation's legalistic and court-centric culture, which defaults to legal adversarialism in
the resolution of disputes, as well as the professional divide that persists between many
"social welfare" and "human rights" advocacy groups, although this is changing. For
perspectives of leaders of U.S.-based human rights organizations that, unlike their global
counterparts, still resist recognizing economic and social rights as full human rights, see
Neier, supra note 290; and Roth, supra note 293.
309. Many of these are formally organized under the loose coordination of the Poor
People's Economic Human Rights Campaign (PPEHRC), a national coordinating body created
in 1998 by poor people's groups largely as a response to the 1996 Welfare Reform Law. For
member organizations, see http://www.economichumanrights.org/members.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2010).
310. See, e.g., PPEHRC Mission Statement, http://www.ussf2007.org/en/node/2211 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2010) ("We do not seek pity. We do seek power to end conditions that threaten
all of us with economic human rights violations .... ").
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and impulses that drive new accountability theory. As with new
governance, and like the early MFP policy, these include a policy focus on
decentralized decisionmaking processes and public-private partnerships,
the opening of new spaces for pluralized stakeholder participation,
performance monitoring and indicator-based targeting for the achievement
of measurable results, the pluralization of competitive compliance
incentives, and subsidiarity-based legal orchestration. Each is considered
below.
1. Decentralization, Subsidiarity, and Public-Private Partnerships
The first core tenet of new accountability, like new governance, insists
that social problem-solving should be designed to take place at the level
closest to the affected individuals, where knowledge inputs are most
immediate, solutions can be most responsive to locally-assessed needs and
priorities, and public and private stakeholders can most easily and
effectively be brought together in constructive partnerships. New
accountability thus rejects the notion (common in earlier rights-based
methodologies) that there is a single, fixed, rule-like definition of human
rights that only external experts removed from domestic politics and local
preferences are competent to define. Rather, it appreciates that the broad,
universal values of dignity, fairness, flourishing, and opportunity that
human rights represent can be instantiated in a wide diversity of ways and
that these instantiations - each context-specific and the product of
continual and evolving interest-based balancing and multi-party
negotiation - should be determined in the first instance by affected
communities themselves.
This emphasis on localism and place-based community organizing
follows not only from the intrinsic-value or dignitary benefits of solving
one's own problems when and where they occur, but from the
instrumental fact that local needs are best appreciated by local actors and
hence may be most effectively redressed by them through local processes
of decision, targeting, partnership, and community resource mobilization.
This is particularly so given the contextual and evolving nature of
problems faced by distinct communities, requiring often unique and
targeted solutions that one-size-fits-all solutions determined from above
generally cannot fully accommodate. It was indeed precisely on this
understanding that President Johnson himself based his call for
community-based, long-range plans for fighting poverty - plans that were
not to be "prepared in Washington and imposed upon hundreds of
different situations," but rather would be "based on the fact that local
citizens best understand their own problems, and know best how to deal
with those problems." 311
New accountability, like new governance, nevertheless recognizes that
local communities cannot solve all problems by themselves. It also
311. See LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 378.
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recognizes that smaller communities are not always willing or able to
faithfully protect the dignity-based rights, liberties, and priorities of all of
their inner members without outside assistance. New accountability thus
draws directly on the principle of subsidiarity. Foundational to the
structure and purposes of international human rights law,312 that principle
insists not only that "problems [should] be solved where they occur, by
those who understand them best, and by those who are most affected by
them,"31' but also that such problem-solving processes must occur within a
national and international infrastructure of rights-based facilitative
support, assistance, and positive orchestration designed to coordinate,
oversee, and strengthen local self-governance capacity.314 In structuring a
relationship of mutual duties and responsibilities between all social
stakeholders in organized society - both public and private - subsidiarity
thus requires that broader systems of regular monitoring, communication,
and orchestration be established, such that failures within smaller units can
be promptly identified and appropriate positive assistance provided as
needed.' This must be done without, however, arrogating tasks more
properly performed through localized agency, competence, and resources.
Correspondingly, new accountability seeks to move problem-solving
processes downward and outward, to the community level and sites of
abuse, where affected individuals can speak for themselves and provide
their own perspectives, solutions, and proposals for confronting the
priority problems experienced in their unique communities. Unlike the
social movements of the 1960s, it does not assume that the best solutions
will come directly from the federal government, nor as any one-size-fits-all
fix. Rather, it sees the federal government as a source of facilitative support
and coordination, while training its eye on initiating and strengthening
processes of human rights performance review at the local level, where
312. For a fuller discussion of subsidiarity as a structural principle of human rights law,
see Carozza, supra note 143.
313. Shelton, supra note 143 (citing Linnan, supra note 143, at 403).
314. See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The U.S. and Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389, 439 n.224 (2009) [hereinafter Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity]
("Subsidiarity represents in this way the constitutive scaffolding around what may usefully be
visualized as a series of nested circles, with the individual human person sitting at the center,
surrounded concentrically by progressively larger social groupings of family, civic solidarity
associations, local government, nation-state, and, ultimately, intergovernmental bodies and
transnational social networks.").
315. International human rights law, accordingly, envisions a constitutive framework of
monitoring, supervision, and facilitation that allows this subsidiary relationship to play itself
out flexibly within a broad variety of institutional structures and mediating procedures. See,
e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 1, Reporting By State Parties, T 1-9, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (Feb. 24, 1989)
(identifying subsidiarity-based objectives of periodic reporting, including stimulating and
regularizing domestic monitoring, enforcement, and participatory self-appraisal processes)
[hereinafter U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 1]; Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity,
supra note 314, at 442-43 (identifying subsidiarity-based institutional restraint doctrines in
contentious procedures, including exhaustion-of-domestic-remedies rule, the margin of
appreciation doctrine, "reasonableness" and other proportionality or interest-balancing tests,
remedial deference doctrines, the fourth instance formula, and friendly-settlement and "good
offices" conciliation).
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individuals live and most directly interact.
New accountability thus entails a distinct form of problem-solving: one
based on listening directly to those who experience the indignities of
poverty and engaging them in sustained conversations about the most
effective, practical ways to overcome the specific day-to-day barriers they
face in meeting their basic needs of food, housing, health care,
employment, income, and education. It aims, in this regard, to engage the
poor in identifying the varied causes of impoverishment, as they
experience it, and hence to establish a tactical map of the relationships that
sustain distinct impoverishing situations in each community. From these
tactical maps, responsibilities for eliminating causes can be determined,
cross-sector and multiscalar social alliances can be fostered, and
monitoring and accountability structures can be created to ensure that the
full scope of public duties and private responsibilities are fulfilled with
respect to poverty alleviation efforts.
A centerpiece of the new accountability movement has
correspondingly been the opening of new decentered spaces in which the
disadvantaged can speak directly about their experiences with poverty on
their own terms and in their own communities, albeit within a human
rights framework.' A central tactic in this regard has been the holding of
local and national public hearings on poverty. Poverty hearings are fora in
which the poor come together to give direct testimony about their lived
experiences with respect to a core set of economic, social, and cultural
rights, to hear the experience of others, to be linked with similarly-minded
organizations, and to propose targeted solutions - large and small - to the
crisis of service delivery, economic planning, and arbitrary or
discriminatory public and private action in the field of social and economic
rights. 318
316. Like the early War on Poverty, new accountability thus appreciates that poverty is
sustained by multiple relationships and interactions and caused by a multitude of reinforcing
and interwoven barriers and constraints. Each of these sources - some local, some national;
some based in policy, others in bias - may require a different strategy or tactic, and may
require the participation of distinct sets of social actors to eradicate it. While the "social work
model" focused attention too narrowly on intra-family and community deficits and the "legal-
bureaucratic model" too narrowly on fixed federal income-based entitlements, new
accountability sees poverty in its fuller complexity, seeking to attack it pragmatically and non-
ideologically as such.
317. The human rights framework facilitates this process precisely because human rights
are defined by reference to both the dignity-based needs of the individual - including food,
housing, education, employment, and health care - and the corresponding obligations held to
each individual by other socially-situated actors in the community.
318. See generally Global Call to Action Against Poverty, Women's Tribunals/Poverty
Hearings: Sharing People's Voices at WSF, http://www.whiteband.org/Action/take-
action/gcap-mobilisation-2009/wsf-2009/women2Ol9s-tribunals-poverty-hearings-dignity-
forum-at-wsf (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) ("The aim of these activities has been to provide a
space for testimonies that highlight the plight of poverty, to give voice to those living in
poverty, to explore the cause of this situation, to provide solutions anchored in local
experiences and to demand for their implementation."). A first iteration of this tactic in the
U.S. context took the form of collecting testimonies at the local level, then sending them to the
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights or one of the U.N. treaty bodies or
special mandate procedures for validation and public exposure. This was done in an effort to
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These hearings have arisen in a variety of jurisdictions."' In each, they
respond directly to a sense that the poor are being "left out" of
decisionmaking processes, denied a voice in charting the direction of
policies that most affect them." They thus constitute an effort by marginal
sectors to gain visibility and voice in monitoring and assessing the way
that priorities are set, policy is made, resources are allocated, and access to
public goods and services is assured. They also constitute an effort to
recognize the multiplicity of social actors responsible for sustaining
barriers to opportunity and conditions of poverty, while insisting upon the
participatory relevance and agency of the poor in identifying the causes of
poverty themselves. By doing so, poverty hearings aim to identify a tactical
map of public and private responsibilities that can be socially enforced
through a growing number of accountability arrangements and public-
private partnerships.
One of the most exemplary of these initiatives came in 1998 in South
Africa, when 10,000 mostly poor people from across the nation came
together to participate in a series of ten open "National Speak Out on
Poverty Hearings" ("Poverty Hearings"), held in each of the nine South
African Provinces. Organized by the South African NGO Coalition
("SANGOCO"), the South African Human Rights Commission, and the
Commission on Gender Equity, the hearings were intended to provide a
platform for the poor to speak publicly and on an official record about the
day-to-day barriers they faced in accessing their constitutional rights to
land, sufficient food and water, adequate housing, access to health care
services, social security, a healthy environment, education, and labor
rights. 32 1 In so doing, the hearings were designed not only to recognize the
dignity and agency of the poor in the new South Africa - affirming them as
indispensable stakeholders in the larger process of local and national
poverty alleviation - but also to provide an instrumental basis for
constructing concrete, highly practical, and responsive "strategies to
eradicate poverty and inequality" in the nation's many communities.322
draw attention to the need for specific public policy reforms or to identify "best practices" and
areas of common concern. Increasingly, however, in an effort to force open domestic spaces
for participation, such testimonies are directed immediately toward national rather than
international audiences.
319. In 2008 alone, poverty hearings were held in at least twelve countries. See id.
320. See, e.g., id.; infra notes 336-338.
321. See SANGOCO, NATIONAL SPEAK-OUT ON POVERTY HEARINGS: THE PEOPLE'S VOICES 7
(1998) (explaining that seven of the ten respective hearings were thematically organized
around one of these core socio-economic rights recognized in the South African Constitution
and in ratified human rights treaty law, while the remaining three were non-thematic,
allowing participants to speak on the topics of their choosing). Nearly 600 people presented
oral evidence over the thirty-five days of the hearings, while others participated through the
presentation of written submissions, attendance at the hearings, or the mobilization of
communities. Id. at 8.
322. As the final report explained:
The Poverty Hearings provide a platform for poor people in South Africa
to share their perspectives on what economic and social rights mean for
them, the obstacles and difficulties they experience in gaining access to
these rights, their suggestions for overcoming these obstacles, and the
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Such strategies would then lay the basis for creating a framework of action
for bringing the full range of public and private stakeholders together in
partnership around a coordinated national commitment to poverty
alleviation.
Consistent with the new accountability agenda, the key features of the
hearings were thus decentralized participation of those most affected by
rights abuse; a space for listening to the suggestions and proposals for
effective solutions from the affected themselves;' a tactical mapping of
barriers to opportunity and the establishment of an accountability plan for
multiple sectors of society to put those recommendations into effect; and a
monitoring system for ensuring that each set of public and private actors
takes appropriate measures within their competence, supported by a
national orchestration and accountability framework.
While rights-based community hearings, organized by and for the
poor, are increasingly common around the world,324 the South African
Poverty Hearings were exemplary in a number of regards. Perhaps most
important was their effort to descriptively catalogue and closely detail the
vast diversity and complexity of causes underlying day-to-day experiences
with poverty in distinct local contexts. As testimony after testimony
revealed, these causes lie as fully in private attitudes and social
stereotypes, bureaucratic inertia and corruption, arbitrary rule
enforcement, and indifference to the policy impacts on distinct groups as in
lack of income in itself.3" Any effective plan to combat poverty, it was
understood, must necessarily address the full range of these issues in ways
that concretely correspond to local contexts.
At the same time, the hearings sought to create a multi-sectoral social
accountability framework designed to bring all social stakeholders, both
public and private, together in a common rights-based partnership to root
out the many sources of poverty. The testimonies collected over the three
months of hearings were thus used to draw up a multi-stakeholder
National Poverty Commitment and National Plan of Action Around
Poverty. These documents not only reflected all of the major themes
discussed in the hearings, but also expressly recognized the roles and
role of government in promoting their rights. The hearings also allow us
to identify the gaps between constitutional rights, laws and policies on
the one hand, and people's lived realities and experiences on the
other.... to transform the economic and social rights in the Constitution into
tools of empowerment and mobilisation in the hands of the poor.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
323. As the final report made clear, "The piles of written testimony bore evidence of the
fact that poverty is about dismal and ongoing drudgery, hunger and struggle. However, the
testimonies also provided ample evidence of the ingenuity and creativity of people who
survive against all odds." Id. at 1.
324. See supra note 319. For more on hearings in India centered on the right to food, for
example, see Right to Food Campaign, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/campaign/
campaign.html. In 2007 and 2008, moreover, women's tribunals took place in India, Peru,
Egypt and the United States. See Global Call to Action Against Poverty, supra note 318.
325. SANGOCO, supra note 321 (documenting major themes of testimonies). This author
attended the hearings and compiled written accounts (on file with Author).
80 [Vol. 13
Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor
responsibilities of the full range of social actors identified by hearing
participants as contributing, in large or small ways, to the persistence of
barriers to opportunity. Thus, under the title "Together We Ended
Apartheid; Together We Can End Poverty," the National Poverty
Commitment enumerated a concrete set of actions towards poverty
eradication and the removal of the obstacles identified by the poor for "the
public," "government officials," "politicians," "the private sector," "civil
society" (NGOs, religious institutions, labor, etc.), and "the media."3 26 it
correspondingly called upon all individuals in both government and
throughout civil society to commit themselves to "take individual
responsibility to ensure the fight against poverty becomes the nation's
priority."32 7
These commitments were, in turn, reflected in the National Plan of
Action Around Poverty, which was to be an on-going, comprehensive plan
that included actions delegated to, or taken on by, groups at all levels of
national organization and institutional affiliation. Every year, the progress
made on each planned action was to be reviewed and - after
acknowledging the gains made and identifying what remains to be done -
the Plan was to be updated as a guide for the following year's activity.3 28
Correspondingly, in an effort "to take forward the struggle to end
poverty,"" the specific commitments undertaken by national stakeholders
were likewise to be updated. In 2008, a follow-up set of Poverty Hearings
was held in all nine provinces to determine the extent of progress made
over the prior decade, and to give new life to the process by recognizing
constructive learning processes."
Finally, consistent with new accountability's insistence on the need for
participatory local monitoring processes and national subsidiarity-based
orchestration, an explicit compliance monitoring framework was
envisioned. "Monitoring and Follow-up Committees" were thus to be
established at local, provincial, and national levels."' As the organizers
recognized, it is not what exactly each group is doing that is important, but
rather that "at every single step groups [are] engaged in some
action ... [that] there is dialogue between government and civil society
around the issue." 332 Accordingly, while local and provincial monitoring
326. Id. at 84-85.
327. Id. ("We the undersigned commit ourselves to the following actions towards poverty
eradication: .... To take individual responsibility to ensure the fight against poverty becomes
the nation's priority by ... lengaging in enumerated actions, specific to each sector].").
328. Id. at 84.
329. Id.
330. According to Jacqui Boulle, one of the original organizers, the 1998 hearings were
successful "because they enabled people to think differently about the capabilities and
abilities of the poor." Yet, they were not fully successful in getting decisionmakers to use the
information gathered and in ensuring proper follow-up. The organizers are thus learning
from their experience and spreading those lessons more broadly by organizing within an
Africa-wide advocacy effort around the Millennium Development Goals. See Patrick Burnett,
Talking Poverty, MAIL & GUARDIAN, July 29, 2008.
331. SANGOCO, supra note 321, at 84.
332. Interview with Jacqui Boulle, Programs Dir. of SANGOCO, in Johannesburg, S. Afr.,
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committees were to work cooperatively and strategically with community-
level authorities and provincial government on removing identified
obstacles to poverty eradication, national level groups such as SANGOCO,
the War on Poverty Forum, and other NGOs would take on larger, more
national policy-oriented issues.
Moreover, to ensure national orchestration of these multi-scalar
monitoring and follow-up processes, rights-based government statutory
bodies such as the South African Human Rights Commission and
Commission on Gender Equality agreed to oversee stakeholder compliance
with the Commitment and Plan. Both entities committed to do so by
coordinating stakeholder implementation reports and conducting a range
of regularized monitoring procedures, such as periodic spot checks."
Based on these collected inputs, the statutory bodies committed to provide
a consolidated report on October 17 every year - International Poverty
Eradication Day - describing the extent of national compliance with the
Commitment.3 5
By creating this subsidiarity-based accountability framework around
the articulated experience and solutions of the poor, the South African
Poverty Hearings sought to upset the traditional balance of power in the
nation, which had for too long functioned to exclude the poor from
policymaking processes. As one organizer explained:
[A] lot of people feel that their voices .. . that they have been
forgotten. The Poverty Hearings were really important in
enabling people to feel that they haven't been forgotten, and
providing a platform for them to express their views.... The
thing about the poverty hearings is that they allowed people
to speak who wouldn't usually get access to policy-makers
because they've been so far removed from the
process.... [Our concern is] how do you give voice to people
who have been marginalized from the process and get them back
n.336
That imperative of "getting marginal people back in" to the system lies
at the heart of new accountability strategies and their strategic opening or
appropriation of creative new political spaces for ensuring the poor have
(June 1998) [hereinafter Boulle Interview] (on file with Author).
333. These included developing and lobbying for an anti-poverty budget, a women and
children's budget, a public sector code of conduct, national credit-financing schemes, macro-
economic strategies, and cancellation of the (internal) apartheid debt. Id.
334. SANGOCO, supra note 321, at 85.
335. Id. The South African Human Rights Commission in fact has a constitutionally-
mandated role to play in rights-based poverty-alleviation efforts. See S. Afr. Const. 1996 §
184(3) ("Each year, the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to
provide the Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the
realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water,
social security, education and the environment.").
336. Boulle Interview, supra note 332.
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meaningful voice. Likewise at new accountability's core lies recognition
that responsibility for poverty alleviation and related human rights
achievement does not rest exclusively with government or with the
individual poor themselves. Rather, it rests with the full range of social
stakeholders, including private institutions, business, the media, and the
general public, all of whom share mutual social duties and responsibilities
to root out the many barriers to opportunity, equality, and participation in
organized society.
Although its antecedents were quite distinct, a similar process was
recently organized in the United States, designed to reverse the invisibility
that surrounds domestic poverty in national politics and media priorities
and to give voice to those who experience human rights violations on a
daily basis. Organized by the national coordination and local chapters of
the Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign ("PPEHRC"), the
National Truth Commission on Poverty was likewise the result of
members' conviction that poverty will not be adequately addressed in the
United States until the poor themselves are seen and heard as real people,
not as mere statistics or stereotyped images. As PPEHRC's national
coordinator explained: "We need to increase [the] visibility [of the poor]
and put a face on poverty in America. What we intend to do, instead of
throwing statistics out there, is show what these mothers and fathers and
children look like. They look like the people that live next door.""
Symbolically held in Cleveland, Ohio - designated in 2004 as the
nation's poorest big city - the U.S. poverty hearings aimed to use the
fundamental rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to mobilize action on and attention to poverty in the United States.
The hearings were thus presided over by a set of independent national and
international human rights experts" 9 invited to listen to the testimony of
337. According to the Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign ("PPEHRC"):
Part of the reason . .. the poor are not surviving, is that our suffering has
been made invisible. The poor have been disappeared from not only the
welfare rolls and the workforce, but from the media and the political
debates. Our stories are not told and our images are not seen. Our
invisibility has allowed our situation to be ignored by our politicians,
who have not placed a priority on addressing the increasing number of
poor families and our worsening conditions. We know that in order to
win this war and to survive, the faces of America's poor must be shown.
If the general public knew our stories and saw our faces, we know that
something would be done. The timing is critical. We need economic
human rights to be a priority or many of us who have been abandoned by
political parties in the past, simply will not make it.
PPEHRC, Faces of the Fallen, http://old.economichumanrights.org/facepage/index.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
338. Diane Suchetka, Who Are the Poor? Come to Tremont To Hear, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, July 14, 2006.
339. In addition to national leaders, the Commissioners included international experts
such as Dr. Arjun Sengupta, U.N. Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights, and Nora Morales de Cortiias, one of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo from
Argentina. See PPEHRC, NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION: SHINING A LIGHT ON POVERTY IN THE
U.S.A., PRELIMINARY REPORT 12-13 (2006).
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poor people from across the United States regarding their personal
experiences with rights abuses in six broad categories: the right to health
care, the right to a living wage, the right to adequate housing, the right to
water and basic utilities, the right to education, and freedom from unjust
child removal from the home.M
Consistent with new accountability models, participants used the
forum to speak specifically and concretely about their personal experiences
with a wide range of abusive conduct that sustains barriers to opportunity
and dignity in their daily lives. From these testimonies, a final report was
prepared, designed to consolidate testimony, identify concrete causes of
and responsibilities for social rights abuses, and thereby propose a tactical
map for what could be done by distinct actors to prevent similar abuse
from occurring in the future. The report's conclusions were then
distributed broadly to PPEHRC's base organizations so that appropriate
follow-up action could be taken locally." In an effort to further localize and
decentralize the hearing process, organizers also encouraged community
leaders to sponsor their own similar, more targeted or issue-specific
hearings at the state and local levels.342 In this way, community-based
organizations could develop and pursue their own context-specific plans of
local action for confronting poverty's many sources, pressing human rights
achievement to the front of local political agendas and ensuring the direct
participation of as many stakeholders as possible.
This "downward" and localizing trend of new accountability
movements aims not only to recognize the dignitary aspects of local
participation, but also the instrumental fact that accountability
arrangements and public-private partnerships can be established and
managed more easily in community settings. Responsive action is,
accordingly, most likely to take place at that level. It is also at the local level
that concrete examples of abuse are most easily identified, tactical maps are
most easily assembled, and responsive, practical action plans can be put
together to directly address locally-identified priorities. Through day-to-
day contacts, cross-sectoral allies may also be more effectively identified
and brought together in productive alliances around concrete human rights
goals. By moving downward, new accountability thus rejects the trap -
340. This testimony included, for example, the struggles of union representatives and the
unemployed to secure a living wage, the experiences of small farming families struggling
against big corporate agriculture, the loss of health care coverage after diagnosis with serious
illness, problems with home ownership, the removal of children from the home because of
conditions of poverty, the loss of water, and forcible evictions. See id. at 27-57 (providing
excerpts of testimony).
341. Telephone interview with Mary Bricker-Jenkins, Coordinating Council Member,
PPEHRC (Aug. 15, 2006).
342. On Sept. 25, 2008, for example, a follow-up public hearing on the human right to
health was held in Brattleboro, Vermont, as part of a Health Care is a Human Right
Campaign. Email from Jonathan Kissam, Coordinating Committee Member, Vermont
Workers' Center (Sept. 11, 2008) (on file with Author) (inviting "testimony on experiences
with the healthcare system from Windham County residents"). Similar public hearings on
access to healthcare as a human right have likewise been held in other U.S. states and
localities.
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succumbed to by the NWRO in the 1960s - of sacrificing, in the name of
higher-level systems reform, attention to the arbitrary and abusive
practices experienced on a day-to-day basis at the local level, many of
which constitute some of the most significant barriers of access to adequate
housing, health, education, and food.
Indeed, as direct testimonies from socially disadvantaged groups
consistently demonstrate, it is the abusive and arbitrary policies
implemented by local level administrators, service providers, and private
actors, particularly when given broad discretion to meet raw program
targets, that so often create the most immediate barriers to individual
dignity and family livelihood." When, for example, poor and inadequately
housed women in the United States provided testimony in a regional
consultation process on the concrete barriers they faced in accessing
adequate housing, the testimonies revealed a priority focus not on access to
housing stock generally, but rather on the arbitrary barriers to that access
imposed by local actors. In particular, attention was centered on family
separation rules in housing and domestic-violence shelters, child removal
policies due to inadequate housing conditions, discrimination by landlords
on the basis of sex, nationality, income and other arbitrary grounds, and
loss of Section 8 vouchers for single instances of missed utility bills or for
sheltering homeless family members.-"' Recognition of these barriers is
critical for establishing maximally responsive and effective rights-based
plans of action in distinct and varied social contexts.
Similar testimonial accounts have been collected with respect to access
to safe, affordable, and adequate housing in other subnational jurisdictions.
From 2007 to 2008, for example, the Ontario Human Rights Commission
undertook province-wide consultations on human rights and rental
housing, collecting testimony from those affected about the extent of the
problem and gathering their proposals for practical solutions." Thousands
of people contributed testimony, either orally or in writing, to document
the systemic and discriminatory barriers faced in accessing and
maintaining adequate and affordable housing. Most commonly, these
centered on inappropriate advertisements, discriminatory stereotypes,
negative attitudes toward the poor, and the discriminatory impacts of
screening requirements such as credit checks, guarantors, rent deposits,
employment verification, and income requirements."' Consistent with the
343. See, e.g., Mencimer, supra note 169 (documenting abuses by welfare caseworkers in
Georgia, including the request for sex in exchange for assistance and the assertion of false
eligibility restrictions, such as surgical sterility requirements and a prohibition on applying
while pregnant).
344. Testimony provided to U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Mr. Miloon
Kothari, during the U.N. Consultation on Women and the Rights to Adequate Housing in
North America, Washington DC, Oct. 15-17, 2005 (audio recording on file with Author).
345. ONT. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, RIGHT AT HOME: REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RENTAL HOUSING IN ONTARIO 5 (May 2008),
http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/discussion.consultation/housingconsultationreport/
pdf.
346. Id. at 3-4.
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new accountability agenda, the Commission not only collected the diverse
testimonies in its final report, but also set out a framework of action
proposing concrete measures to be taken by each set of relevant
stakeholders." Echoing President Johnson's emphasis on the imperative of
broad stakeholder participation in poverty alleviation efforts, it did so
under the express recognition that, in protecting the right to housing, "We
must all work together, through partnerships and creative solutions, to
make the substantive and long-lasting changes that are warranted.""
These arbitrary abuses in the housing field parallel many of those
named by TANF recipients under PRWORA. As addressed in Part II,
clients have regularly been dropped from the public assistance rolls for
such "offenses" as a family member missing a single appointment for a job
interview, or denied benefits for a series of reasons entirely unrelated to
need."'9 Stringent eligibility verification procedures, meanwhile, "cause
erroneous denials, lead to routine invasions of claimants' privacy, place
heavy burdens on claimants, unnecessarily delay claimants' receipt of
benefits, and discourage many eligible individuals from applying for
welfare or completing the application process." 
Significantly, none of these regularized abuses are officially tracked as
part of government-sponsored performance monitoring. New
accountability seeks to fill this critical gap. It seeks to spotlight street-level
abuses, publicly name unfair, arbitrary or unreasonable practices, identify
those responsible, propose concrete and targeted solutions, and build
strong public-private partnerships among allied stakeholders within a
rights-centered and subsidiarity-based orchestrating structure. In so doing,
it seeks to provide a critically necessary instrumental check on the practical
implementation of new governance regulatory regimes, particularly as
they affect the poor.
2. From Fixed Rules to Participatory Monitoring of Rights-Based
Standards and Safeguard Policies
The second organizing principle of new accountability, closely related
to the first, is that the rights of the poor cannot be protected through
government provision of fixed income or material goods alone, no matter
how reliable. The causes of poverty are too complex and their sources too
varied. Thus, while the 1960s welfare rights movement, operating under
the mantra "More Money, NOW!," focused on gaining immediate access to
bureaucratically defined "minimum standards" for good family living,
new accountability movements of the poor today organize under the
participatory mantra "don't talk about us, talk with us"352 and "nothing
347. Id. at 85-96.
348. Id. at 85.
349. See supra notes 203-204.
350. See Mulzer, supra note 126, at 689.
351. KORNBLUH, supra note 47, at 41-48, 60.
352. See supra note 50.
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about us, without us.""' In so doing, they seek meaningful participation in
setting the standards through which the substance of social welfare policy
is made and, correspondingly, through which stakeholder behavior is
determined to meet minimum community expectations of adequacy,
responsiveness, fairness, and accountability.
Drawing on human rights principles and methodologies, these
standards tend to focus on ensuring that a core set of substantive and
procedural safeguard policies are rigorously followed in decisionmaking
processes that affect the enjoyment of livelihood rights. Four of the most
common safeguard policies in this regard include ensuring the following:
one, that all civil society actors are able to effectively participate in the
design, monitoring, assessment, and implementation of policy; two, that
disparate impacts do not fall on discrete social groups, especially the most
vulnerable; three, that policy is reasonably targeted to ensure the
progressive realization of the full enjoyment of rights by all social sectors
on a non-discriminatory basis; and, four, that failures in the achievement of
outcome-oriented targets are fully justified by reason-giving and
explanation in transparent, evidence-based processes that take account of
the full availability of human, financial, technological, and social resources
in the community.
By insisting on the observance and active monitoring of such
standards, modern social movements of the poor thus seek to participate in
how budget priorities are set, how housing projects are approved, how
targets are monitored, and how ten-year plans are assessed. Likewise, they
want to ensure that social impact assessments are completed before project,
licensing, or funding decisions are made, assuring thereby that their views,
interests, and expertise are taken actively into account in policymaking
processes.
Such direct participatory engagement is necessary, new accountability
insists, both at the design stage of policy planning (to ensure effective
targeting of the needs of all social actors, particularly the most vulnerable)
and, equally important, in the implementation and monitoring phase.
Vulnerable groups can thereby directly "block watch" policy performance,
monitoring its practical impacts on distinct social groups and its
achievement of dignity-enhancing outcomes. Accountability processes can
then be established through which performance failures or backsliding can
be immediately brought to public attention, transparent explanations can
be required, and better targeted, more responsive policies can be offered to
replace those whose performance has been deficient.
By putting people's participation and active engagement in democratic
rights-based decisionmaking at its center, new accountability thus rejects a
construction of human rights that views rights as having a necessarily
fixed, rule-like, unitary content that is universal and constant across
jurisdictions. Such was the dominant view under both the legal-
bureaucratic model of the 1970s and the equally rigid human rights model
353. See supra note 51.
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of the 1980s and 1990s, frequently perceived as elitist, narrow, insensitive,
and even irrelevant to real human needs on the ground, especially of the
poor." Rather, new accountability seeks to return to what may be said to
be human rights law's single, primary aim: to protect and enhance the
participatory agency of individuals to stand up and defend their own rights
when threatened by external actors, whether public or private.35 The
international human rights architecture has correspondingly made
protecting and promoting the right to participatory inclusion in
decisionmaking processes an increasing priority in its work, recognizing it
as "an integral component of any policy, programme or strategy developed
to discharge governmental [human rights] obligations.. . ."
In innovating new processes through which these principles can be
ensured, new accountability movements are learning from each other's
successes across the globe. Participatory budgeting processes, for example,
have been developed in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and increasingly replicated
and built upon in localities around the world . In these processes, local
354. See generally MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE
(2002) (discussing criticisms of Western dominated human rights movement); see also, Makau
Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201
(2001); Kennedy, supra note 298. Such narrow views risk not only impoverishing the human
rights discourse, but rendering it irrelevant or inapplicable to vast areas of human suffering
and arbitrary or abusive conduct. The historic absence of the poor from the "international"
construction of rights meaning has meant that "human rights" have often had little meaning
for their day-to-day realities. New accountability seeks to reverse this.
355. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS
AND IDOLATRY 4 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) ("We know from historical experience that when
human beings have defensible rights - when their agency as individuals is protected and
enhanced - they are less likely to be abused and oppressed."); Philip Alston, International Law
and the Human Right to Food, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 9, 62 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski
eds., 1984) (noting that human rights law aims to "develop in all people the belief that they
possess certain inalienable rights and that they are entitled, perhaps even obliged, to do all in
their power to realize those rights for themselves") (emphasis added); see also Roosevelt, "In Your
Hands," supra note 304 (declaring to communities that the UDHR is now "fin your hands" and
calling for "concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home"); TARA MELISH, HUMAN
RIGHTS TO FOOD IN GUATEMALA: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 157 (1997) (discussing crucial
mobilizing role of human rights law in encouraging marginal communities to organize
themselves, engage systems and structures of abuse, insert themselves into the
decisionmaking processes that affect their lives, and to otherwise make use of all available
means to take action against poverty and its underlying determinants themselves).
356. U.N. ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 154, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(2000) ("[Tihe right of individuals and groups to participate in decision making processes,
which may affect their development, must be an integral component of any policy,
programme or strategy developed to discharge governmental [human rights]
obligations....") [hereinafter U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment 141; see also id. ("Effective
provision of health services can only be assured if people's participation is secured by States.")
(emphasis added); U.N. ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Annex Ill,
General Comment No. 4, The Right to Adequate Housing, 19, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1992/23
(1991) ("[Tihe right to participate in public decision-making - is indispensable if the right to
adequate housing is to be realized and maintained by all groups in society.").
357. In 2008, the United Kingdom in fact unveiled a draft National Strategy on
Participatory Budgeting, subtitled "Giving More People a Say in Local Spending." For more
on this important initiative, see DEP'T FOR CMTYS. & LOCAL GOv'T, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING:
A DRAFr NATIONAL STRATEGY (2008), available at
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communities determine a ranking of the priority issues they want city or
local budgets to focus on - from improvements in access to potable water,
sanitation, or education to those involving employment, transportation or
health care.3 5 Considered binding on local legislators and city planners
(who have in fact accepted them as such), these priorities are then
monitored by citizens' groups over the annual budgetary cycle. Such
citizen monitoring, together with the informed debate the production of
transparent, empirical data produces, allows shifts in priorities to evolve as
problems are addressed, new problems emerge, and democratic decisions
are made about how best to address local needs within the practical
constraint of available human, financial, and informational resources.
Other participation-enhancing tactics have likewise been broadly
shared by large numbers of civil society organizations, including the
organized use of civil society "report cards", "testing" processes, shadow
reports, social auditing and certification schemes, and development of
alternative budgets." While many of these auditing and certification
processes have initially been developed in the environmental arena, they
are increasingly being used in the labor, education, health, and other fields
by new accountability movements." This is done in a concerted effort to
engage ordinary people in directly monitoring the quality and impacts of a
range of public services by both public and private actors. By explicitly
identifying areas of satisfactory and unsatisfactory service delivery,
competitively rating providers, and then assessing "grades," rankings, or
minimum standards for social certification, social movements of the poor
create new and consumer-driven accountability frameworks that can impel
direct rights-based improvements in public service delivery and access.
Such participatory rights-based projects aim thereby to reverse the
"powerlessness [that] results in a failure to include poor people
systematically in the generation of information and adjustment of policies
and actions which affect them," ensuring that the "long route" of
traditional accountability (citizen monitoring of policy delivery) is
effectively supplemented with the "shorter route" of consumer monitoring
of service delivery.3 6 2
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/participatory budgeting.
358. See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a
Redistributive Democracy, 26 POL. & Soc'Y 461 (1998); Nilifer Cagatay et al., Budgets As If People
Mattered: Democratizing Macroeconomic Policies (SEPED Conference Paper Series No. 4, 2000),
available at http://www.iskran.ru/cddata/disk2/rr/044.pdf.
359. See, e.g., NEW TACTICS, supra note 291, at 107 (discussing testing processes).
360. Id. at 130-31 (documenting work of the Commission for the Verification of Corporate
Codes of Conduct (Coverco), which "conducts long-term, intensive independent monitoring
of labor conditions in Guatemalan apparel factories and agricultural export industries").
361. See, e.g., Rob Jenkins & Anne Marie Goetz, Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical
Implications of the Right-to-Information Movement in India, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 603, 618 (1999)
(discussing use of "report card" method in which public opinion surveys are conducted in
low income neighborhoods to report on the perceived quality and appropriateness of a range
of public services, without significant financial cost, and then to use such results as social
leverage for improving service delivery performance).
362. PRSA REVIEW, supra note 231, at 51, 73 & n.83.
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Within this framework, new accountability likewise focuses on
engaging directly with legislative and executive authorities at the initial
stages of policy development and implementation. New accountability
movements are thus engaged in a series of efforts to institutionalize
processes of participatory review of jurisdiction-specific laws, policies, and
practices to ensure their consistency with human rights standards. In many
jurisdictions, this takes the form of procedural safeguards requiring, for
example, the completion of "poverty impact assessments" (or poverty
proofing),' "human rights impact assessments," "social and
environmental impact assessments," "social audits," and "equality impact
assessments" before laws, policies, or projects are implemented that could
significantly and adversely affect the local population. They also include
notice and comment processes under administrative procedure acts,
mandatory consultation procedures with affected communities, and free,
informed prior consent guarantees.'
Each of these rights-based procedural requirements seeks to ensure
direct civil society participation in the monitoring and review of policies
before they are implemented. They thus serve as critical ex ante
accountability tools, allowing civil society actors to affirmatively halt
implementation processes where negative or disparate impacts are
perceived and/or to require corrective policy modification before harmful
impacts are experienced by socially vulnerable or less advantaged groups.
In the United States, recent efforts have similarly been underway to
ensure that participatory processes of rights-based review are regularized
in state and local legislative processes. In 2002, for example, the
Philadelphia-based Kensington Welfare Rights Union"5 partnered with the
Pennsylvania chapter of the National Association of Social Workers to
submit draft language for a Pennsylvania General Assembly resolution
proposing a study on how universal human rights standards could be
integrated into the laws and policies of Pennsylvania?. Following state-
363. Poverty proofing has been defined as "the process by which Government
Departments, local authorities and State agencies assess policies and programmes at design
and review stages in relation to the likely impact they will have or have had on poverty and
on inequalities which are likely to lead to poverty, with a view to poverty reduction." OFFICE
FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION, GOV'T OF NORTHERN IRELAND, POVERTY PROOFING GUIDELINES 3.1
(2005).
364. The imposition of such requirements has been particularly prevalent in situations
where private business activities, public development projects, or extractive industries
threaten to cause significant harm to the rights to health, housing, property, privacy, and
culture of surrounding communities. See, e.g., Saramaka v. Suriname, 2008 Inter-Am. C. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1995); U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., Linsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992 (1994).
365. KWRU was founded in 1991 by six homeless women in Philadelphia, who shared a
common need for adequate housing and common commitment to helping homeless families
like theirs stay together and find homes of their own, where they can live dignified lives
outside shelter systems. It was the founding organization of the PPEHRC. See
www.aboutus.org/KWRU.org.
366. Bricker-Jenkins Interview, supra note 341. The resolution passed unanimously after a
series of preliminary town meetings to mobilize support for the legislation. See id.; see also
NELL MCNAMARA & DOUG SCHENKELBERG, HEARTLAND ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN NEEDS &
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wide hearings with the poor on the effects of state laws on their everyday
lives, a 2004 House committee report found significant holes in state law
and policies with respect to the enjoyment by state citizens of the
individual rights to healthcare, nutrition, housing, quality education, and
sustainable employment at a living wage. 7 It correspondingly issued
recommendations to the legislature and other social stakeholders for
addressing them." In 2005, a similar human rights bill was proposed in the
Massachusetts legislature seeking to establish a special commission to
review the integration of international human rights standards in the
commonwealth's laws and policies, including through a series of public
hearings in which the full participation of affected stakeholders would be
assured.'
In calling for meaningful participation as an alternative to fixed rules,
new accountability is nonetheless highly wary of what has come to be
known as the "participation industry," often called the fastest growing
sector of the aid, development, and governance business. Development aid
institutions have responded to criticism that their policies are anti-poor
with efforts to enhance "voice" and "stakeholder participation,"
particularly "participation of the poor."370 Consequently, there has been a
proliferation of efforts initiated by government agencies, NGOs, private
sector businesses, and intergovernmental bodies to ensure "consultations"
and "focus groups" with affected communities, the inclusion of a
"representative" of marginalized groups on an advisory committee or
board, or the creation of self-help groups or users' associations under
program guidelines. Such "stakeholder participation" has become a core
element of new governance and new management models. Yet, as these
models have proliferated, many of their participation exercises have been
discredited as mere tokenism. Where the voices and preferences of the
poor are simply provided a formal outlet without any corresponding
power to effect policy choices, influence decisions, or hold actors to
HUMAN RIGHTS, EXTREME POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PRIMER 15 (2007).
367. See PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 144
INVESTIGATING THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN PENNSYLVANIA LAWS AND
POLICIES (Nov. 30, 2004).
368. See id. In issuing the recommendations, the report concluded that "for development
of economic and social policy to address the issues brought forth in these hearings, it is critical
to define human economic rights as those basic individual rights to healthcare, nutrition,
housing, quality education and sustainable employment at a living wage." Id. The task of new
accountability is to mobilize civil society participation and oversight to ensure that these
recommendations are turned into concrete measures and policy changes.
369. H.R. 706, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2005). If passed, the bill would have incorporated
principles of international human rights treaties into state law and authorized state
legislatures to investigate human rights abuses in Massachusetts through a series of public
hearings in which the full participation of all affected stakeholders would have been assured.
See MASS. CEDAW PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL (April 2005), available at
http: / /www.suffolk.edu/files/cwhhr/endorsement.pdf (endorsing the initiative).
370. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK GROUP, THE WORLD BANK PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK,
145-46 (1996); DEP'T OF INT'L DEVELOPMENT UK, TECHNICAL NOTE ON ENHANCING
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN AID ACTIVITIES (1995),
http://www.euforic.org/gb/stake2.htm.
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account, "stakeholder participation" and "voice" may become political
tools that operate in practice to further marginalize the interests of the
poor.
New accountability movements have, correspondingly, increasingly
insisted on creating new mechanisms through which they may
independently monitor the performance of decisionmakers and hold them to
account - not by invitation, but by their own power to identify minimum
standards of appropriate community conduct (consistent with human
rights values) and to exert social sanction where performance does not
meet those standards.37 ' This independent accounting role is an essential
element of new accountability. Indeed, it is the key to its ability to serve as
an effective check on the increasing discretion and power of service
providers under new governance regimes.
3. Accountability Through Performance Monitoring
A third core tenet of new accountability likewise parallels that of new
governance, while also serving as a functional check on the latter's day-to-
day operation. That tenet lies in its priority for results-oriented and
evidence-based performance monitoring. While new governance tends to
use performance monitoring as a tool of orchestration, new accountability
uses it as a tool of accountability. In so doing, it seeks to ensure not only that
the policy goals chosen by decisionmaking authorities in the social welfare
field reflect how well people affected are in fact faring in meeting their
basic needs in the areas of health care, employment, jobs, housing, and
food, but also that any policy measures chosen in pursuit of those goals in
fact lead to enhanced human dignity outcomes and empirically verifiable
reductions in barriers to social and economic opportunity (not just raw
program efficiency goals).
To do this, new accountability relies on the tools of human rights law
and, specifically, on the international duty of states to ensure that their
regulatory systems are designed and operating in ways through which
constant improvements in the enjoyment of the full range of internationally
recognized human rights can reliably be achieved across social sectors.
Under this duty - widely known as the duty of progressive realization -
regulatory systems must be designed to ensure that any unjustified
backtracking, arbitrary impact, or insufficient progress in such
achievement is immediately recognized, assessed for its causes, and
replaced by more effective and responsive alternative means of rights
achievement. New accountability methods tend, therefore, to be less
concerned with the precise means chosen to achieve any particular socially-
371. See generally PRSA REVIEW, supra note 231, at 44 n.63 (defining "participation" as "the
process through which stakeholders (those affected by the outcome of reform or capable [of]
affecting the reform) influence or share control over setting priorities, making policy, allocating
resources, and ensuring access to public goods and services.") (emphasis added).
372. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 239-240.
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sanctioned end, than with the progress (or lack thereof) that is in fact being
made on core human rights indicators, particularly for the most vulnerable.
In this way, new accountability embraces a highly pragmatic, non-
ideological and evidence-based framework that seeks to work not in
opposition to, but rather in engaged cooperation with, other social
stakeholders in continually innovating more effective and responsive
policies for rights-based achievement in the social welfare context.
Long spurned by older human rights movements as antithetical to the
claimed absolutism and immediacy of human rights law, performance
monitoring and its associated concepts of "progressive realization" and
maximum and targeted usage of "all available resources" are in fact core to
the international law of human rights and its subsidiary structure.
Correspondingly, every human rights treaty establishes a procedure
through which state parties commit to prepare and submit reports -
generally within a year of ratification, and thereafter every two, four or five
years - describing the concrete measures they have taken to give effect to
the rights enshrined therein, the actual progress achieved in ensuring the
enjoyment of those rights, and any setbacks encountered in the process.
These reporting processes are designed to serve a variety of
participation-enhancing, accountability, and outcome-based achievement
ends. In particular, by requiring states to report transparently on the
measures they have adopted and to monitor their success in achieving
human rights-based improvements, such processes aim to facilitate "public
scrutiny of government policies with respect to protected rights," and
thereby to encourage "the involvement of the various economic, social and
cultural sectors of society in the formulation, implementation and review
of the relevant policies."37
Indeed, by tracking outcomes and achievement over time, civil society
monitors put themselves in the position of being able to pinpoint public
policy successes and failures. Diagnosing the causes of any concerns, they
can thus be ready with informed alternatives when unjustified
backtracking, arbitrary practices, or insufficient progress occurs in any
given area, thereby ensuring program responsiveness, innovation, and
flexibility to real needs on the ground. Because it serves so many important
instrumental objectives, performance monitoring has in fact been called
"an integral part of any process designed to promote accepted goals of
public policy."m Accordingly, it is an operational priority not only of
human rights and new accountability initiatives, but also of new
governance and new public management models, which likewise privilege
good governance techniques and rational, evidence-based policy planning
373. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("The States
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the
enjoyment of those rights.") (emphasis added).
374. U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 1, supra note 315, 1 5.
375. Id. 9J3.
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and program design." It also corresponds to the innovation-centered,
experimental demonstration model on which the early MFP was conceived.
Within this framework, performance monitoring entails three distinct
stages: (a) goal articulation accompanied by indicator identification,
baseline assessment, and benchmark setting; (b) the adoption of targeted
plans of action and assurances as to the transparency and accessibility of
related informational inputs; and (c) training and outreach programs to
promote behavioral or attitudinal changes. Where new accountability's
embrace of performance monitoring differs from that of new governance is
in how adequate performance is in fact assessed: What kind of performance
is considered adequate? Who does the assessing? And, upon what standards
or metrics is performance assessed?
a) Performance Goals, Indicators, and Targets
The first two steps in any performance monitoring system are, one,
identification of the goals of positive performance and, two, the
establishment of a set of indicators to measure whether progress is or is not
being made toward those performance goals. Once performance goals and
indicators are established, a baseline must then be determined to indicate
one's measurement starting point and, ideally, a target or benchmark to
indicate the level of performance expected by a given time. Such
benchmarks represent the degree of progress that can reasonably be
expected within a given timeframe, appreciating that the journey from
baseline to ultimate goal will generally take time and must be balanced
against competing commitments and parallel processes of progressive
rights achievement. The use of targets in performance monitoring is
nevertheless crucial for allowing collaborative and participatory processes
of "scoping" and targeted planning to take place, through which
community energies and resources can be focused on concrete, short-term
advances in the achievement of larger, longer-term rights-based goals."
As discussed above, the PRWORA new governance regime has
determined that the overriding goal of welfare policy is to move people off
welfare and into work.3 7" As such, it has established a set of performance
indicators centered on rates of welfare enrollment and initial job
placements for former recipients. New accountability, by contrast, sees its
goal not as reducing welfare enrollment per se - a goal which provides
little relevant information about how people are in fact faring. Rather, it
sees its goal as ensuring that all individuals have adequate and reliable
376. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has, correspondingly, been exploring
options for the creation of a National Indicator System to help the U.S. diagnose and assess its
comparative position and progress, both domestically and internationally, in an effort to
improve national performance in a range of important areas. See GAO, INFORMING OUR
NATION, supra note 183.
377. See, e.g., U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 14, supra note 356, T 58 (describing
"scoping" process before treaty body).
378. See supra Part [l.A.
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access to a core set of social rights, including the rights to adequate
housing, health care, social insurance, education, labor protections, food,
and clean water.
The challenge new accountability faces, then, is to establish a set of
indicators that can accurately measure changes in levels of access to and
enjoyment of these core rights. Because the "success" of public policy
performance will largely be determined on the basis of how quickly
indicators show improvement and benchmarks are met, the adequacy of
the process for selecting performance indicators is of vital importance.
Getting them wrong may contribute to distorted policy outcomes, or mis-
signals to the "market" on what constitutes policy-based success - as has,
by multiple accounts, been the case with PRWORA. It may also function to
be jurispathetic, closing off spaces for legitimate or sanctioned participation
of particular actors. Such an effect is most frequent where policy goals are
identified in ways that are too oriented towards raw efficiency or economic
rather than social criteria.'
This skewed indicator system has been the principal criticism leveled
against dominant performance monitoring systems in the development,
regulatory, and public management fieldsm These fields have tended to
focus on indicators that measure macro changes in access to goods and
services, but often miss the ways that public policies arbitrarily or
irrationally impact individuals and particular disadvantaged groups. As
such, new accountability initiatives - with the assistance of human rights
institutions - have increasingly sought to alter the way indicators are
selected and employed. They have done so not only by seeking to redefine
the broader goals of performance systems (shifting toward a socially-
oriented human rights framework), but also by decentralizing the sites in
which performance indicators are selected and by redefining the parameters
within which performance indicators should be defined.
With respect to the former, new accountability movements have found
it increasingly necessary to appropriate the situs in which performance
indicators are selected. Traditionally, it has been assumed that
governments should define relevant indicators for national use. Experience
has shown, however, that when governments are left to select and define
their own indicators, those measurements often do not coincide with the
real concerns and priorities of local populations. That is, the process runs
the risk of measuring the wrong things - i.e., raw service delivery targets or
narrow outcome indicators that tell a partial, even skewed story of what is
in fact happening on the ground. In the U.S. context, this has been the case
with both PRWORA and, according to many accounts, the No Child Left
Behind Act."1 The same may be true with respect to indicators generically
379. See supra text accompanying note 185.
380. Examples include the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), the Millennium
Development Goals progress reports, and the U.N. Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF).
381. It is in this regard that the "new accountability" discussed here differs from the new
accountability used to describe local school governance structures in the U.S.: the latter is
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determined by "international experts," generally far removed from
processes and priority problems on the ground.
New accountability movements have, correspondingly, stressed the
importance of decentralizing indicator selection processes to local
communities, especially as they relate to localized struggles for specific,
priority policy changes in the health, education and housing fields. This
work is perhaps best exemplified by the creative community work of the
Participation and Practice of Rights Project, a new accountability initiative
operating in economically-marginalized communities in Northern Belfast
and North Inner City Dublin."' The Project works with communities to
address abusive situations involving core human rights concerns that
community members have identified as imposing the most significant
barriers to dignity and equality in their day-to-day lives." Communities
are then assisted in identifying and prioritizing a small set of human
rights-based indicators that are capable of measuring progress on those
concrete priority issues?
Once such indicators are chosen, a baseline survey is undertaken and
reasonable six and twelve-month benchmarks are set for assessing
improved performance from that baseline. Communities then engage
directly with relevant officials - such as those from the local ministries of
housing, education or health - to achieve those targets, offering their own
suggestions for best practices and effective means of speeding improved
performance outcomes. In this way, they seek a cooperative, engaged
relationship with public authorities and other stakeholders, with whom
based on indicators and benchmarks established administratively from above. See Liebman &
Sabel, supra note 37, at 229-31.
382. The Project's mission statement calls for "promotfing] awareness of international
human rights instruments and standards and supportling] marginalized communities and
groups to use them in accessing services and achieving equality." See Participation and the
Practice of Rights (PPRI Project, Home, http://www.pprproject.org/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2009). It adopts an explicit human rights-based approach (HRBA) to poverty alleviation,
seeking to "empower people to take full part in identifying the issues important to them, and
help them to tackle the issues themselves. The HRBA works to ensure people in poverty are
involved when decisions are made that affect their lives." Id.
383. The PPR Project has to date worked with community groups to address the right to
adequate housing, the improvement of mental health services for those at risk of suicide, the
accessibility of taxis for persons with disabilities, access to health services by drug users, and
the child's right to play. The corresponding reports are available at PPR Project, PPR
Resources and Publications, http://www.pprproject.org/index.php?option=comContent
&task=view&id=27&ltemid=38 (last visited June 10, 2010).
384. With respect to the right to mental health, for example, the participating community
identified indicators with respect to four priority issues: lack of follow-up appointments on
discharge from hospital for persons with severe mental health issues; inadequate provision of
medical information by general practitioners; lack of information on and access to complaints
mechanisms; and lack of opportunities for participation in mental health decisionmaking. For
the precise benchmarks set at six and twelve month intervals for each, see PPR PROJECT,
RIGHTS IN ACTION: CHANGING MENTAL HEALTH SERvICES, MENTAL HEALTH FORUM REPORT 26-
42 (2007), available at http://www.pprproject.org/images/documents/mh-transcript.pdf. See
also PPR PROJECT, RIGHTS IN ACTION: CHANGING MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: FINDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PANEL 13 (2007), available at
http://www.pprproject.org/images/documents/ findings-mh.pdf.
Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor
they can work in constructive local partnership, using human rights based
indicators that directly correspond to the issues most significant to them
and their families. The process thus creates a direct form of accountability
between historically marginalized communities and the agencies or
institutions that have duties over the fair and equal provision of public
services.'
Such projects have repeatedly yielded concrete results for underserved
communities in accessing services in appropriate, nondiscriminatory, and
non-arbitrary ways. They tend to show that when local people are
involved in monitoring local issues using a cooperative, rights-based
approach, especially where reasonable and concrete performance targets
are set, responsible agencies engage in discussions on appropriate access to
services from a rights perspective, yielding more accountable responses
from the statutory agencies. At the same time, such initiatives demonstrate
the imperative of decentralized, community-based processes for defining
relevant human rights performance indicators. Such processes are
necessary to ensure that indicators genuinely correspond to local
populations' experiences with rights deprivations, and hence truly serve as
a metric for human wellbeing and rights-based improvements in dignity
and equality.
In addition to greater control over the selection of indicators used in
local performance monitoring, new accountability movements have also
sought an expansion in the scope and types of indicators used to measure
rights-based progress. Such expansion has occurred along four distinct
axes. First, new accountability movements have insisted on greater
attention to qualitative indicators, rather than exclusively quantitative ones.
That is, they have sought to have perceptions and testimonials of
stakeholders, as collected through questionnaires, open interviews, and
public testimonies, taken as fully into account in performance monitoring
processes as more traditional statistical data collected in censuses or
surveys." Failure to do this has been a particular concern with the
385. To increase the social leverage of disadvantaged communities in institutional
engagement processes, the PPR Project invites participation from a broad spectrum of
stakeholders, including international figures who - through their contacts, influence, stature
or greater access to the media - may be able to exert distinct types of pressure on local
authorities in cooperation with local communities. Thus, the indicators and benchmarks
chosen by PPR groups are invariably presented in community-wide fora in which
international experts are invited to preside as a panel, offer comments, and continue a longer-
term monitoring process. See, e.g., PPR PROJECT, FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL, supra
note 384.
386. For example, in response to the Mental Health initiative, the Health Minister agreed
to implement a "Card Before You Leave" appointment system for mental health patients to
ensure follow-up appointments are given within one week of discharge. The Minister likewise
appointed a liaison to work on the issues identified by the group. See PPR Project, Call for
Minister To Deliver on Promises To Put Service Users at Heart of Decision Making, PPR
PROJECT E-BULLETIN 3-4 (July 2008).
387. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Guidelines for Preparation of Progress
Indicators in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.132 doc. 14, 1 28
(2008) ("Specifically, quantitative social indicators derive from methods that chiefly collect
information in a numeric format or in pre-coded categories, whereas in qua[lilitative research,
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PRWORA performance regime, which, especially as taken in conjunction
with narrowly identified performance goals, has relied exclusively on
limited statistical indicators - such as the raw number of TANF recipients
or former recipients now in jobs. While such indicators are clearly
important, they nevertheless cannot tell the full story of rights achievement
and, depending on how they are supplemented by other indicators, may in
fact mask serious abuses or even backward trends in human wellbeing.
Thus, unemployment rates may fall, signaling success, even as poverty
rates climb due to some other related but unmeasured cause, such as lack
of minimum wage protections. More people may be off public assistance,
but it may be the result of arbitrary rules and procedures or abusive
conduct by street-level bureaucrats, rather than because former recipients
are now self-sustaining. It is thus critical that additional performance
measures are assessed to ensure that policies respect the rights and dignity-
interests of those they purport to serve.
Another axis upon which new accountability has insisted that
indicators be assessed derives from the conclusion of human rights bodies
that all rights have core dimensions that correspond to their availability,
accessibility, adequacy, and quality for distinct social actors.3 Accordingly,
new accountability movements increasingly focus on identifying indicators
that track improvements in each of these important dimensions. They also
track those along the core human rights commitments of nondiscrimination,
participation, and accountability.'
With respect to the duty of non-discrimination in particular, new
accountability insists that all indicators be further disaggregated according
to major prohibited grounds, such as sex, race, ethnicity, social status, and
other categories, such as poverty. Such disaggregation is necessary to show
the differential impacts of public policies on distinct groups, and hence to
reveal where new policy interventions and targeted special measures may
be required. A growing number of nations now require that these types of
"equality impact assessments" and/or "poverty impact assessments" be
conducted on all significant policy or legislative proposals before they
come into effect.39 As of 1998, for example, all "significant policy
proposals" in Northern Ireland are required to "indicate clearly the impact
of the proposal on groups in poverty or at risk of falling into poverty"
before they will be considered."'
analysis techniques and procedures are far from standardized; rather, data analysis is intrinsic
to the way in which the questions are framed, locations selected, and information
harvested."); ISOBEL FRYE, WHAT IS POVERTY? A QUALITATIVE REFLECTION OF PEOPLE'S
EXPERIENCES OF POVERTY (2007).
388. See, e.g., U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 14, supra note 356, T 11-12.
389. See, e.g., id. 18-19, 59.
390. See, e.g., Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (U.K.); Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 75
(requiring public bodies to give due regard to promoting equality of opportunity in all their
functions); OFFICE FOR SoC. INCLUSION, GOV'T OF IR., GUIDELINES FOR POVERTY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (2008) [hereinafter PIA GUIDELINES).
391. See PIA GUIDELINES, supra note 390, at 7 (citing DEP'TOF THE TAOISEACH, GOv'T OF IR.,
CABINET HANDBOOK 19 (1998)).
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Finally, new accountability has sought to focus performance
monitoring attention not just on "outcome-indicators," but on a fuller
range of "process indicators" and "structural indicators."392 While outcome
indicators, such as maternal mortality rates, HIV prevalence rates, or under
and unemployment rates, are designed to measure the impact of programs,
activities, and interventions on the enjoyment of specific rights, process
indicators are designed to measure the quality and extent of efforts to
implement rights. They do so by measuring the scope, coverage, and
content of strategies, plans, programs, policies or other specific activities
and interventions designed to accomplish the goals necessary for the
realization of a specific right. Structural indicators, in turn, evaluate how a
given government's institutional apparatus and legal system are organized
to perform human rights treaty obligations. They look at the existence of
legal standards, strategies, plans of action, programs, policies and public
agencies or institutions with an implementing capacity. It is only possible
to see the full picture of a given jurisdiction's efforts to achieve human
rights protections through a concurrent examination of each of these sets of
outcome, structural, and process indicators, especially as disaggregated
across population sub-groups and with respect to the various dimensions
of human rights achievement.
b) Information Transparency and Targeted Plans of Action
Just as important as identifying responsive rights-based indicators,
however, is making sure that the measurements they produce can be used
in ways that promote critical assessment and community debate around
the appropriateness of current policies and practices. Indeed, performance
monitoring and associated periodic reporting processes are designed
precisely to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are "aware of the extent to
which the various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed by all individuals,"
thereby "facilitat[ing] public scrutiny of government policies" with respect
to protected rights and "encourag[ing] the involvement of the various
economic, social and cultural sectors of society in the formulation,
implementation and review of the relevant policies."3 -
Such policy engagement requires, in turn, that information about
performance monitoring and how it was undertaken is fully transparent,
publicly available, and accessible to all stakeholders in the marketplace.
Indeed, such data sets "provide a basis on which [relevant stakeholders]
can effectively evaluate the extent to which progress has been made,"
392. This work has been spearheaded by the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, as part of an
effort to steer the periodic reporting process away from over-reliance on development-based
indicators. See, e.g., The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Interim
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health,
IT 6-35, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/427 (Oct. 10, 2003).
393. U.N. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 1, supra note 315, 3, 5.
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putting them in a position to be able to make informed judgments about
how to fill gaps and accelerate progress. Where information is not
accessible and transparent, the basis for engaged and evidence-based
public debate is weakened. This may, in turn, lead to overly ideological
policy positions or the privileging of other non-evidence-based
considerations in public policymaking that do not in fact correspond to
actual lived experience and hence do not contribute to progressive rights-
based performance outcomes. As a non-ideological, practice-based
movement, new accountability seeks to avoid such results, ensuring that
policymaking corresponds to the factual circumstances and lived realities
of actual stakeholders on the ground, as experienced and assessed by
affected communities themselves.
By ensuring evidence-based research at the community level on
relative human rights achievement, systems of rights-based performance
monitoring thus serve as a critical means for negotiating and preparing
targeted plans of action to address priority community concerns in the
social welfare context, especially as they affect the least advantaged.
Indeed, as has been noted, while performance monitoring is "designed to
give a detailed overview of the existing situation, the principal value of
such an overview is to provide the basis for the elaboration of clearly stated
and carefully targeted policies.""'
Such "clearly stated and carefully targeted" plans of action serve a
number of performance enhancing and accountability functions. On the
performance end, by focusing public attention on a smaller set of specific
actions targeted at community priorities and the livelihood needs of the
most vulnerable, such plans facilitate the immediate mobilization of
community energy and resources around concrete achievable ends. The
attainment of such ends can, correspondingly, serve to mobilize
imaginations and propel continuous coordinated action among a growing
variety of stakeholders. This process is facilitated by the fact that such
plans are designed to be highly flexible, capable of accommodating
changing community needs and evolving priorities as well as
incorporating comparative learning processes to maximize performance
results. Reviewed and updated every several years, new targets and
benchmarks can correspondingly be established as previous ones are met.
Perhaps most important for new accountability movements, however,
are the accountability enhancing functions that such plans provide. Indeed,
by concretely identifying the specific actions to be taken by distinct
community stakeholders, such targeted plans create a critical framework
within which social movements of the poor can hold distinct social actors
to account for taking (or failing to take) identified actions. Within this
context, where plans of action do not reflect the interests of the least
advantaged, new accountability movements will seek formal explanations,
justified in the empirical record, followed by appropriate revisions and
394. Id. T 6.
395. Id. T 4.
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updates. Where such interests are reflected, they will engage in
participatory monitoring processes to ensure that benchmarks and targets
are in fact being met for rights-based improvements in performance,
offering their active assistance and expertise throughout the process. In this
way, social movements of the poor become integral participants in the
process of negotiated public policymaking and democratic setting of the
public agenda.
c) Training and Outreach to Promote New Behaviors
Finally, like new governance, new accountability appreciates that one
of the most significant barriers to achieving rights-based performance goals
lies in social attitudes. In particular, negative attitudes about the lifestyles
and motivations of the poor as well as the responsibilities of the broader
public and of service providers constitute major barriers to progress on
poverty alleviation.39 ' Correspondingly, just as PRWORA authorities in the
U.S. context have promoted cultural change trainings in an effort to
channel the way discretion is exercised by ground-level employees in state
and local-level welfare administration agencies, new accountability
movements similarly seek to use institutional trainings and public outreach
proactively to reverse the anti-poor bias and mistrust that often pervades
service delivery to the poor. Accordingly, new accountability sees one of its
central tasks as working with other stakeholders, through training and
education, to change public attitudes about the poor. This is true both
within the regulatory apparatus and for the public at large. With respect to
the former, new accountability movements recognize that both anti-poor
bias and ignorance about how human rights standards fit within new
governance-styled performance monitoring mandates pervade government
bureaucracy and many private service delivery entities. Indeed, it is
precisely the volatile amalgam of anti-poor bias and broad discretion
within performance-based incentive systems that has led to growing
complaints of abuse in the welfare exchange.
As such, increasing attention has been placed on directing institutional
human rights training programs, education and outreach to prisons, police
forces, schools, welfare departments, and other service providers -
stakeholders that exert significant power over marginalized populations
and often have histories of abusive conduct toward them9 7 They are doing
so by seeking to change the culture of regulatory welfare agencies and
396. Reflecting these negative attitudes, three key shortcomings in U.S. approaches to
poverty alleviation over the last forty years have been identified as (1) the erosion of the social
compact on ensuring economic opportunity for all, in favor of an individualization of
responsibility for poverty; (2) the limited sense of possibilities for public action in poverty-
eradication programs; and (3) an inadequate attention to the variety of social actors
responsible for poverty alleviation. See, e.g., Daniel P. Gitterman, Confronting Poverty: What
Role for Public Programs?: An Overview of Panel 1, 10 EMP. RTs & EMP. POL'Y J. 9 (2006)
(providing summary and transcript of commentary by national poverty experts Alice
O'Connor, Peter Edelman, David Ellwood, and Sandy Darity).
397. See generally NEW TACTICS, supra note 291 (providing examples of trainings).
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service providers, such that they are more amenable to human rights
standards, indicators, and safeguard policies, especially as they relate to
the principles of nondiscrimination, participation and accountability in
social welfare policymaking.
Indeed, rights-based performance monitoring can be effective only if
the personnel working in the public and private institutions being
monitored understand the process and, particularly, the relevance of
human rights law to their daily routines and bureaucratic functions. Such
personnel may in fact be highly sympathetic to human rights values in
principle - consistent with U.S. public perception as a whole"' - but
unaware of how concretely to translate those values into their day-to-day
bureaucratic tasks and work duties. Others may be more hostile, taking a
more confrontational or dismissive approach, often due to a misperception
of what human rights law is or what human rights entitlements entail. Both
categories of personnel require rights-based education and outreach. A
core purpose of such outreach, from new accountability's perspective, is to
make clear to agency personnel that the human rights framework being
advanced is not the "old" confrontational one of militant demand and
protest around rigidly defined rules and material entitlements. Rather, it is
an engaged one of working collaboratively and in partnership with elected
authorities and other community stakeholders to achieve improved human
dignity outcomes through, in particular, the incorporation of human rights
safeguards and principled rights-based policymaking into public
administration and private decisionmaking processes.
On a broader level, new accountability movements likewise seek
proactively to alter attitudes about the poor among the public at large.
They are doing so in recognition of the fact that if they don't do so, no one
else will. In the United States, these attitudes have tended to portray the
poor as socially and morally irresponsible, lazy and unmotivated to work,
and prone to criminality.3" New accountability movements seek to change
this public perception by making the voices of the poor heard and their
faces seen. They have used truth commissions and other public fora as a
means of drawing attention to their personal stories and hence educating
the public as to who precisely "the poor" are in the United States, the
breadth and diversity of their experience, and the nature of the varied
public policy choices that maintain so many in or at the brink of poverty."
398. National public opinion polls, for example, suggest that eighty percent of Americans
believe that human rights inhere in every human being, irrespective of whether the
government ratifies human rights treaties. See BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, THE
OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 12 (2007).
399. See, e.g., supra note 135.
400. See, e.g., supra note 337 (quoting PPEHRC on the purposes of U.S. truth commission
on poverty).
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4. Pluralization (and "Hardening") of Flexible Enforcement
Incentives
A fourth organizing principle of new accountability, shared in many
ways with new governance theory, is a healthy skepticism about over-
reliance on coercive, legal-adversarial enforcement mechanisms. Such
skepticism stems not from a rejection of standard legal-adversarial
accountability tools, such as administrative hearings and other forms of
judicial process, but rather from a more realistic appraisal of the practical
limits of their effectiveness in securing comprehensive and lasting
solutions to the multitude of ways in which the poor are kept in
impoverishing and abusive relationships.' New accountability recognizes
that there are an abundance of ways that the organized public can exert its
power over abusive social actors and that, often, these social sanctions are
just as powerful as their court-centric counterparts, while being far less
costly and far more accessible to the poor.
Thus, just as new governance models advocate a shift toward
voluntary codes of conduct, peer competition and pressure, self-adopted
equal employment policies, diversity training programs, and a host of
other "voluntary" and "collaborative" methods of compliance control,42
new accountability likewise embraces these new forms of more flexible and
voluntary self-regulation. It then, however, seeks to take them a step
further by hardening the "soft" incentives that new governance models
prefer - transforming them into socially enforceable commitments.4 0
This hardening is not necessarily achieved through new forms of state
legal regulation, but rather through a more concrete set of mechanisms for
achieving de facto accountability. Such de facto accountability tools are
defined not by formal law per se, but by the practical power to impose a
sanction where conduct is inadequate. In this way, new accountability
seeks to harness the expressive power of human rights law, using the
financial and political leverage of rights-sensitive citizens and consumers
to establish a regime of increasingly persuasive incentives (of both a
negative and positive variety) for promoting minimum levels of rights-
respecting behavior by a wide range of public and private actors.
401. See White, Paradox, supra note 54, at 868-69 (challenging notion that a legal remedy,
designed by lawyers and not the poor who use the system, can ever be the final or even partial
solution, and noting that fair hearings do not grant clients the right to mold welfare
bureaucracies to their needs, only to challenge the bureaucracy's mistakes and excesses; even
then, hearings correct mistakes only after they occur and only for one client at a time). This
does not mean that new accountability movements do not seek to use strategic litigation in
conjunction with broader processes of socio-political engagement in a variety of
decisionmaking fields. See supra note 237.
402. See supra text accompanying note 217.
403. As has been noted, "That businesses speak of corporate social responsibility rather
than corporate accountability is not a mere difference of terminology. It is based upon the
understanding that measures taken to mitigate the ill-effects of business activity fall into the
category of voluntary action, commitments which are not to be enforced." Goetz & Jenkins,
supra note 239, at 8.
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In promoting this model, new accountability movements appreciate
the difference between "hard" and "soft" incentives. In particular, they
understand the imperative of hardening the soft incentives traditionally
associated with human rights law, particularly in the social welfare field.
"Hard" incentives have been described as those that score high on three
distinct dimensions of enforceability: obligation, precision, and delegation.
That is, they derive from obligations that are binding on distinct social
actors, that are precisely defined in terms of the concrete conduct required of
those actors, and that are backed by strictly enforced sanctions for
compliance and non-compliance.4
New accountability movements correspondingly seek to emphasize
each of these three dimensions in their work. Thus, in its reliance on
human rights language and methodologies, new accountability
underscores the fully binding nature of the obligations human rights
norms impose on the full range of social actors. These obligations, it is
stressed, do not derive exclusively from formal law, such as ratified
treaties, nor are they imposed exclusively on government actors. Rather,
they derive just as robustly from the moral and political responsibilities
imposed by human rights values on members of organized, just society, a
conception that resonates widely in the twenty-first century public
imagination.4 0 By emphasizing this reciprocal framework of stakeholder
rights and duties, new accountability thus provides a critical set of legal
resources through which individual and collective rights-holders can make
reasonable and recognized demands on other social actors to engage in
specified rights-protective conduct." Where such rights protective action
is not taken or where such failure is not sufficiently justified through
appropriate and transparent reason-giving and explanation, the human
rights framework allows rights-holders to hold corresponding duty-bearers
to account by imposing on the wrongdoer a set of negative incentives or
sanctions. Such sanctions can be of a moral, political, financial or legal
nature.
In so doing, new accountability movements appreciate that the
practical enforceability of human rights obligations depends in large part
on how precisely they can be defined in terms of the verifiable conduct
required of distinct social actors. As such, attention has been targeted
within new accountability on those dimensions of human rights duties that
can be defined at the very highest level of precision. The result has been a
strategic focus on a core set of procedural safeguards or process-oriented
duties with which social actors must comply as a necessary part of rights
protection efforts. Such duties include, for example, requirements that
404. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Mark A. Pollack, Mainstreaming Gender in the European
Union: Getting the Incentives Right (jean Monnet Working Paper No. 08/08, 2008) (defining
"hard incentive" ); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
405. See supra note 398.
406. See generally Clarence Dias, The Legal Resources Approach, in FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT
175, 176-77 (Asbjern Eide et. al., eds., 1984).
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business, government, and other institutional actors engage in mandatory
consultation or free, informed prior consent procedures with affected
communities, that they observe notice and comment processes under
administrative procedure acts, and that they complete "social and
environmental impact assessments," "social audits" "equality impact
assessments," "poverty impact assessments," or "human rights impact
assessments" before projects are commenced that could significantly and
adversely affect vulnerable populations.' These process-oriented
dimensions of human rights duties are particularly powerful in their
operation as ex ante accountability tools. Unlike their ex post counterparts,
which require justification of conduct after harmful action may have
occurred, these critical tools subject decisionmaking processes to
questioning before final actions are undertaken and hence play a vital role
in safeguarding vulnerable populations from avoidable harm and ensuring
their active participation in the decisionmaking processes that affect them.
They are thus a particular priority of new accountability movements.
Equally important for hardening human rights incentives, new
accountability methodologies have sought to delegate or assign to
particular individuals or entities specific responsibilities for ensuring
compliance with both procedural safeguards and reasonable performance
targets or benchmarks in rights achievement. Through such delegations,
discrete individuals or entities can be required to affirmatively justify
underperformance and, where such explanations are inadequate, face real
interest-based financial, political, or reputational consequences for their
failures. Such consequences may include the threat of institutional funding
cuts, consumer boycotts of offending businesses, political naming and
shaming campaigns or - where responsibilities have been administratively
assigned within institutions or government to managers or other
individuals - pay cuts, loss of promotion, or ineligibility for other valuable
individual employment benefits. These "hard" incentives have repeatedly
been shown to be the most effective way to modify behavior within and
across institutions.
Finally, to ensure that the threat of reputational, economic, or political
costs is in fact capable of influencing interest-based decisionmaking
processes, new accountability movements have increasingly constructed
new institutional and extrainstitutional regimes designed to back those
threats up. Consisting of a wide range of rights-based certification
initiatives, social auditing schemes, report card systems, and other
performance-based grading arrangements, these regimes aim to ensure
that rights-related behavior is regularly monitored and assessed for
compliance with human rights standards. In so doing, they aim to ensure
that best and worst performers are publicly and transparently named, that
processes exist through which consumers are provided valuable
407. See supra text accompanying notes 363-364.
408. See, e.g., Hafner-Burton & Pollack, supra note 404 (analyzing comparative
performance incentives used in public sector gender mainstreaming initiatives).
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information about which businesses comply or fail to comply with
minimum standards of human rights protections, and - most importantly -
that all such information is widely and transparently accessible to the
broad range of citizens and consumers that are in a position to act on it in
making choices about how to spend their money, support political
candidates, pursue their interests, and otherwise organize their day-to-day
lives.
In this regard, replicating the competitive performance systems already
in widespread use through new governance and new public management
regimes around the world, new accountability supplements its attention to
"negative incentives" with a congruent attention to "positive incentives."
Through the latter, strong reputational and financial benefits may be set up
to accrue to those entities and individuals who demonstrate compliance
with human rights standards. Modeled on many current mainstreaming or
participation-enhancing efforts in the corporate and public management
contexts,m these incentives seek to tie performance to pay bonuses,
funding, institutional benefits, and individual promotions within
institutions, as well as to create a competitive environment for achieving
rights-related goals as quickly and effectively as possible. By tying real
financial, political, reputational benefits to positive performance and to
superior scores in competitive systems of rights-based performance review,
new accountability seeks to reward social actors for exceeding minimum
standards and for establishing new industry or community standards in
acceptable levels of rights protections. In this way, it seeks to ensure the
increasing incorporation of human dignity concerns in the formulation and
implementation of public policies affecting the poor.
5. Orchestration Among Proliferating Stakeholder Participants
The final core tenet of new accountability, as with new governance, is
legal orchestration. Indispensable to all subsidiarity-based institutional
frameworks, legal orchestration ensures that the decentralized
information-gathering and decisionmaking processes that new
accountability unleashes are linked together within a supportive "higher"
frame. That higher frame is one that can intervene with a facilitative hand
for purposes of gathering, coordinating, sorting, and repackaging the
expanse of information generated by decentralized norm-generating
processes around the nation - facilitating innovation, standardizing good
409. A significant example is the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) processes in the mid-1990s to assist in poverty reduction and the attainment of the
Millennium Development Goals. Under this mechanism, states must prepare national poverty
reduction strategies - with mandatory requirements on broad processes of consultation and
civil society participation - before a loan or grant is extended by the World Bank. By tying
failure to engage in such participatory processes and impact assessments to real financial
consequences for states, PRSPs have served as a critical and powerful stimulant to
governments to ensure participatory poverty-reduction strategy processes at the domestic
level. See PRSA REVIEW, supra note 231, at 51.
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practices, researching and replicating success stories from local or private
levels, assisting in scaling-up, and communicating information to all
stakeholders transparently and comprehensively.
In the human rights field, this role tends to be played at the national
level by a National Office on Human Rights, generally in cooperation with
a National Human Rights Institution. Significantly, the United States has
no corresponding set of institutions. This vacuum has been perhaps new
accountability's greatest weakness in the U.S. context. Indeed, without a
national orchestrating structure - such as exists with respect to new
governance regimes - community-based new accountability movements in
the United States have tended to remain isolated and unconnected in their
work. While national clearinghouse NGOs, such as the U.S. Human Rights
Network and the Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign, have
stepped in to play a limited orchestration role, as non-governmental
umbrella groups, they cannot ensure that regulatory agencies in fact take
the inputs generated by new accountability into regular constructive
account. Indeed, without an effective national orchestrating body to
connect localized rights-based performance review and accountability data
with broader processes of institutional reform and policy development,
new accountability processes have remained cut off from the formal
institutional structures of government. This disconnect limits the ability of
the new accountability movement in the U.S. to have significant impact on
the formulation of major public policies or on the competitive performance
monitoring of the welfare regulatory apparatus. It is a gap that urgently
needs to be filled.
Notably, this gap exists despite the fact that a national infrastructure
for indicator-based competitive performance review already exists in the
United States. Under the 1993 Government Performance Results Act, every
federal agency is today mandated to prepare an annual performance plan
with respect to each program activity in its budget. Such plans must
include measurable performance goals, performance indicators, and a basis
for comparing actual results with the performance goals.o
Notwithstanding, no corresponding mandate exists to require full and
effective stakeholder participation in the process of choosing relevant
performance goals and indicators. As such, no institutional process exists
to recognize the critical data points that new accountability is producing,
nor to transform them into measurable indicators for use in rating the
"performance success" of social welfare programs.' Such data points aim
410. All U.S. federal agencies are required to provide performance-based plans to the
Office of Management and Budget and Congress each year. See Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, §§ 3(a), 4(b), 107 Stat. 285, 286-87 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 1115-1116, (b) (2000)) (specifying contents of performance plans). The
Government Accounting Office has likewise submitted a report to Congress calling for a more
comprehensive national indicators assessment. See GAO, INFORMING OUR NATION, supra note
183.
411. The result of such narrow performance measure selection processes is that regulators
and politicians repeatedly declare local applications of PRWORA and similar programs
performance "successes," even as those applications lead to measurable (but officially
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to ensure that the "end result" of programs is not simply to meet raw
service delivery targets, but rather to reduce poverty and to improve
human wellbeing.
Significantly, while this gap remains notably unfilled at the federal
level, state and local governments are increasingly being pressed by civil
society to create their own orchestration systems around local human
rights achievement and poverty alleviation. Illinois, for its part, has
recently created a state-level Commission on the Elimination of Poverty
with a mandate to collect views and testimonies from local communities on
how to cut extreme poverty in half by 2015.412 Following the conviction that
"[flull participation in civic life cannot be achieved without those things
that protect and preserve human dignity and make for a healthy life,
including adequate nutrition and housing, meaningful work, safe
communities, health care, and education,",13 the Commission is to sponsor
community-based hearings across the state designed to collect and
consolidate the experiences, perspectives, and suggestions of stakeholders
on the most effective ways of eliminating barriers in access to food,
housing, work, health, and education. By coordinating these informational
inputs and ensuring that they are widely accessible to state decisionmaking
processes, the Commission can serve as an important orchestrating
institution with respect to state-wide efforts at poverty alleviation.
Connecticut, too, has established a Commission on Health Equity,
based on the conviction that "[e]qual enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health is a human right and a priority of the state."414 With the
mission of eliminating disparities in health status and improving the
quality of health for all the state's residents, it is likewise mandated to act
in an orchestration role by conducting hearings, undertaking interviews,
and receiving testimony on the barriers to equal enjoyment of good health
experienced by inhabitants.' The Commission is to use these informational
inputs to identify policy solutions to the state's significant disparities and
inequities in accessing the right to adequate health.1 Cities and states are,
correspondingly, increasingly holding their own local hearings with
disadvantaged communities to discuss the impacts of programs on the
rights to health, employment, housing, and nutrition, and to seek
responsive solutions, within a human rights framework. Public hearings on
poverty have taken place in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Vermont."'
unmeasured) declines in human wellbeing. See supra notes 199-204.
412. The Commission on the Elimination of Poverty Act, 2008 1Il. Legis. Serv. 95-833
(West).
413. Id.
414. 2008 Conn. Pub. Acts 08-171, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/ACT/
PA/2008PA-00171-ROOSB-00681-PA.htm.
415. Id. at § 1(a)-(e).
416. Id.
417. See JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & KRISTEN MICHELLE GORZELANY, CLASP & SPOTLIGHT ON
POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY, SEIZING THE MOMENT: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE NEW
COMMITMENT TO REDUCE POVERTY IN AMERICA 10-32 (2008),
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Civil society groups have likewise sought to bind city and local
governments to regularized human rights self-performance assessments
and audits. Local governments have been urged to adopt ordinances or
resolutions that mandate city-orchestrated periodic performance review of
human rights progress and commitments. These are designed to assess,
through participatory, multistakeholder processes, how well city
governments are standing up to human rights standards, and what they
can do better. The most notable advances have been in San Francisco,
Berkeley,"' and New York City,420 with other initiatives being pressed in
Los Angeles, Eugene, Seattle, and elsewhere. By orchestrating city policy
around regularized institutional human rights self-analysis, such initiatives
have led to important concrete changes in the way that policies are
designed and implemented, especially with respect to their impacts on
distinct social groups, such as women and racial minorities.421 Equally
important, they have served to raise awareness among city employees of




418. For a copy of the San Francisco city ordinance, see SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K (2001), available at http://muni.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/
cosw/cedaw/pdf/appenda.pdf. The San Francisco initiative represents an experiment in
localized replication of U.N. periodic reporting, constructive dialogue, and expert
recommendation processes, undertaken with dramatic positive benefits. It specifically
establishes a local CEDAW Task Force, composed of eleven elected representatives from both
government and civil society, to work with the Human Rights Commission and city
departments to identify discrimination against women and girls and to implement human
rights principles at the city level. See generally Stacy Laira Lozner, Note, Diffusion of Local
Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human
Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 768 (2004).
419. On February 27, 2007, the Berkeley City Council adopted a resolution requiring the
City Manager to supervise a periodic reporting process on the city's progress in eliminating
racial discrimination, in accordance with the ICERD. See Berkeley, Cal., Eliminating Racial
Discrimination, Resolution 63,596-N.S. (2007). The Office of the City Manager thereupon
created a template and sent it to every city agency in Berkeley, seeking information on racial
discrimination. The first Berkeley City report, submitted on June 26, 2007, was sent to the
Attorney General of California as well as to the U.N. CERD Committee in anticipation of its
February 2008 review of the United States' record under the CERD.
420. In New York City, a bill was introduced to the New York City Council in late 2004 to
turn CEDAW and CERD into statewide principles of governance. See NYCHRI.org, Human
Rights GOAL (Government Operations Audit Law), http://www.nychri.org/HumanRightsin
GovernmentOperationsAuditLawHumanRightsGOAL.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). The bill
would require that city government departments and programs review their policies and
programs to determine their effects on women and racial minorities and to report on those
impacts for review by a city task force. It would also authorize local human rights
commissions to interpret and apply the principles in cases over which they exercised
jurisdiction. For information on the New York City Human Rights Initiative (NYCHRI), see
NYCHRI, http:/ /www.nychri.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
421. WOMEN'S INST. FOR LEADERSHIP DEV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RESPECT, PROTECT, FULFILL:
RAISING THE BAR ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN SAN FRANCISCO 7 (2008) (documenting concrete
changes, such as agreement by the San Francisco Department of Public Works to consider
how the placement of street lights impacts the safety of women and the implementation of
flexible work policies by the Department of the Environment).
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It is precisely these sorts of local-level orchestration systems that merit
replication not only in other local U.S. jurisdictions, but also at the state
and ultimately federal levels. As orchestration systems replicate, what is
nonetheless imperative is that they preserve at every scale the right of civil
society actors to submit their independent assessments, testimonies, and
solutions, and thus to be in a position to contribute directly to the process
of naming reforms and holding social actors to account. Within this
structure, "higher level" authorities play an essential coordinating,
facilitating, and orchestrating role: cataloguing abuses, sharing
comparative experience, and attending to the issues that cannot be
resolved through local action alone.
IV. BRIDGING THE "NEw GOVERNANCE" AND "NEW ACCOUNTABILITY"
DIVIDE: STRUCTURING A PARTICIPATION-BASED 21ST CENTURY WAR ON THE
SOURCES OF POVERTY
The question that remains to be answered, in light of the full discussion
above, is how can these two frameworks of action be brought together in
constructive synergy to mount a participation-based twenty-first century
War on the Sources of Poverty? As I have sought to demonstrate, new
governance and new accountability, as theory-based frameworks of action,
share largely the same set of underlying tenets and subsidiary orientations.
Both embrace decentralized decisionmaking and broad stakeholder
participation, expanded public-private partnerships, flexible results-
oriented policy planning, innovation and competitive experimentalism,
rigorous performance monitoring and evaluation, and nationally
orchestrated incentive systems around defined performance goals.
Yet, despite these strong similarities and overlapping goals, the two
frameworks of action - one promoted from within the regulatory
infrastructure, the other promoted from without - have in practice
operated in almost entire isolation from one another. As a result, neither
has benefited from the other's complementary check and balance, with
negative implications for the performance of both. Thus, while new
governance-led regulatory institutions, such as the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, are mandated to gather comparative
performance data on state-by-state welfare roll reduction rates, numbers of
former recipients in work, and other related statistics, there is, with few
exceptions, no parallel structure or effort to collect performance indicators
designed to measure how well people are in fact faring in meeting their
basic human welfare and dignity needs.
That is, are those who have been moved "from welfare to work" in fact
doing better? Are they in fact accessing sufficient food, adequate housing,
education, childcare, and job skills? Do they have heat in their homes and
sufficient food for the household? If so, what worked for them and what
strategies can they share with others? If not, what are the barriers they are
facing, and what are their own ideas on how those barriers can best be
lifted, or at least lowered, in their own communities? These are the sorts of
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information data points and progress indicators that are relevant to
genuine multiscalar, anti-poverty initiatives. They aim to ensure that the
"end result" of programs is not simply to meet raw service delivery targets,
but rather to reduce poverty and to improve human wellbeing.
Critically, these dignity-based data points are precisely the types of
indicators privileged by new accountability movements in their own
information-gathering and advocacy work. Poor people's organizations in
the United States, as around the world, have thus made a priority of
opening spaces in which the disadvantaged can document their personal
experiences with poverty and poverty programs and create new types of
quantitative and qualitative indicators for measuring the relative "success"
of such programs from the vantage of actual improvements in human
wellbeing.422
Yet, despite the growing mobilization of civil society groups to
produce such information, there is no current institutional mechanism in
place for ensuring that such valuable testimonies, proposals, indicators,
and experiences in fact penetrate regulatory policy-making and
administrative programs for the poor. It is here, then, that the central
regulatory challenge for the future lies: how to institutionally link the
human rights-based indicators, standards, and knowledge reservoir of new
accountability - data points that seek to measure and assess human
wellbeing in terms that reflect the dignity-based perspectives of those in
poverty themselves - with the broader institutionalized processes of new
governance-based regulatory administration, competitive performance
review, and decisionmaking processes. The current lack of any effective
mechanism to do this reflects a deep failure in federal orchestration policy
in the social welfare field, underscoring the weaknesses of its
accountability framework and its continuing sidelining of the poor as equal
stakeholders in poverty alleviation programs.
It is nonetheless precisely in this orchestration failure that the lessons
of the early War on the Sources of Poverty - and particularly its MFP
policy - become so critical. Indeed, the early national commitment to
poverty alleviation in the United States was based on a core understanding
that U.S. poverty could not effectively be addressed without equal attention
to ensuring, on the one hand, broad and regularized participation of the
poor in the design, implementation, and monitoring of anti-poverty
programs that affect them and, on the other, national-level orchestration of
those very activities. Such orchestration was to be pursued with a view to
supporting community-level initiatives, sharing best practices, fostering
competitive experimentation, and promoting comparative learning
processes to allow scaling up and continual institutional innovation.
Both new governance and new accountability regimes fully embrace
these orchestration and participation-enhancing objectives, understanding
each as core to their very operational identity. The convergence of the two
regimes in the twenty-first century political and regulatory environment
422. See supra text accompanying notes 317-348.
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thus provides a solid foundation for recapturing the core elements of the
early MFP policy. This is especially so as that policy is capable of being
directly incorporated into already operating indicator-based performance
monitoring and competitive evaluation systems that rely on stakeholder
participation and national orchestration to achieve program goals and
priorities effectively.
A full reembrace of this participatory orientation in the modern U.S.
context will nonetheless require that lessons be learned from the early War
on Poverty experience. Indeed, that War's MFP policy fell short of
expectations, quickly unraveling, not because of its conceptual priority for
participatory engagement of the poor, but rather because the design
structure for its implementation machinery failed to take sufficient account
of the political and regulatory context in which the policy was in fact
embedded." The key lesson to be derived from this experience is that any
attempt to reinstate a MFP policy as the basis of a modem attack on
national poverty will require that a unique design structure be employed,
one which not only steers clear of its predecessor's key design
shortcomings424 but that better and more instrumentally corresponds to the
actual regulatory and political context of the twenty-first century.
Such a structure, I submit, would seek to build upon and reinforce the
best features of modern new governance regulatory regimes (i.e., their
institutionalized systems of competitive performance review) and the best
features of new accountability systems (in particular, their production of
densely valuable first-hand information on poverty's day-to-day causes,
the relationships that sustain them, and the rights-based indicators that can
measure them). It would then bring these best features together - using
each to shore up the deficiencies of the other - through the coordinated
work of two new nationwide orchestrating bodies: a National Office on
Poverty Alleviation and a National Human Rights Commission. Both
would operate, in turn, under the directive mandate of an executively-
declared and legislatively-authorized National Commitment to Poverty
Alleviation, accompanied by a set of national poverty reduction targets.
Each of these three essential orchestrating arrangements, starting with the
latter, is considered below.
A. National Poverty Alleviation Commitment
As experience suggests, a fully coordinated nationwide effort to
eliminate the causes and sources of poverty must begin with a clearly
articulated national policy commitment to that goal.4" Thus, just as the U.S.
423. See supra discussion in Part I.C.
424. These design shortcomings included, in particular, the over-investiture of conflicting
representation mandates in local CAPs, the administrative overload of the OEO, and the
effective removal of the OEO's orchestration role with respect to CAP learning processes and
competitive performance evaluation. See supra discussion in Part .B and I.C.
425 See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 22, at 16 (noting that poverty rates in the
United States have not appreciably declined since the last time poverty alleviation was made
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Congress declared in 1964 that the elimination of poverty in the nation was
to be "the policy of the United States"42 6 - and just as a growing number of
U.S. states are legislatively or constitutionally declaring poverty
427elimination to be a fundamental policy and goal of state government, So
too must the current Congress and Executive jumpstart a national initiative
by declaring the nationwide coordination of efforts to lift barriers to
economic opportunity and security to be "the policy of the United States of
America.""
Such a policy commitment, issued both through executive order and
congressional act or resolution, would serve to establish the goal of poverty
alleviation as a moral and political imperative for the nation, directing all
public action toward that end. It would, in this regard, serve to reinforce
and mobilize the already strong national public conviction that poverty is
either "the single most important priority" facing the nation or a "top
priority" for Congress and the President.4 29 Such a national policy
commitment would not only establish a nationwide institutional
orchestrating structure to carry it into effect, but would have three
additional constitutive parts: First, it would set out a concrete set of
poverty reduction goals and performance targets for the nation
affirmatively to meet within specified timeframes. Second, affirming the
need for "maximum feasible participation" of affected communities, it
would identify the broad range of public and private stakeholders
responsible for eliminating poverty in the United States, calling them to
concerted action. And finally, it would expressly endorse a rights-based
approach to poverty alleviation.
an explicit national priority - i.e., during Johnson's War on Poverty.
426. The U.S. Congress declared in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964:
The United States can achieve its full economic and social potential as a
nation only if every individual has the opportunity to contribute to the
full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings of our
society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to eliminate the
paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to
everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to
work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity. It is the
purpose of this Act to strengthen, supplement, and coordinate efforts in
furtherance of that policy.
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, 508 (repealed 1981)
(emphasis added).
427. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. pmbl. (naming poverty elimination as a fundamental goal of
state government).
428. Correlatively, in 1992 President Bill Clinton issued an Executive Order declaring that
"[i]t shall be the policy and practice of the Government of the United States, being committed to the
protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and
implement its obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is a party,
including the ICCPR, the CAT, and the CERD." Exec. Order No. 13,107, §1, 63 Fed. Reg.
68,991, 68,991 (Dec. 15, 1998) (emphasis added).
429. See supra note 23; see also WorldPublicOpinion.org, Obama, McCain Supporters Agree
Government Responsible for Ensuring Basic Healthcare, Food, and Education Needs,
http:/ /www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/553.php (last
visited Feb. 8, 2010) (national poll suggesting population wants government to spend more
time - and more money - addressing issues of poverty in the United States).
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1. National Poverty Reduction Targets
Given modem priorities for performance-based incentive systems, a
twenty-first century national poverty commitment would appear
incomplete, even toothless, without an express set of accompanying
national poverty reduction targets to measure and competitively assess
performance outcomes." Such targets, increasingly used by U.S. states and
nations around the world, function to break broader social goals down into
achievable pieces, around which stakeholder attention can be concretely
and sustainably focused and against which progress can be measured and,
correspondingly, the effectiveness of comparative policies transparently
assessed."' Poverty reduction targets thus facilitate the establishment of a
competitive, incentive-based system around the achievement of poverty
reduction goals, while allowing for local diversity, decentralized
experimentation, negotiated cross-sectoral solutions, and responsive
innovation in decisions about how precisely to achieve those goals. In this
sense, targets operate by being generally agnostic about which policies
should be enacted in any given context, leaving such decisions to localized
democratic negotiation, comparative learning experiences, and creative
experimentation.
Reflecting the growing trend toward the national embrace of
performance targets, in 2008 the United States House of Representatives
took its first tentative step toward adopting a National Poverty Reduction
Target by endorsing a national policy goal of cutting poverty in half over
the next ten years.432 Such a goal should explicitly be incorporated into a
U.S. policy on poverty alleviation. Indeed, by establishing such a goal at
the national level, the United States would encourage states and localities
to set their own targets (accompanied by renewable two or five year action
plans), promoting thereby a competitive race to the top in who can most
quickly and effectively reduce poverty rates. In so doing, a renewed and
continuous dialogue would be encouraged at all levels of society and
430. Cf. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 43, at 16 (recommending that the next
President begin his or her term with an executive order declaring the goal of cutting poverty
in half in ten years and send such legislation to Congress).
431. As Jodie Levin-Epstein has noted, such targets have "four 'S' strengths:"
[A poverty reduction target] offers a shared vision that establishes the
intent to tackle poverty; a simple metric whose simplicity fosters
transparency and is readily understood by both policymakers and the
public; a silo-busting tool, since reaching the target invariably requires
cross-agency work; and a solution-building environment, since if a
proposal is rejected or a program fails to work, another solution needs to
take its place. Further, since a target is typically in place for the long term
- a decade or more - it can, if used effectively, contribute to sustained
attention.
Jodie Levin-Epstein, Sustaining Anti-Poverty Solutions: Keep an Eye on the Prize, NFG Rep. 19, 20
(Fall 2008), available at http://www.nfg.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/3571.
432. H.R. Con. Res. 198, 110th Cong. (2008) ("[lIt is the sense of Congress that the United
States should set a national goal of cutting poverty in half over the next 10 years.")
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across the political spectrum about what poverty means, what the best
policies and practices are to address it in distinct contexts, which indicators
most accurately measure it, and how comparative experiences of policy
success and failure can most meaningfully be shared.
In fact, pressed by civil society advocates from below, U.S. states and
localities are increasingly setting their own state poverty reduction
strategies and targets. With ten doing so over the last three years, twelve
states have now established statewide antipoverty initiatives.'3 Eight of
these have in fact established, or are in the process of establishing, poverty
reduction targets.'- Connecticut, the first to do so, committed in 2004 to
reducing child poverty by fifty percent in ten years. Minnesota
committed to ending poverty by 2020.4' A national poverty reduction target
would establish a supportive frame in which these state-level policies
would be encouraged, incentivized, and scaled-up where appropriate.
It bears mention in this regard that, in failing to establish a national
poverty reduction strategy or target, the United States remains decidedly
behind its international peers. Indeed, increasing numbers of nations, both
rich and poor, have adopted national poverty reduction strategies and
plans of action. Many of these set hard poverty-reduction targets within
distinct time intervals and follow up with periodic progress reports on how
effectively those targets are being met. The European Union, for example,
requires all twenty-seven of its Member States to prepare National
Antipoverty Strategy Papers and Social Exclusion Strategy Papers, and to
report annually on progress in achieving antipoverty goals through the
437
Open Method of Coordination. Ireland, a leader in the field, created a
National Anti-Poverty Strategy as early as 1997, through which it
committed to "reduce, or ideally eliminate (consistent) poverty" by 2007.",
433. LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GORZELANY, supra note, at 1.
434. These include Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon,
and Vermont. See id. at 9, 13-32.
435. Id. at 13.
436. Id. at 25.
437. See, e.g., Isabelle Maquet & David Stanton, Income Indicators for the EU's Social
Inclusion Strategy, at 2-3, http://www.welfareacademy.org/pubs/international/oecdumd/
asp-papers/papers/Income%20Indicators%20in%20the%20EU%20%2030%20April%2009.pdf
(last visited May 7, 2010); see also The Lisbon Strategy, http://www.eapn.ie/policy/55 (last
visited May 7, 2010) (undertaking made by EU Heads of State in March 2000 to "make a
decisive impact on the eradication of poverty" by 2010, including by establishing an EU
Inclusion Strategy built around National Action Plans and the Open Method of Coordination
(OMC)). The OMC involves (1) the agreement of Common Objectives at the EU level; (2) the
development of Common Indicators to measure progress towards reaching these Objectives;
(3) the development of National Plans for achieving such Objectives; (4) Peer Review of the
National Plans; and (5) European Reports documenting the outcomes of the process. Id. Since
2006, the National Action Plans Against Poverty and Social Exclusion have become a distinct
chapter within the National Reports on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion.
See European Antipoverty Network Ireland, Anti-Poverty Strategies,
http://www.eapn.ie/eapn/policy/social-inclusion/anti-poverty-strategies (last visited May
7, 2010).
438. GOv'T OF IR., SHARING IN PROGRESS - NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY (1997)
(establishing series of targets, including reducing proportion of Irish households determined
to be "consistently poor" to less than five percent by 2004). See also European Anti-Poverty
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Helped along by two-year plans of action, it succeeded in meeting its goal
of reducing poverty by ten percent in ten years - from fifteen percent to
less than five percent439 - and in 2007 adopted a new ten-year target and
plan to reduce consistent poverty to below two percent in five years, while
eliminating it by 2016."o
In 1999, the United Kingdom followed suit, establishing a target to end
child poverty by 2020, while reducing it by twenty-five percent by 2005
and fifty percent by 2010.4' By 2005, it had in fact reduced child poverty by
twenty percent - a reduction that occurred, notably, during the same
period in which the U.S. child poverty rate increased by twelve percent.2
Similar strategies are being implemented in countries around the world.
Canada is expected to announce a new National Poverty Reduction
Strategy in 2010, following the lead of its many provinces which already
have their own plans in place."
The same is occurring in the poorest nations, especially through
national target-based undertakings to reduce extreme poverty consistent
with the U.N. Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).' Indeed, in 2008, 140 nations of the world reported to the United
Nations on the national actions plans they have prepared and progress
made in meeting the MDG poverty reduction targets." Similarly, all poor
nations receiving concessional loans, grants, or loan forgiveness from the
World Bank now complete Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers describing
national plans of action for effectively reducing poverty as a national
Network Ireland, Anti-Poverty Strategies, http:eapn.ie/eapn/policy/social-inclusion/anti-
poverty-strategies (describing aim of 1997 National Anti-Poverty Strategy).
439. Laurie Monsebraaten, What the Poor Need: A Strategy, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 20, 2006 at
Al.
440. Gov'T OF IR., NATIONAL ACION PLAN FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION 2007-2016, at 13 (2007)
(establishing overall poverty goal "[tlo reduce the number of those experiencing consistent
poverty to between 2% and 4% by 2012, with the aim of eliminating consistent poverty by
2016, under the revised definition"); see also GOv'T OF IR., TOWARDS 2016, TEN-YEAR
FRAMEWORK SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 2006-2015 (2006); GOV'T OF IR., TRANSFORMING
IRELAND- A BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE FOR ALL: IRELAND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2007-
2013 (2006).
441. See Tony Blair, Beveridge Lecture, Mar. 1999
www.bris.ac.uk/poverty/Publicationfiles/Tony%20Blair%2Child%2Poverty%2Speech.d
oc; see also Jane Waldfogel, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Investing in Our Children: The U.S. can Learn
from the U.K., July 30, 2007, http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2007/07/investingjin_children.html (visited Mar. 28, 2010) (reviewing targets and
observing that UK has reduced poverty by fifty percent since the start of its anti-poverty
campaign - reducing numbers of children in absolute poverty before housing costs from 3.4
million in 1999 to 1.6 million in 2006).
442. Waldfogel, supra note 441.
443. The Canadian provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island,
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia all have
poverty reduction strategies or campaigns. See Canadian Social Research,
http://www.canadiansocialresearch.net/antipoverty.htm#on (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
444. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, 19, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
445. See UNDP, Tracking the MDGs: Country Progress, http://www.undp.org/
mdg/tracking-countryreports2.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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priority."' Aimed at reversing the powerlessness that results from the
failure to include poor people systematically in the generation of
information and adjustment of policies and actions that affect them, a
requirement exists that these plans be prepared in active and regular
consultation with the poorest social sectors in national society."'
All of these initiatives operate under a common idea: that sustained
progress occurs best where clear targets are set, performance is measured,
plans of action are made, and assessment thereof is both transparent and
broadly participatory.
2. Broad Stakeholder Responsibility and Participatory
Commitments
A twenty-first century national commitment to poverty alleviation
would also - like its predecessor - feature a strong insistence on the need
for broad stakeholder participation and expanded public-private
partnerships in lifting the barriers to nation-wide poverty. Reflecting core
new governance and new accountability precepts, it would thus expressly
recognize that poverty reduction cannot be understood as the
responsibility of either the government or the poor alone. Rather, it
requires the "maximum feasible participation" of all stakeholders in
society, operating in increasingly broad community partnerships. Such
partnerships seek to take advantage of the full scope of human, financial,
technological, and informational resources available, from the dense
knowledge and expertise in local communities of poverty's causes, to the
entrepreneurial skills, ideas, and investment potential of private business,
to the civic energies of private citizens, to the research capabilities of the
nation's universities and educational institutions.
Indeed, in calling for his nationwide war on poverty, President
Johnson expressly appealed to "American labor and American business,
private institutions and private individuals" and "all the energy of our
nation," stressing the need for "their help, their support, and their full
participation," to bring to bear on "our common enemy" of poverty."
President Roosevelt likewise called on all the American people to make the
rights recognized in his politically-declared Second Bill of Rights a reality,
understanding that without direct action and sustained political pressure
by civil society the policies and practices of government were unlikely to
meaningfully change."'
446. See WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,men
uPK:384207-pagePK:149018-piPK:149093-theSitePK:384201,00.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
447. PRSA REVIEW, supra note 231, at 51, [73 (describing importance of participatory
inclusion of the poor in poverty assessment processes).
448. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 377. He did so by situating the
public's responsibility equally in "what is right" and "what is wise," and by underscoring that
increasing the opportunity of some would increase the prosperity of all through new industry,
higher production, increased earnings and better income for all. Id.
449. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
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A twenty-first century nationwide commitment to poverty alleviation
would similarly recognize the imperative of sustained public action by all
social stakeholders. It would call specifically on businesses, the media, civic
solidarity groups, community-based organizations, politicians, private and
religious institutions, the police, teachers, students, and the poor
themselves to take direct action in eliminating the many sources of
poverty, insisting that poverty cannot be wiped out without their creative
leadership and active partnership. A commitment framed in this way
would serve to mobilize not only civic imaginations but also concrete and
coordinated actions across a diversity of policy spheres and narrow issue-
silos.
3. Rights-Based Process Orientation
Equally important for promoting the participatory relevance of the
poor and mobilizing the full range of social stakeholders, a twenty-first
century national poverty commitment should expressly endorse a rights-
based approach to poverty alleviation. In so doing, it should begin by
providing a broad, capabilities-based definition of poverty. Such a
definition would ideally draw directly on human rights standards and,
specifically, on the imperative of ensuring the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living, including adequate housing, health care, food,
education, and employment." In so doing, it would ensure that poverty
was not defined as simple lack of adequate income, but rather as the lack of
adequate access to the capabilities and inputs necessary for human dignity,
equal opportunity, and full participation in civic life. As President Johnson
himself declared in announcing his anti-poverty commitment to Congress,
The war on poverty is not a struggle simply to support people, to
make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle
to give people a chance ... an effort to allow them to develop and
use their capacities, as we have been allowed to develop and use
ours, so that they can share, as others share, in the promise of this
Address, January 11, 1944, reprinted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER app. 1, at 235-44 (2004)
[hereinafter FDR State of the Union].
450. Asserted as a "common standard of achievement" for all nations and for all peoples,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right of "[elveryone" to "a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services." UDHR
supra note 240, pmbl. & art. 25. See also id. art. 23-24 (likewise enshrining the rights of
"[elveryone" to work, free choice of employment, just conditions of work, equal pay for equal
work, just and favorable remuneration, freedom of unionization, rest and leisure, education,
culture); id. art. 25 (enshrining "the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control").
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nation.'"
A growing number of U.S. states are declaring their own poverty
elimination commitments in precisely such broad and human rights-based
terms.45 2 In giving content to its own constitutional mandate to eliminate
poverty as a fundamental goal of state government, the Illinois legislature,
for example, has recently proposed language declaring that the
comprehensive plans developed to meet the state's poverty reduction
targets must be "consistent with international human rights standards""
and that "[flull participation in civic life cannot be achieved without those
things that protect and preserve human dignity and make for a healthy life,
including adequate nutrition and housing, meaningful work, safe
communities, health care, and education."" In so doing, it notes that "[tlhe
State of Illinois is a party to all international human rights treaties signed
and ratified by the United States.""
By framing poverty elimination goals in broad, rights-based terms as
the extension of human opportunities, capabilities, and participation in
civic life, a national commitment to poverty alleviation would function to
serve notice on government agencies, private service providers, and the
broader public that the current focus of many anti-poverty initiatives on
narrow income transfer programs - whether through direct welfare
payments or earned income tax credits - is no longer acceptable as a
national response to poverty." Rather, a more holistic and comprehensive
set of policies is required to address the many barriers to economic
opportunity faced by the nation's poor in accessing an adequate standard
of living. An important set of directive principles to guide poverty
alleviation efforts would thereby be established. These directive principles
would serve to focus processes of competitive performance monitoring and
assessment on measuring the comparative effectiveness of antipoverty
policies and programs directly in terms of their impacts on improving
individual and community access to adequate education, safe housing,
meaningful work, health care, safe communities, adequate nutrition, and
other essentials for a life of dignity for all persons within the nation on a
fair and equal basis. This is not to say that traditional new governance
indicators - like drops in welfare rate enrollment - should not likewise be
measured and comparatively assessed. It is only to say that a fuller set of
performance indicators must be contemplated to get a true sense of
national achievement in eliminating the causes and sources of poverty.
451. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5.
452. See, e.g., LEVIN-EPsTEIN & GORZELANY, supra note 417.




456. David Ellwood notes that the increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit during the
Clinton administration was greater than total spending on Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") at both state and local levels. See Gitterman, supra note 396, at 21.
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Perhaps most importantly in this regard, a national policy commitment
to poverty alleviation that made express reference to human rights
standards and achievement would constitute a direct political cue to
Americans at all levels of society of the need to take direct action themselves
in the fight against poverty. In particular, it would provide a critical set of
participation and accountability enhancing tools for mobilizing community
action to insist that public programs be planned, budgeted, and
implemented consistent with human rights targets, standards, and
safeguard policies.
It was, correspondingly, in reliance on this mobilizing capacity of
rights that President Roosevelt tied his New Deal program to a politically-
framed Second Bill of Rights for the United States. That Bill declared that
all Americans are entitled to "the right to a useful and remunerative job,"
the "right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation," the "right of every family to a decent home," the "right to
adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good
health," the "right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old
age, sickness, accident, and unemployment," and the "right to a good
education," among others4 8 Asserting that "America's own rightful place
in the world depends in large part upon how fully these and similar rights
have been carried into practice for our citizens," the President called upon
Congress "to explore the means for implementing this economic bill of
rights -for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress to so do."5 9
A twenty-first century national commitment to poverty alleviation
would make the same bold commitments to human rights achievement. In
so doing, it would situate the imperative of poverty alleviation not only in
faithful achievement of the ideals and mandates of national constitutional
identity, as did President Johnson,460 but also in the core human rights
commitments that underlie our identity as a rights-respecting nation.
Indeed, not only do national public opinion polls suggest that roughly
eighty percent of Americans believe that human rights inhere in every
human being, regardless of government treaty commitments, 46 but a
457. See supra note 355.
458. FDR State of the Union, supra note 449 at 243.
459. Id. (emphasis added). He continued, "We cannot be content, no matter how high
[our] general standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people - whether it be one-
third or one-fifth or one-tenth - is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and insecure." Id. at 242.
460. In calling on Congress to implement the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, for
example, President Johnson referred specifically to its constitutional duty to "provide... for
the general welfare of the United States." LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at
380. He similarly identified his own protagonism as resting in the Executive duty to provide
for the general welfare of the nation's people as a whole, and in particular the Executive's
"special responsibility to the distressed and disinherited, the hungry and the hopeless of this
abundant nation." Id. (emphasis added). In Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Brennan similarly tied
government duties with respect to poverty alleviation not only to the U.S. Constitution's
directive to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity" but, more broadly, to "the nation's basic commitment [from its
founding] ... to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders." 397 U.S. at
264-65.
461. See BELDEN RUSSONELLO &STEWART, supra note 398, at 12.
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significant majority "strongly believe" that equal access to quality public
education, access to healthcare, living in a clean environment, fair pay for
workers to meet the basic needs for food and housing, freedom from
extreme poverty, and adequate housing are human rights to which all
Americans are entitled.
A national poverty alleviation commitment that expressly embraced
these core economic, social and cultural rights - especially if symbolically
accompanied by U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and recognition of its basis in the U.S.
Second Bill of Rights"* - would go a long way to reigniting the spirit of
civil society to make these rights real in our local communities. Such
commitments, it would need to be underscored, constitute key process
undertakings, signaling to the nation our genuine commitment to strike out
at the barriers to participation and economic opportunity throughout our
society." They fit particularly comfortably with the growing sophistication
and use of process-oriented new accountability methodologies.
B. National Office on Poverty Alleviation
To ensure sufficient national orchestration of the plurality of
implementation initiatives that a decentralized, rights-based national anti-
poverty commitment would unleash, a national commitment to poverty
alleviation should also establish an executive focal point or headquarters
on poverty alleviation. To inspire the attention and political gravitas it
merits, that focal point should sit within the Executive Office of the
President, 65 operating as a fully staffed National Office on Poverty
Alleviation (OPA).4" In that capacity, it would function to ensure that there
462. Id. at 3-4 (documenting poll support for each right at eighty-two percent, seventy-two
percent, sixty-eight percent, sixty-eight percent, fifty-two percent, and fifty-one percent,
respectively). See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 449, at 62-63 (noting a 1991 survey of U.S. citizens
in which strong majorities identified adequate housing; a reasonable amount of leisure time;
adequate provision for retirement years; an adequate standard of living; and adequate
medical care as "a right to which he is entitled as a citizen," and not as "a privilege that a
person should have to earn").
463. The United States signed the ICESCR in 1977. The United States played an active
leadership role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from which the
ICESCR was normatively derived. For discussion of that role, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 115-16 (2001).
464. See FDR State of the Union, supra note 449.
465. In 2008, Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton called for a new Cabinet-
level post focused on poverty as part of her campaign platform, together with setting a
national goal of cutting child poverty in half by 2020 and ending child hunger by 2012. See
LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GORZELANY, supra note 417, at 4 (citing Press Release, Giving Every Child a
Chance, Hillary Clinton for President (Feb. 28,2008)).
466. Cf. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5 (announcing establishment of an
Office of Economic Opportunity to serve as a national headquarters for poverty alleviation,
with the Office's Director serving as the President's "personal Chief of Staff for the War
against poverty"). There is an increasing emphasis in international law and development
theory on ensuring government focal points. Such focal points generally take the shape of a
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is a single identifiable Executive office with recognized responsibility for
orchestrating and overseeing the full range of national efforts on meeting
national poverty reduction targets and that, correspondingly, can be held
to public account for national progress and setbacks on that front.
It is important to emphasize, in this regard, that the OPA would serve
exclusively as an orchestrating body for national stakeholder efforts. That is,
unlike President Johnson's Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO),'6 the
OPA would exercise neither administrative functions nor implementation
responsibilities for any single poverty-related program or policy - outside
those on transparency, capacity-building, and training. Rather, its purpose
would be exclusively to "take care" that the nation's commitment to
poverty alleviation was being appropriately implemented by all competent
authorities and stakeholders in the domestic jurisdiction."
There is currently no such single institution that has responsibility for
comprehensive oversight of national social welfare policy. Rather,
responsibilities are distributed among many different agencies and
departments of government, all of which engage in their own issue-specific
competitive performance review in pursuit of varying, not always
consistent, goals. Thus, the Department of Health and Human Services
oversees TANF policy, with welfare roll reduction and work as its central
priorities. The U.S. Department of Agriculture oversees national food
stamp policy, with its own set of performance indicators and competitive
financial incentives. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
oversees social welfare law in the housing field, and a host of similar
performance review systems operate in other U.S. departments and
agencies, all with their own sets of service delivery targets, indicators, and
financial incentives.o
A National Office on Poverty Alleviation would serve to link the
dedicated office within government or other policy coordinating body. See, e.g., Disability
Convention, supra note 51, art. 33.1, ("States Parties... shall designate one or more focal
points within government for matters relating to the implementation of the present
Convention."). On March 11, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order
establishing a White House Council on Women and Girls, to be situated within the Executive
Office of the President, with the mandate to establish a coordinated Federal response. See
Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. 11271 (Mar. 16, 2009).
467. Some analysts have urged that joint responsibility for advancing a national poverty
reduction target should lie with the Domestic Policy Council and National Economic Council,
with each agency describing its action plan for advancing that goal in its annual budget
justification. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 22, at 16. To ensure that there is in fact an
easily identifiable body that has orchestration of national efforts as its primary mandate, a
single focal point within the White House may be the better option for enhanced public
accountability. This is true even as that focal point would work closely with other more
general advisory bodies having competence in the area.
468. The OEO was granted direct administration functions over a number of large federal
anti-poverty programs. Together with the statutory limitations placed on its orchestration role
over CAP performance, the extensiveness of this mandate played an important contributing
role in the MFP policy's early demise. See supra discussion at Part L.B & I.C.
469. The U.S. Constitution vests the President with the power and duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
470. This is required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 31 U.S.C. §
1115 (2006).
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performance incentives and informational outputs of all of these programs.
With a birds-eye view over the national performance monitoring system in
the social welfare field, it would oversee the rationality of competitive
performance regimes. Where program-specific financial incentives
conflicted, the focal point would be mandated to intervene in an advisory
capacity and mediate the conflict such that government incentives worked
comprehensively toward the end of improving opportunity outcomes. In
this respect, it would serve as a centralized clearinghouse for information
generated from a variety of programs, agencies, and private sector sources,
with dedicated staff responsible for analyzing data intersections, making
recommendations, and ensuring that programs are working together
toward the common end of improving livelihoods and opportunities.
At the same time, because the choice of indicators is so important to the
success of any performance monitoring system, OPA would be tasked with
overseeing the various indicators in use by federal departments and
agencies around the nation. In this regard, it would engage in periodic
public consultations and assessment reviews to determine whether new
indicators should be proposed, and assemble both quantitative and
qualitative indicators that could be compared across jurisdictions. Such
sharing of comparative indicators would include those of other national
jurisdictions engaged in national poverty reduction strategies, following
the recommendations of the Government Accountability Office, which has
favored the creation of a National Indicator System to help the U.S. assess
its comparative position and progress on various economic indicators, both
domestically and internationally.71
Most important, the National Office would ensure that all resulting
information was made public and transparent. All government agencies
and departments would, for example, be required to submit to OPA their
annual plans of action for achieving national poverty reduction targets. The
National Office would compile, synthesize, monitor, assess, and
transparently distribute the results for further public consumption. It
would correspondingly report annually to Congress and to the nation on
the measures taken by the full range of public and private stakeholders and
the progress achieved in meeting national targets on poverty alleviation. In
doing so, it would be competent to make recommendations on new
poverty-related legislation or policies that might be required to fill gaps in
coverage, eliminate duplication, or maximize administrative efficiencies.
The resulting information could additionally be made available to the U.S.
Department of State, which has taken lead responsibility in coordinating
the preparation of treaty compliance reports to the United Nations, the
OAS, and other international organizations."
To assist the focal point in accessing this massive data set and in
facilitating cross-agency collaborations, a coordination mechanism or
471. See GAO, INFORMING OUR NATION, supra note 183.
472. See generally Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity, supra note 314 (discussing U.S.
human rights treaty practice).
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mechanisms should likewise be created." Such a mechanism - in which the
focal point director would sit or, ideally, chair - would ensure that
representatives of the U.S. Departments of Housing and Urban
Development, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Labor, Justice, and
the Interior, as well as of the Domestic Policy Council, the National
Economic Council, and other relevant federal agencies were meeting on a
regular basis to coordinate efforts and share ideas. This coordination
mechanism (or a parallel one) might similarly include a range of state-level
partners, including representatives of the National Governors Association
Center for Best Practices, the National Conference of State Legislatures,'7
and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, which have taken an increasingly
active role in poverty matters over the last few years." It might also
include rotating representatives of civil society organizations with
particular expertise in poverty reduction strategies and in monitoring the
performance of public and private service-delivery partners. 7
By joining these groups together in active consultation surrounding
best practices, reported concerns, incentive failures, and other practical
matters related to the implementation of national poverty reduction targets
and goals, the focal point would play a critical orchestration role in
ensuring that efforts were appropriately coordinated and that learning
processes were effectively being transferred from one agency or initiative
to another through continual data collection and information exchange."
In so doing, it would ensure that national efficiencies and productive
performance outcomes were maximized across all levels of policy
response.
At the same time, to ensure that planning processes around poverty
473. Cf. Disability Convention, supra note 51, art. 33.1 ("States Parties ... shall give due
consideration to the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within
Government to facilitate related action in different sectors and at different levels.").
474. In 2007 these two groups hosted a three-day institute to help state policymakers
develop strategies to reduce child and family poverty. Teams, comprised of both executive
and legislative branch officials worked together to develop action plans for their state, with
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Vermont, and
Washington participating. See LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GORZELANY, supra note 417, at 5.
475. See, e.g., ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA, TASKFORCE ON POVERTY, WORK, AND OPPORTUNITY,
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, REPAIRING THE ECONOMIC LADDER: A
TRANSFORMATIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGY TO REDUCE POVERTY AND EXPAND AMERICA'S MIDDLE
CLASS (2007), available at http://usmayors.org/chhs/VillaraigosaPovertyReport7.pdf
(proposing set of ambitious recommendations to reduce poverty); UNITED STATES
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS TASK FORCE ON POVERTY, WORK AND
OPPORTUNITY (2007).
476. Cf. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, §605, 78 Stat. 508, 531
(repealed 1981) (establishing a National Advisory Council composed of civil society
representatives to review operations and activities of OEO and make appropriate
recommendations to it). President Kennedy likewise, created an auxiliary Citizen's Advisory
Council to assist his Cabinet-level President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, a direct
predecessor to the War on Poverty. See MARRIS & REIN, supra note 62, at 22.
477. Cf. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 22, at 16 ("The White House should issue an
annual report, describing federal actions, state and local progress, the contributions of private
actors, civil initiatives and voluntary efforts. The report should provide an annual scorecard of
short-term and long-term measures of progress.").
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reduction targets were fully participatory and accessible to all
stakeholders, including particularly to the least economically advantaged,
the OPA would be mandated to ensure that training programs were
available for public and private officials at the state, local and federal
levels. Such trainings would emphasize both the instrumental and intrinsic
importance of participation in program design, monitoring, and
assessment processes as well as the need for planned public outreach and
education on poverty and poverty reduction strategies.78
In addition to these core orchestration functions, the National Office
would ideally also enjoy a discretionary project funding mandate. Such a
mandate would differ significantly from Johnson's OEO, which funded up
to ninety percent of CAAs operating budgets." Rather, OPA funding
would be significantly more targeted and flexible, allowing grants to be
made to innovative demonstration projects proposed by community
groups, particularly where designed either to lift specific barriers to
opportunity at the grassroots level or to ensure the participation of
disadvantaged groups in processes to identify those barriers and propose
effective ways to lift them." In this way, it would help innovate and share
best practices in an effort to scale good programs up and outward.
In sum, through grants, technical assistance, information sharing, and
competitive stimulation, the executive focal point on poverty alleviation
would support and facilitate the plurality of experiments and innovative
programs arising at state and local levels around the nation. This was,
indeed, the central idea behind President Johnson's subsidiarity-based War
on the Sources of Poverty. That initiative was not based on the notion that
government would implement a single national program that would
address the needs of all, nor that the government would leave everything
to the local level. Rather, it understood the critical need for the
establishment of a national headquarters for poverty alleviation that would
facilitate the development and strengthening by "every American
community . . . [of a] comprehensive plan to fight its own poverty.""
Where commonalities were found, federal action could proceed on a
national basis. But the solutions would arise from the ground, where
poverty was experienced first-hand and where "the causes, not just the
consequences of poverty" could best be identified.48 2
478. Cf. Exec. Order No. 13,107, §§ 2-4, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991, 68,991-92 (Dec. 15, 1998) (1999)
(defining the orchestration mandate of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Human Rights as
"developing plans for public outreach and education concerning [human rights provisions]").
479. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, §§204-08, 78 Stat. 508, 518-
19 (repealed 1981).
480. It would, in this way, more closely approximate the discretionary funding mandate
of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office on Violence Against Women. See Office on Violence
Ag. Women, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Grant Programs,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ovwgrantprograms.htm. Cf. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note
22, at 16 ("Congress should establish a fund for demonstration projects and innovative policy
experiments. This new fund should be guided by a nonpartisan expert panel that would make
recommendations for funding and evaluating new approaches.").
481. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 377.
482. Id. at 375.
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C. National Human Rights Commission83
While a National Office on Poverty Alleviation would orchestrate
national implementation of poverty reduction efforts, an additional
orchestration institution would be required to ensure that transparent
monitoring processes were being independently undertaken around the
nation on the impact of government policies on human rights, particularly
of the most disadvantaged. Such monitoring processes would aim to
ensure the adequacy and responsiveness of implementation efforts to real
needs on the ground, as well as their programmatic consistency with
human rights standards and safeguard policies. The importance of this
monitoring function has been recognized around the world and is
increasingly a requirement of human rights law and human rights treaty
commitments.' Most countries honor it by creating a national human
rights commission or ombudsperson's office,4' bodies that can be further
replicated within sub-national political units as close to the individual as
necessary.
A United States Human Rights Commission (USHRC) would serve this
national monitoring and orchestration role. It would be mandated to
monitor indicators of progressive human rights achievement in the nation
- including with respect to improved access by all social groups to the
rights to education, housing, health care, food, and employment - and,
equally important, to maximally promote the full participation of all
stakeholders in the decisionmaking processes that affect such achievement.
In so doing, it would understand its primary mandate as an orchestrator or
amplifier of the voices at the local level most affected by human rights
interferences, yet often least able to access regulatory governance
structures. In particular, consistent with the new accountability agenda it
would operate to ensure that disadvantaged communities had genuine
access to and felt safe participating in local and national-level performance
monitoring and that the informational inputs produced thereby were
transparent, effectively coordinated, and locally and nationally accessible
483. This section draws heavily on a similar proposal made in Melish, From Paradox to
Subsidiarity, supra note 314, at 458-61. The proposals therein were correspondingly drawn
upon in the drafting of a domestic policy blueprint on human rights submitted to the
incoming Obama administration in October 2008. See CATHERINE POWELL, AM. CONST. SOc'Y
FOR LAW & POL., HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME: A DOMESTIC POLICY BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION (2008) (citing article's proposals for the creation of two new U.S. human
rights bodies dedicated, respectively, to the domestic implementation and monitoring of U.S.
human rights commitments).
484. See, e.g., Disability Convention, supra note 51, art. 33.2 ("States Parties
shall... maintain, strengthen, designate or establish within the State Party, a framework,
including one or more independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and
monitor implementation of the present Convention. When designating or establishing such a
mechanism, States Parties shall take into account the principles relating to the status and
functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights.").
485. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AND OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL
EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Hossain et al., eds., 2000) (compiling comparative
experiences with national human rights monitoring and oversight bodies).
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to all stakeholders.
To be maximally effective, the USHRC should be instituted and
financed by the federal government, but functionally independent of the
political branches, consistent with the Paris Principles.' It can thereby act
as a check on the nation's progress in implementing its human rights and
poverty alleviation commitments - monitoring achievements, raising
awareness, publicizing abusive conduct, and providing advice and
recommendations to communities and national institutions. In this respect,
while the proposed USHRC must remain wholly independent of political
influences to maintain its credibility as a monitoring body, close
coordination with the National Office on Poverty Alleviation is absolutely
essential. Indeed, such a body will have at its disposal enormous amounts
of human rights data and indicator assessments, as generated by multiple
stakeholders around the nation. That information must be funneled in
appropriate ways to the OPA, such that the two national orchestrating
bodies can work collaboratively at the top of a national structure fully
dedicated to national poverty alleviation and full rights-based participation
in civic life.
As a formal matter, many U.S. states and cities do already have bodies
called "human rights commissions" or "human relations commissions."
Few, however, interpret their mandate as extending beyond investigating
complaints of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, age,
national origin and, sometimes, sexual orientation.m The USHRC would
serve to encourage states and localities to broaden their own mandates to
encompass the full field of rights recognized in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the treaties ratified by the United States (or adopted
by states and localities, where this has been done"), a field which
necessarily includes the rights to education, health care, housing, food,
employment, fair remuneration, and social assistance. In so doing, it would
play a particularly important role in identifying and orchestrating the
comparative use of performance indicators with respect to these rights,
ensuring that such indicators were in fact being locally monitored by
486. Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles), G.A.
Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993).
487. There reportedly are only three states - Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi - that do
not have any form of a state or local level human rights or human relations commission.
Kenneth L. Saunders and Hyo Eun (April) Bang, Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights
Commissions 13 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Executive Session on Human Rights Commissions and
Criminal Justice, No. 3, 2007).
488. The United States has a national Commission on Civil Rights with a similarly limited
mandate. See http://www.usccr.gov/.
489. See, eg., Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women's Rights Treaty
(CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263, 274 nn.48-50 (2002) (noting that at least nineteen
U.S. states or territories have adopted resolutions or instruments endorsing CEDAW or
adopting it on behalf of their jurisdictions). On February 11, 2009, the Chicago City Council
passed a resolution of support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in which
the Mayor and City Council agreed to "advance policies and practices [that] are in harmony
with the principles of the [CRCI in all city agencies and organizations that address issues
directly affecting the City's children." City of Chicago, II., Resolution Adopting the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Feb. 11, 2009) (on file with author).
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citizens groups and incorporated into competitive local, state, and
nationwide performance monitoring systems aimed at achieving distinct
poverty reduction targets.
Within this process, the USHRC would have a broad promotional
mandate.' With respect to the national project on poverty alleviation and
attainment of the national poverty reduction targets, several of its functions
stand out in particular.
First, to ensure transparent national information about the types and
frequency of human rights abuses occurring in distinct communities,
particularly with respect to experiences with abusive, arbitrary or
discriminatory situations related to housing, healthcare, education, social
assistance or related matters, the HRC would collect statistics from local
and state human rights commissions on the numbers and types of issues
and complaints they were addressing, as well as from the new anti-poverty
commissions being established in many states.9 It would also serve as a
clearinghouse of sorts for reports produced by civil society and new
accountability movements on economic and social rights violations and
strategies for resolving, remedying or overcoming them. Such information
would then be synthesized by the USHRC and (subject to privacy
constraints) made publicly available and accessible to the full range of
social stakeholders for use in their own advocacy efforts.492
Where complaints revealed a pattern of abusive conduct, the USHRC
could, moreover, engage in broader independent monitoring through
investigations, surveys, inquiries, spot checks, and hearings in an effort to
draw attention to the abuse and get the relevant parties involved in direct
discussions about appropriate remedial action. In particular, periodic
thematic hearings on a variety of rights including health, education,
culture, housing, social assistance, and accessibility of public services for
persons with disabilities would play an important role not only in drawing
national attention to these issues, but also in promoting the direct input of
civil society in confronting them.4 " The USHRC could thereby work with
490. Paris Principles, supra note 486, Annex, Competence and responsibilities, 1 2 ("A
national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set
forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of
competence.").
491. See, e.g., LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GORZELANY, supra note 417 (discussing new state-wide
anti-poverty initiatives and commissions).
492. Where local remedies were not available to confront abuse, the USHRC might,
moreover, have the power to consider human rights complaints directly, investigating the
claim, seeking mediation or conciliation to resolve the issues, or issuing recommendations to
the parties and to relevant authorities on appropriate measures designed to remedy the
situation or prevent similar abuses from recurring. See Paris Principles, supra note 486, Annex,
Additional principles (recognizing principles concerning the status of commissions with
quasi-judicial competence).
493. In the absence of a national human rights commission, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has been playing this role. In recent years it has held hearings
on such issues as the right to adequate housing in the United States, human trafficking, and
U.S. labor standards and treatment of undocumented workers. See Tara J. Melish, The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights: Defending Social Rights through Case-Based Petitions, in
SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
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and encourage less advantaged groups to come forward and speak on an
official record about experiences with poverty and discrimination,
encouraging them to offer their own solutions for eliminating arbitrary
barriers to access and opportunity. Such hearings could be replicated at
state and local levels, with the USHRC acting in a supportive role to
facilitate information exchange and compilation into easily-shared and
accessible formats. It could then host the outputs of these local
consultations on its website, promoting media attention, broader
stakeholder collaborations, creative brainstorming, and idea transfer."'
Such an independent space for civil society input is crucial for promoting
broad and effective participatory governance.
Based on the extensive material available to it, the USHRC would also
be mandated to issue relevant reports and guidelines on rights-respecting
behavior by distinct social actors. Thus, for example, where a mass of
information had been collected on national experiences with barriers to
accessing adequate health care, the HRC could issue a report compiling
testimonies and providing recommendations to relevant stakeholders in
society and government. Like other NHRIs, it could issue nonbinding
guidelines or guiding principles on appropriate conduct in the labor,
education, health, or social security fields. Such recommendations or
proposals could be directed not only to Congress, the legislatures of the
many states, and the private sector, but also to the various agencies and
departments of government with administrative responsibilities over
public assistance, including TANF grants, food stamps, Section 8 housing
49-1
vouchers, and job training programs.
To further maximize its orchestration role, the USHRC might even be
granted a mandate over economic and social rights similar to that of the
South African Human Rights Commission. Enshrined in the Constitution
itself, that mandate requires that all relevant organs of state provide the
Human Rights Commission each year "with information on the measures
that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights ... concerning
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the
environment.""' This information could then be compiled into a single
annual public report that could be made accessible to the public as an
accountability tool for ensuring appropriate action on the part of all
relevant organs of government. This procedure might even be expanded
through statute to include a request (tied to funding or other hard
incentives) that other state and local stakeholders provide similar
339,340 (M. Langford, ed., 2008).
494. The Paris Principles, supra note 486, 1 3, 3(0-3(g) (affirming that NHRIs "shall" assist
"in the formulation of programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights" and
"publicize human rights ... by increasing public awareness, especially through information
and education and by making use of all press organs").
495. Id. 7 3(a) ("A national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities:
To submit to the Government, Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory
basis ... opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the
promotion and protection of human rights").
496. S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 184(3).
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information to the HRC each year. An organized civil society mobilized
around a national poverty commitment would produce many voluntary
participants in such a national endeavor, particularly if such participation
became part of an organized civil society certification, auditing or report
card scheme.
Taken together, these three national orchestration arrangements would
function, I contend, as an effective national enabling framework for
carrying forward a participation-based national recommitment to poverty
alleviation in the United States. By drawing together the core tenets of new
governance and new accountability, they would do so, moreover, in a way
that not only could avoid the key political pitfalls of the early MFP policy,
but could realistically, even wholeheartedly, be embraced by advocates
across the national political spectrum.
CONCLUSION: RE-EMBRACING "MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION" AS U.S.
NATIONAL POLICY
This Article has aimed to demonstrate not only why a national
recommitment to the participatory orientation of the early War on Poverty
is important, but also why it would not be a particularly heavy political lift
in the modern U.S. policy context. Skeptics may nevertheless still wonder,
given the powerful political legacy left by the early MFP policy, whether
sufficient political buy-in for such a project can in fact be assured today.
Indeed, that legacy has effectively kept poverty alleviation off the national
political agenda for the last forty years. Within this context, any call to
affirmatively re-embrace the participatory, rights-based framework of
Johnson's early MFP policy must explain not only why such a model
would have a different impact today than it did in the 1960s, but also how,
once such a program were put in place, appropriate buy-in by relevant
actors could be assured.
There are, I would argue, three reasons why such buy-in should be
expected, both from the regulatory apparatus and from affected
communities. The first is straightforward. As a practical matter, such
stakeholders are already highly familiar and largely comfortable with the
model suggested here. Indeed, within the regulatory apparatus, the
national infrastructure for competitive performance review is already
firmly established in the United States. As described, under the 1993
Government Performance Results Act, every federal agency is today legally
mandated to prepare an annual performance plan with respect to each
program activity in its budget, a plan that must include measurable
performance goals, performance indicators, and a basis for comparing
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actual results with the performance goals." The same is true for countless
state entities receiving federal funds for social welfare programs in a wide
variety of fields, including education, jobs, job training, and nutritional
assistance. Even modern-day CAP agencies around the nation operate
under the Results-Oriented Management and Accountability (ROMA)
system, a mandatory reporting framework that requires such agencies to
terminate or redesign programs that do not verify specific, measurable
permanent changes in client or customer behavior.
For their part, U.S. social movements of the poor are increasingly
relying on the identification of rights-based indicators to monitor policy
performance in a wide range of social welfare fields, including access to
adequate and non-discriminatory health care, housing, and food resources.
While this effort is still in its initial (some might say embryonic) stages,
civil society organizations are increasingly comfortable with the
methodologies of performance review, benchmarking, and auditing, and
with working cooperatively with local policymakers around these targets
as a means of effectively inserting themselves into decisionmaking
processes that affect their lives. Consequently, the argument that either set
of stakeholders would not embrace a MFP policy, structured in the form
suggested here, would not seem to have much of a basis in the actual day-
to-day practices such groups regularly engage in and readily accept. 498
Second, much of the backlash to the early MFP policy can be attributed
to the particular structure that policy was given in the 1960s political
environment and, specifically, to the failure in its design to take account of
the key social trends that characterized that era: the increasing militancy
and rights absolutism of the civil and welfare rights movements and,
correspondingly, the progressive shift in the U.S. regulatory apparatus
toward a more centralized legal-bureaucratic model. As discussed, neither
of these trends was amenable to the decentralized, coordinated,
cooperative, and flexibly responsive policy orientation on which the MFP
model had been conceived by its sponsors. In particular, as implemented,
the early MFP policy was designed to operate principally through federal
creation of a new set of community action agencies. These agencies were to
function not only as the principal mechanism through which the active
participation of the poor in antipoverty efforts was to be assured, but also
as the exclusive mechanism through which federal War on Poverty funds
were to be distributed. By investing such agencies with the dual mandate
497. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
498. An indication of federal regulatory "buy-in" or amenability to such participatory
antipoverty programs may be seen, for example, in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 2009
"listening sessions" organized across the country to solicit comments, suggestions, and ideas
from a broad scope of stakeholders, including food stamp program participants, on what
should be included in a Food and Nutrition Service comprehensive work plan for realizing
President Obama's 2008 campaign pledge to end childhood hunger by 2015. For text of USDA
solicitation, see http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/ech/default.htm (extending invitation to
"stakeholders from many organizations including State Governments, local program offices,
professional organizations, private industry and advocacy groups, as well as program
participants, their families and other interested parties") (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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to at once zealously represent the interests of the poor and to apolitically
arbitrate those of the broader community in policymaking decisions,
without taking account of the necessary conflicts of interest from which all
policy evolves, a clash between two different conceptions of democratic
accountability was set in motion from which the early MFP policy was not
to survive.
By contrast, the MFP policy espoused in this Article would embrace a
fundamentally different structure and implementation strategy, one
designed explicitly for compatibility with the dominant methodologies and
organizational frameworks through which twenty-first century American
society operates in practice. It would not aim in this regard to create new
federally-certified entities to represent the interests of the poor. Rather, its
focus would be on the development and expansion of transparent and
participation-friendly performance-based orchestration systems through which
the poor, using their own independent and diverse organizations, can
autonomously voice their perspectives and pursue their plural interests on
an equal basis with others. In this way, the focus is on affirmatively
enlarging or pluralizing democratic spaces for participatory engagement,
not on artificially limiting to a single forum the vehicle through which
diverse and conflicting interests must be pursued. In sum, a modern MFP
structure would be designed not only to be maximally compatible with and
operationally complementary to the best features of modem new
governance and new accountability regimes, but also to avoid the volatile
clash between differing conceptions of democratic legitimacy that led to the
early MFP policy's rapid political unraveling. It would, in this respect,
avoid precisely the problems that critics of the early MFP have emphasized
as core to their opposition to that policy.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, rights understandings in the U.S.
are changing. Although this shift has been slower than in many other parts
of the world, the primary conception of human rights no longer is one of
strict demand and protest, of confrontation and absolute rules. Rather, it is
one increasingly focused on democratic process, safeguards, interest-
balancing, performance monitoring, negotiation, and expanded
opportunities for participatory engagement. Recognition of this shift,
especially among government policymakers and within professional
academia, is critical. This is so as it allows the policy of MFP to be
conceptually delinked from the dominant social movement tactics and rights
absolutism of the 1960s. Such delinking permits, in turn, a more explicit
appreciation that the motivating tenets of the early MFP policy - like those
of both new governance and new accountability - resonate deeply with
American cultural narrative and longstanding democratic traditions. In
particular, they reflect America's obsessive faith in divided powers and
fragmented authority; a democratic tradition that rejects patronizing
government action and expects every citizen to play an autonomous part in
the determination of his or her own affairs; and a practical insistence that
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public policies be demonstrably rational, justified, and evidence-based.m
The MFP structure endorsed herein draws directly on these same
commitments& Within this context, and together with a renewed U.S.
interest in poverty reduction targets and indicator collection, the
convergence of new governance and new accountability today thus
provides a uniquely fertile environment for recommitting as a nation to
that vital goal of eliminating the "paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty
in this Nation."-" Indeed, as President Johnson affirmed in announcing his
own War on the Sources of Poverty based on maximum feasible
participation, "Today, for the first time in our history, we have the power
to strike away the barriers to full participation in our society. Having the
power, we have the duty."5
2
499. MARRIS & REIN, supra note 63, at 7-9.
500. It is the same distinctively American commitment manifested in President
Roosevelt's practical, experimental approach to New Deal Programs in the 1930s. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 449, at 42 ("There was no simple or consistent theme to Roosevelt's
domestic policies. In the words of Robert Jackson, one of Roosevelt's close advisers, 'The New
Deal was not a reform movement. It was an assembly of movements - sometimes inconsistent
with each other.'. .. Roosevelt was an experimenter, a pragmatist interested in results and
solutions rather than theories and themes. 'Take a method and try it. If it fails admit it frankly
and try another. But above all, try something."').
501. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, 508 (repealed
1981).
502. LBJ Special Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 380. See also id. (affirming "a total
commitment by this President, and this Congress, and this nation, to pursue victory over the
most ancient of [hulmankind's enemies").
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